WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA: Al-Qaeda

Introduction

Al-Qaeda, alternatively spelled al-Qaida and sometimes al-Qa’ida, is an international Sunni Islamist movement founded in 1988. Al-Qaeda have attacked civilian and military targets in various countries, the most notable being the September 11 attacks in 2001. These actions were followed by the US government launching a military and intelligence campaign against al-Qaeda called the War on Terror.

Characteristic techniques include suicide attacks and simultaneous bombings of different targets. Activities ascribed to it may involve members of the organization, who have taken a pledge of loyalty to Osama bin Laden, or the much more numerous “al-Qaeda-linked” individuals who have undergone training in one of its camps in Afghanistan or Sudan but not taken any pledge. Al-Qaeda’s objectives include the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate. Reported beliefs include that a Christian-Jewish alliance is conspiring to destroy Islam, and that the killing of bystanders and civilians is Islamically justified in jihad. Its management philosophy has been described as “centralization of decision and decentralization of execution.” Following 9/11 and the launching of the War on Terrorism, it is thought al-Qaeda’s leadership has “become geographically isolated”, leading to the “emergence of decentralized leadership” of regional groups using the al-Qaeda “brand name.”

Al-Qaeda has been labeled a terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General, the Commission of the European Communities of the European Union, the United States Department of State, the Australian Government, Government of India, Public Safety Canada, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, South Korean Foreign Ministry, the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, the United Kingdom Home Office, Russia, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Government.

Etymology

In Arabic, al-Qaeda has four syllables. However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name the voiceless uvular plosive [q] and the voiced pharyngeal fricative are not phones found in the English language. Al-Qaeda’s name can also be transliterated as al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida, el-Qaida, or al Qaeda. The name of the organization comes from the Arabic noun qâ’idah, which means foundation or basis and can also refer to a military base or database. The initial al-is the Arabic definite article the, hence the base. In Arabic qa’idah bayanat is database where bayanat is data and qa’idah is base.

Osama bin Laden explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview with Al Jazeera journalist Tayseer Alouni in October 2001:

“The name ‘al-Qaeda’ was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia’s terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed. “

Saad Al-Faqih, a Saudi expert on al-Qaeda, has stated that the name al-Qaeda, “...originated from a documentation system in the Bait al-Ansar guesthouse back in the 1980s.” The United Kingdom politician Robin Cook, who served as the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons described Al-Qaeda as meaning “the database” and a product of western miscalculation. Cook wrote, “Al-Qaeda, literally “the database”, was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians.”

History of the name

There is at least one public reference to the name “al-Qaeda” that pre-dates the 2001 trial. The name appears with the spelling “al-Qaeda” in an executive order issued by President Bill Clinton in 1998, less than two weeks after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Executive Order 13099, issued on August 20, 1998, lists the organization as one of several associated with Osama bin Laden, the others being the Islamic Army, Islamic Salvation Foundation, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites.

The name al-Qaeda could have been introduced to the U.S. intelligence community by Jamal al-Fadl, who had been providing the Central Intelligence Agency with intelligence about bin Laden since 1996. The defecting Al-Fadl was debriefed by the CIA’s Bin Laden Station (“Alex Base”). In the 1998 United States embassy bombings, al-Fadl testified that al-Qaeda was established in either late 1989 or early 1990 to continue the jihad after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He said during the war against the Soviets, bin Laden had been funding a group called Maktab al-Khadamat, which was led by Abdallah Azzam. This organization was based in Pakistan and provided training, money and other support for Muslims who would cross the border into Afghanistan to fight.

According to al-Fadl, the Maktab al-Khadamat was disbanded following the Soviet withdrawal, but bin Laden wanted to establish a new group to continue the jihadist cause on other fronts. Al-Fadl testified that al-Qaeda’s leader was initially Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, who was later replaced by Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, but that both of these leaders nevertheless “reported to” bin-Laden. Al-Fadl claims the group initially went by two different names “al-Qaeda” and “Islamic Army”, before eventually settling on the former. A meeting was apparently held in Khost, Afghanistan to establish the new group, which al-Fadl claims to have attended. Al-Fadl’s recollection was that this occurred in either late 1989 or early 1990. Journalist Peter Bergen argues that two documents seized from the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation show that the organization was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group and contain the term “al-qaeda”.

Author Lawrence Wright also quotes this document (an exhibit from the “Tareek Osama” document presented in United States v. Enaam M. Arnaout), in his book The Looming Tower. Notes of a meeting of bin Laden and others on August 20, 1988 indicate “the military base” (“al-qaeda al-askariya”), was a formal group: `basically an organized Islamic faction, its goal is to lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious.` A list of requirements for membership itemized “listening and obedient... good manners” and making a pledge (bayat) to obey superiors. According to Wright, “[t]he name al-Qaeda was not used,” in public pronouncements like the 1998 fatwa to kill Americans and their allies because “its existence was still a closely held secret.” Wright writes that Al-Qaeda was formed at a August 11, 1988 meeting of “with several senior leaders” of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, (Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and others), Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden, where it was agreed to join bin Laden’s money with the expertise of the Islamic Jihad organization and continue jihad elsewhere after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

In April 2002, the group assumed the name Qa’idat al-Jihad, which means “the base of Jihad”. According to Diaa Rashwan, this was “...apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt’s al-Jihad (EIJ) group, led by Ayman El-Zawahiri, with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.”

Jihad in Afghanistan

The origins of the group can be traced to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The United States viewed the conflict in Afghanistan, with the Afghan Marxists and allied Soviet troops on one side and the native Afghan mujahedeen on the other, as a blatant case of Soviet expansionism and aggression. The U.S. channelled funds through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency to the native Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviet occupation in a CIA program called Operation Cyclone.

At the same time, a growing number of foreign Arab mujahedeen (also called Afghan Arabs) joined the jihad against the Afghan Marxist regime, facilitated by international Muslim organizations, particularly the Maktab al-Khidamat, whose funds came from some of the $600 million a year donated to the jihad by the Saudi Arabia government and individual Muslims-particularly wealthy Saudis who were approached by Osama bin Laden. Maktab al-Khidamat was established by Abdullah Azzam and Bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1984. From 1986 it began to set up a network of recruiting offices in the United States, the hub of which was the Al Kifah Refugee Center at the Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Avenue. Among notable figures at the Brooklyn center were “double agent” Ali Mohamed, whom FBI special agent Jack Cloonan called “bin Laden’s first trainer,” and “Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel-Rahman, a leading recruiter of mujahideen for Afghanistan.

The Afghan Mujahedeen of the 1980s have been alleged to be the inspiration for terrorist groups in nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Chechnya, and the former Yugoslavia. According to Russian sources, the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 allegedly used a manual allegedly written by the CIA for the Mujihadeen fighters in Afghanistan on how to make explosives.

Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office), a Muslim organization founded in 1980 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahadeen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was founded by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian Islamic scholar and member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Maktab al-Khadamat organized guest houses in Peshawar, in Pakistan, near the Afghan border, and paramilitary training camps in Afghanistan to prepare international non-Afghan recruits for the Afghan war front. Azzam persuaded Bin Laden to join MAK, to use his own money and use his connections with “the Saudi royal family and the petro-billionaires of the Gulf” to raise more to help the mujahideen. The role played by MAK and foreign Muslim volunteers, or “Afghan Arabs”, in the war was not a major one. While 250,000 Afghan Mujahideen fought the Soviets and the communist Afghan government, it is estimated that were never more than 2000 foreign mujahideen in the field at any one time. Nonetheless, foreign mujahedeen volunteers came from 43 countries and the number that participated in the Afghan movement between 1982 and 1992 is reported to have been 35,000.

The Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. To the surprise of many, Mohammed Najibullah’s communist Afghan government hung on for three more years before being overrun by elements of the mujahedeen. With mujahedeen leaders unable to agree on a structure for governance, chaos ensued, with constantly reorganizing alliances fighting for control of ill-defined territories, leaving the country devastated.

Expanding Operations

Toward the end of the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan, some mujahedeen wanted to expand their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. A number of overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed to further those aspirations.

One of these was the organization that would eventually be called al-Qaeda, formed by Osama bin Laden with an initial meeting held on August 11, 1988. Bin Laden wished to establish nonmilitary operations in other parts of the world; Azzam, in contrast, wanted to remain focused on military campaigns. After Azzam was assassinated in 1989, the MAK split, with a significant number joining bin Laden’s organization.

In November 1989, Ali Mohamed, a former special forces Sergeant stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, left military service and moved to Santa Clara, California. He traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and became “deeply involved with bin Laden’s plans.”. A year later, on November 8, 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of Mohammed’s associate El Sayyid Nosair, discovering a great deal of evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers. Nosair was eventually convicted in connection to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and for the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane on November 5, 1990. In 1991, Ali Mohammed is said to have helped orchestrate Osama bin Laden’s relocation to Sudan.

Gulf War and the Start of U.S. Enmity

Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had put the country of Saudi Arabia and its ruling House of Saud at risk as Saudi’s most valuable oil fields (Hama) were within easy striking distance of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and Saddam’s call to pan-Arab/Islamism could potentially rally internal dissent. In the face of a seemingly massive Iraqi military presence, Saudi Arabia’s own forces were well armed but far outnumbered. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahedeen to King Fahd to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi army. The Saudi monarch refused bin Laden’s offer, opting instead to allow U.S. and allied forces to deploy on Saudi territory.

The deployment angered Bin Laden, as he believed the presence of foreign troops in the “land of the two mosques” (Mecca and Medina) profaned sacred soil. After speaking publicly against the Saudi government for harboring American troops, he was quickly forced into exile to Sudan and on April 9, 1994 his Saudi citizenship was revoked. His family publicly disowned him. There is controversy over whether and to what extent he continued to garner support from members of his family and/or the Saudi government.

Sudan

From approximately 1992 to 1996, al-Qaeda and bin Laden were located in Sudan, coming at the invitation of Islamist theoretician Hassan al Turabi following an Islamist coup d’état, and leaving after being expelled by the Sudanese government. During this time bin Laden assisted the Sudanese government, bought or set up various business enterprises, and established training camps where insurgents trained. But in Sudan bin Laden lost his Saudi passport and source of income in response to his verbal attacks on the Saudi king. A key turning point for bin Laden occurred in 1993 when Saudi Arabia gave support for the Oslo Accords which set a path for peace between Israel and Palestine.

Zawahiri and the EIJ, who served as the core of al-Qaeda but also engaged in separate operations against the Egyptian government, had even worse luck in Sudan. In 1993, a young schoolgirl was killed in an unsuccessful EIJ attempt on the life of the Egyptian Interior Minister, Hasan al-Alfi. Egyptian public opinion turned against Islamist bombings and the police arrested 280 more of al-Jihad’s members and executed six. In 1995 an even more ill-fated attempt to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak led to the expulsion of EIJ and not long after of bin Laden by the Sudanese government.

Refuge in Afghanistan

After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was effectively ungoverned for seven years and plagued by constant infighting between former allies and various mujahedeen groups.

Throughout the 1990s, a new force began to emerge. The origins of the Taliban (literally “students”) lay in the children of Afghanistan, many of them orphaned by the war, and many of whom had been educated in the rapidly expanding network of Islamic schools (madrassas) either in Kandahar or in the refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

According to Ahmed Rashid, five leaders of the Taliban were graduates of a single madrassa, Darul Uloom Haqqania (also known as “the University of Jihad”,) in the small town of Akora Khattak near Peshawar, situated in Pakistan but largely attended by Afghan refugees. This institution reflected Salafi beliefs in its teachings, and much of its funding came from private donations from wealthy Arabs, for whom bin Laden provided conduit. A further four leading figures (including the perceived Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahed) attended a similarly funded and influenced madrassa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Many of the mujahedeen who later joined the Taliban fought alongside Afghan warlord Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi’s Harkat i Inqilabi group at the time of the Russian invasion. This group also enjoyed the loyalty of most Afghan Arab fighters.

The continuing internecine strife between various factions, and accompanying lawlessness following the Soviet withdrawal, enabled the growing and well-disciplined Taliban to expand their control over territory in Afghanistan, and they came to establish an enclave which it called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In 1994, they captured the regional center of Kandahar, and after making rapid territorial gains thereafter, conquered the capital city Kabul in September 1996.

After Sudan made it clear that bin Laden and his group were no longer welcome that year, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan—with previously established connections between the groups, a similar outlook on world affairs and largely isolated from American political influence and military power—provided a perfect location for al-Qaeda to establish its headquarters. Al-Qaeda enjoyed the Taliban’s protection and a measure of legitimacy as part of their Ministry of Defense, although only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border regions are alleged to have trained militant Muslims from around the world. Despite the perception of some people, al-Qaeda members are ethnically diverse and connected by their radical version of Islam.

An ever-expanding network of supporters thus enjoyed a safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan until the Taliban were defeated by a combination of local forces and United States air power in 2001 (see section September 11, attacks and the United States response). Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders are still believed to be located in areas where the population is sympathetic to the Taliban in Afghanistan or the border Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Fatwas

In 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they felt were Islamic lands. Bin Laden issued a fatwa, which amounted to a public declaration of war against the United States and any of its allies, and began to focus al-Qaeda’s resources towards attacking the United States and its interests. Also occurring on June 25, 1996 was the bombing of the Khobar towers, located in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with three other Islamist leaders, co-signed and issued a fatwa (binding religious edict) under the banner of the World Islamic Front for Combat Against the Jews and Crusaders (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyya al-’Alamiyya li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) declaring:

[T]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Makka) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, ‘and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,’ and ‘fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah’.

Neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri possessed the traditional Islamic scholarly qualifications to issue a fatwa of any kind; however, they rejected the authority of the contemporary ulema (seen as the paid servants of jahiliyya rulers) and took it upon themselves. Assassinated former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko alleged that the Russian FSB trained al-Zawahiri in a camp in Dagestan eight months before the 1998 fatwa.

Organization structure

Though the current structure of al-Qaeda is unknown, information mostly acquired from Jamal al-Fadl provided American authorities with a rough picture of how the group was organized. While the veracity of the information provided by al-Fadl and the motivation for his cooperation are both disputed, American authorities base much of their current knowledge of al-Qaeda on his testimony.

Osama bin Laden is the emir and Senior Operations Chief of al-Qaeda (although originally this role may have been filled by Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi), advised by a Shura Council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members, estimated by Western officials at about twenty to thirty people. Ayman al-Zawahiri is al-Qaeda’s Deputy Operations Chief and Abu Ayyub al-Masri is possibly the senior leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The Military Committee is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
The Money/Business Committee runs business operations, provides air tickets and false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses. In the 9/11 Commission Report, it is estimated that al-Qaeda requires $30,000,000 USD per year to conduct its operations.
The Law Committee reviews Islamic law and decides if particular courses of action conform to the law.
The Islamic Study/Fatwah Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
In the late 1990s there was a publicly known Media Committee, which ran the now-defunct newspaper Nashrat al Akhbar (Newscast) and handled public relations.
In 2005, al Qaeda formed As-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.

The number of individuals belonging to the organization is also unknown. According to the controversial BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares, al-Qaeda is so weakly linked together that it is hard to say it exists apart from Osama bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges is cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that meets the description of al-Qaeda exists at all. Therefore the extent and nature of al-Qaeda remains a topic of dispute.

Its rank and file has been described as changing from being “predominantly Arab,” in its first years of operation, to “largely Pakistani,” as of 2007. It has been estimated that 62% of al-Qaeda members have university education.

Organization v. Concept

When asked about the possibility of Al Qaeda’s connection to the 7 July 2005 London bombings in 2005, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair said:

“Al Qaeda is not an organization. Al Qaeda is a way of working... but this has the hallmark of that approach.... Al Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training... to provide expertise... and I think that is what has occurred here.”

What exactly al-Qaeda is, or was, remains in dispute. In the BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares, writer and journalist Adam Curtis contends that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contends the name “al-Qaeda” was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of Osama bin Laden and the four men accused of the 1998 United States embassy bombings in East Africa. As a matter of law, the U.S. Department of Justice needed to show that Osama bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him in absentia under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, also known as the RICO statutes. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, who claimed to be a founding member of the organization and a former employee of Osama bin Laden. To quote the documentary directly:

The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term “al-Qaeda” to refer to the name of a group until after September the 11th, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.

Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl’s testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty and because he was delivering it as part of a plea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack U.S. military establishments. Sam Schmidt, a defense lawyer from the trial, had the following to say about al-Fadl’s testimony:

There were selective portions of al-Fadl’s testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.

Ideology

The radical Islamist movement in general and al-Qaeda in particular developed during the Islamic revival and Islamist movement of the last three decades of the 20th century along with less extreme movements.

Some have argued that “without the writings” of Islamic author and thinker Sayyid Qutb “al-Qaeda would not have existed.” Qutb preached that because of the lack of sharia law the Muslim world was no longer Muslim, having reverted to pre-Islamic ignorance known as jahiliyyah. To restore Islam, a vanguard movement of righteous Muslims was needed to implement Sharia and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences, such as concepts like socialism or nationalism. Enemies of Islam included “treacherous Orientalists” and “world Jewry”, who plotted “conspiracies” and “wicked[ly]” opposed Islam.

In the words of Mohammed Jamal Khalia, a close college friend of Osama bin Laden: Islam is different from any other religion; it’s a way of life. We [Khalia and bin Laden] were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.

Qutb had an even greater influence on Osama bin Laden’s mentor and another leading member of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri’s uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb’s student, then protégé, then personal lawyer and finally executor of his estate-one of the last people to see Qutb before his execution.

“Young Ayman al-Zawahiri heard again and again from his beloved uncle Mahfouz about the purity of Qutb’s character and the torment he had endured in prison.” Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work Knights under the Prophet’s Banner.

One of the most powerful effects of Qutb’s ideas was the idea that many who said they were Muslims were not, i.e. they were apostates, which not only gave jihadists “a legal loophole around the prohibition of killing another Muslim,” but made “it a religious obligation to execute” the self-professed Muslim. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslims countries since they failed to enforce sharia law.

Attacks

1992

On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda’s first terrorist attack took place as two bombs were detonated in Aden, Yemen. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel. The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort, Operation Restore Hope. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the United States the attack was barely noticed. No Americans were killed because the soldiers were staying in a different hotel altogether, and they went on to Somalia as scheduled. However little noticed, the attack was pivotal as it was the beginning of al-Qaeda’s change in direction, from fighting armies to killing civilians. Two people were killed in the bombing, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker. Seven others, mostly Yemenis, were severely injured.

Two fatwa are said to have been appointed by the most theologically knowledgeable of al-Qaeda’s members, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, aka Abu Hajer al Iraqi, to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim referred to the thirteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, much admired by Wahhabis. In a famous fatwa, Ibn Tamiyyah had ruled that Muslims should kill the invading Mongols, and so too Salim said al-Qaeda should kill American soldiers. The second fatwa followed another of Ibn Tamiyyah’s, that Muslims should not only kill Mongols but anyone who aided the Mongols, who bought goods from them or sold to them. In addition the killing of someone merely standing near a Mongol was justified as well. He ruled these killings just because any innocent bystander, like the Yemenite hotel worker, would find their proper reward in death, going to Paradise if they were good Muslims and to hell if they were bad. This became al-Qaeda’s justification for killing civilians.

1993 World Trade Center bombing

In 1993, Ramzi Yousef used a truck bomb to attack the World Trade Center in New York City. The attack was intended to break the foundation of Tower One knocking it into Tower Two, bringing the entire complex down. Yousef hoped this would kill 250,000 people. The towers shook and swayed but the foundation held and he succeeded in killing only six people (although he injured 1,042 others and caused nearly $300 million in property damage).

After the attack, Yousef fled to Pakistan and later moved to Manila. There he began developing the Bojinka Plot plans to blow up a dozen American airliners simultaneously, to assassinate Pope John Paul II and President Bill Clinton, and to crash a private plane into CIA headquarters. He was later captured in Pakistan.

None of the U.S. government’s indictments against Osama bin Laden have suggested that he had any connection with this bombing, but Ramzi Yousef is known to have attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. After his capture, Yousef declared that his primary justification for the attack was to punish the United States for its support for the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and made no mention of any religious motivations.

Late 1990s

On November 13, 1995, a van containing a hundred pounds of Semtex explosive blew up near the communications center for the Saudi National Guard in downtown Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where some American military contractors and Army officers had been training the Saudi National Guard. Seven people were killed, and sixty people were injured. The Saudi government arrested four men, “torturing confessions” out of them that they had been inspired by bin Laden’s speeches and trained at al-Qaeda’s camp in Afghanistan, and quickly executed them. It is unclear if they had anything to do with the crime. As with many bombings suspected to be the work of al-Qaeda, bin Laden praised the attacks but denied authorizing the attack or training the bombers.

The U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, resulting in upward of 300 deaths, mostly locals. A barrage of cruise missiles launched by the U.S. military in response devastated an al-Qaeda base in Khost, Afghanistan, but the network’s capacity was unharmed.

Bin Laden then turned his sights towards the United States Navy. In October 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemen bombed the missile destroyer U.S.S. Cole in a suicide attack, killing 17 U.S. servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda’s command core began to prepare for an attack on the United States itself.

September 11 Attacks

The September 11 attacks were the most devastating terrorist acts in American and world history, killing approximately 3,000 people. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the World Trade Center towers, a third into The Pentagon, a fourth, originally intended to target the United States Capitol crashed in Pennsylvania.

The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the 1998 fatwa issued against the United States and its allies by military forces under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others. Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commander Mohamed Atta as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Hambali as the key planners and part of the political and military command. Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001 praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement.

Bin Laden legitimized the attacks by identifying grievances felt by both mainstream and Islamist Muslims, such as the general perception that the United States was actively oppressing Muslims. Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in ‘Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq’ and that Muslims should retain the ‘right to attack in reprisal’. He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at women and children, but ‘America’s icons of military and economic power’.

Evidence has since come to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the east coast of the U.S. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack “might get out of hand”.

War on Terrorism

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the United States government decided to respond militarily, and began to prepare its armed forces to overthrow the Taliban regime it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. Before the United States attacked, it offered Taliban leader Mullah Omar a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The Taliban offered to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the United States would provide evidence of bin Laden’s complicity in the attacks. U.S. President George W. Bush responded by saying: “We know he’s guilty. Turn him over”, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned the Taliban regime: “Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power”. Soon thereafter the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the Afghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban government in the war in Afghanistan.

As a result of the United States using its special forces and providing air support for the Northern Alliance ground forces, both Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged Gardez region of the nation. Again, under the cover of intense aerial bombardment, U.S. infantry and local Afghan forces attacked, shattering the al-Qaeda position and killing or capturing many of the militants. By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared an initial success. Nevertheless, a significant Taliban insurgency remains in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda’s top two leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, evaded capture.

Debate raged about the exact nature of al-Qaeda’s role in the 9/11 attacks, and after the U.S. invasion began, the U.S. State Department also released a videotape showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power. Although its authenticity has been questioned by some, the tape appears to implicate bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks and was aired on many television channels all over the world, with an accompanying English translation provided by the United States Defense Department. In September 2004, the U.S. government commission investigating the September 11 attacks officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives.

In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a videotape released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon: “As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children.” By the end of 2004, the U.S. government claimed that two-thirds of the top leaders of al-Qaeda from 2001 were in custody (including Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Saif al Islam el Masry, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) or dead (including Mohammed Atef). Despite the capture or death of many senior al-Qaeda operatives, the U.S. government continues to warn that the organization is not yet defeated, and battles between U.S. forces and al-Qaeda-related groups continue. In the meantime, autonomous regional branches of al-Qaeda continue to emerge around the world.

Regional activities
Africa

Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa, as well as supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia. From 1991 to 1996, Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders were based in the Sudan.

Asia

Al-Qaeda involvement in Asia has largely been centered on Afghanistan and northwest sections of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda also has affiliate groups, including Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and has carried out a number of attacks in Indonesia. For a period of time in the mid-1990s, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef resided in Manila in the Philippines, and were plotting attacks including Oplan Bojinka.

Europe

European activities of Al Qaeda have included involvement in the wars in Bosnia, as well as attacks carried out in Istanbul, London, and Madrid.

Middle East

In the Middle East, Al-Qaeda has been involved in a number of attacks inside Saudi Arabia, occurring as early as 1995. Al Qaeda or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s former organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, have carried out various attacks inside Egypt. In Iraq, elements at first loosely associated with al-Qaeda, in the Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad organization commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have played a key role in the War in Iraq.

Internet activities

In the wake of its evacuation from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. As a result, the organization’s use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, encompassing financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, as well as information dissemination, gathering, and sharing.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri’s al-Qaeda movement in Iraq regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the Mujahideen Shura Council, has a regular presence on the Web where pronouncements are given by Murasel. This growing range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and epic-themed videos with high production values that romanticize participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda, for example, posted a video of captured American entrepreneur Nick Berg being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of Paul Johnson, Kim Sun-il, and Daniel Pearl, were first posted on jihadist websites. With the rise of “locally rooted, globally inspired” terrorists, counter-terrorism experts are currently studying how al-Qaeda is using the Internet– through websites, chat rooms, discussion forums, instant messaging, and so on – to inspire a worldwide network of support.

The bombers responsible for the 7 July 2005 London bombings, some of whom were well integrated into their local communities, are an example of such “globally inspired” terrorists, and they reportedly used the Internet to plan and coordinate. A group called the “Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe” claimed responsibility for the London bombings on the Al-Qalah website, which was subsequently shut down. The publicity opportunities offered by the Internet have been particularly exploited by al-Qaeda. In December 2004, for example, bin Laden released an audio message by posting it directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to al Jazeera as he had done in the past. Al Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain it would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editors editing the videos and cutting out anything critical of the Saudi royal family. Bin Laden’s December 2004 message was much more vehement than usual in this speech, lasting over an hour.

In the past, Alneda.com and Jehad.net were perhaps the most significant al-Qaeda websites. Alneda was initially taken down by American Jon Messner, but the operators resisted by shifting the site to various servers and strategically shifting content. The U.S. is currently attempting to extradite an information technology specialist, Babar Ahmad, from the UK, who is the creator of various English-language al-Qaeda websites such as Azzam.com. Ahmad’s extradition is opposed by various British Muslim organizations, such as the Muslim Association of Britain.

Alleged CIA involvement

Whether or not the al-Qaeda attacks were “ blowback” from the American CIA’s “Operation Cyclone” program to help the Afghan mujahideen is a matter of some debate. Robin Cook, former British Foreign Secretary from 1997-2001, has written that al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were “a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies,” and that the mujahideen that formed al-Qaeda were “originally... recruited and trained with help from the CIA”.

A variety of sources — CNN journalist Peter Bergen, Pakistani ISI Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, and CIA operatives involved in the Afghan program, such as Vincent Cannistraro and Milton Bearden — deny that the CIA or other American officials had contact with the Afghan Arabs (foreign mujahideen) or Bin Laden, let alone armed, trained, coached or indoctrinated them. Bergen and others argue that there was no need to recruit foreigners unfamiliar with the local language, customs or lay of the land since there were a quarter of a million local Afghans willing to fight; that Arab Afghans themselves had no need for American funds since they received several hundred million dollars a year from non-American, Muslim sources; that Americans could not have trained mujahideen because Pakistani officials would not allow more than a handful of them to operate in Pakistan and none in Afghanistan; and that the Afghan Arabs were almost invariably militant Islamists reflexively hostile to Westerners whether or not the Westerners were helping the Muslim Afghans.

According to Peter Bergen, known for conducting the first television interview with Osama bin Laden in 1997, the idea that “the CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden... a folk myth. There’s no evidence of this.... Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretly and independently.... The real story here is the CIA didn’t really have a clue about who this guy was until 1996 when they set up a unit to really start tracking him.” But as Bergen himself admitted, in one “strange incident” the CIA did appear to give visa help to mujahideen-recruiter Omar Abdel-Rahman.

Criticism

According to a number of sources there has been a “rising tide of anger in the Islamic world toward Al Qaeda and its affiliates” by “religious scholars, former fighters, and militants... alarmed” by Al Qaeda’s takfir and killing of Muslims in Muslim countries, especially Iraq. Noman Benotman, a former Afghan Arab and militant of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, went public with an open letter of criticism to Ayman al-Zawahiri in November 2007 after persuading imprisoned senior leadership of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with Al Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months later after “they were said to have renounced violence.”

In 2007, around the sixth anniversary of September 11, Sheikh Salman al-Ouda, a Saudi religious scholar and one of the fathers of the Sahwa, the fundamentalist awakening movement that swept through Saudi Arabia in the ’80s, delivering a personal rebuke to Osama bin Laden. Al Ouda addressed Al Qaeda’s leader on MBC, a widely watched Middle East TV network, asking him

My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed... in the name of Al Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions [of victims] on your back? In 2007, the imprisoned Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, an influential Afghan Arab, “ideological godfather of Al Qaeda”, and former supporter of takfir, sensationally withdrew his support from al Qaeda with a book Wathiqat Tarshid Al-’Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-’Alam (“Document of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World”).

Usama Hassan, an Imam in London and former supporter of Al Qaeda who traveled to Afghanistan to train as jihadi was alienated by the July 2005 bombings in London and now preaches against bin Laden and helped launch the Quilliam Foundation.

According to Pew polls, support for Al Qaeda has been dropping around the Muslim world in recent years. The numbers supporting suicide bombings in Indonesia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh, for instance, have dropped by half or more in the last five years. In Saudi Arabia, only 10 percent now have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, according to a December poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based think tank.

Al-Qaeda in Kashmir

Violence in Kashmir has existed in various forms, mainly in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian side of the disputed territory. Kashmir has been the target of a campaign of militancy by all sides in the conflict. Thousands of lives have been lost since 1989 due to the intensified insurgency. Casualties include civilians, Indian security forces, and Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri militants.

The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accused by India of supporting and training mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Militancy and military

Though there had been instances of sporadic conflict in many regions for many years, intensified attacks occurred in the late 1980s, when Mujahideen fighters from Afghanistan slowly infiltrated the region, with Pakistan's help, following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989. Since then, violence has increased significantly in strength. Many separatists have carried out attacks on local Hindus, Indian civilians and Indian army installations in response to what they see as Indian army occupation.

India frequently asserts that most of the separatist militant groups are based in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (also known as Azad Kashmir). Some like the All Parties Hurriyat Conference and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, openly demand an independent Kashmir. Other militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed favour a Pakistani-Kashmir. These groups have contacts with Taliban and Bin Laden. Both the organisations no longer operate under these names after they were banned by the Indian and Pakistani government, and by other countries including the US and UK. Of the larger militant groups, the Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant organisation based in Indian administered Kashmir, unlike other groups, has only kept its name. Despite casualties, the militants are still believed to number thousands rather than hundreds. Several new separatist organisations have also emerged. According to US Intelligence, Al-Qaeda also has a main base in Pakistani Kashmir and is helping to foment terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

It is hard to determine the total number of casualties. According to a report by the Government of India in the year 2000, 31,000 Indian civilians had lost their lives due to the insurgency. Human rights groups and local NGOs put the total figure at more than 84,000 (2005 figure). Militancy had reached its peak in 1994 when the region saw more than 6,043 incidents and has since declined. However, Kashmir continues to remain as the most volatile region in the world with an average of 2,500 incidents every year. According to an Indian estimate in 2005 there were about 2,000 militants in the Kashmir valley alone; 1,200 of them belong to the Hizbul Mujahideen. Not all Kashmiri separatists and militant organizations share the same ideology. Some fight in the name of religion, some are openly pro-Pakistan and some favour an independent Kashmir.

Due to the presence of these numerous anti-India insurgent groups India has been compelled to deploy massive number of troops in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir for the task of counter insurgency. New Delhi has never made an official count, but military analysts estimate that anywhere from 30,000 to nearly 33,000 security personnel are most likely involved, supported by thousands of Indian paramilitary groups such as the Rashtriya rifles, and the Romeo Force(all a part of Indian army). Stimson.org notes of the Indian Armed forces in Kashmir that:

Some reports estimate that India deploys approximately 400,000 combined army and paramilitary forces in Kashmir, most of which are stationed in the interior, 80,000 of which are deployed along the LoC. Pakistani forces deployed along the LoC are reported to number in the 40,000-50,000 range

Times Online reports that around 250,000 Indian troops are stationed in Kashmir, while Pravda.RU, a widely read Russian News source notes that 350,000-600,000 troops may be deployed in Kashmir.

Militant groups

Over the last two years, a militant group, Lashkar-e-Toiba has split into two factions: Al Mansurin and Al Nasirin. Another new group reported to have emerged is the Save Kashmir Movement. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly known as Harkat-ul-Ansar) and Lashkar-e-Toiba are believed to be operating from Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir and Muridke, Pakistan respectively. Other less well known groups are the Freedom Force and Farzandan-e-Milat. A smaller group, Al-Badr, has been active in Kashmir for many years and is still believed to be functioning. All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an organisation that uses moderate means to press for the rights of the Kashmiris, is often considered as the mediator between New Delhi and insurgent groups.

Not much is known about collaboration between the various groups, but most say they are members of an alliance known as the United Jihad Council (UJC). The two groups which India says were behind the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi - known then as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba are believed to be members of the UJC. India says that it was Jaish-e-Mohammed that attacked the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly in Srinagar in October 2001. It is also known that the Jaish-e-Mohammed was responsible for the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 to Kandahar, which forced the Government of India to release Maulana Masood Azhar, the chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed. Recruits from various parts of the world have been sent to Pakistan-administered Kashmir for training and advice.

India and Pakistan

A 1994 report by Human Rights Watch group lends support to both Indian and Pakistani charges. In support of Indian claims, it states that " There is compelling evidence that elements of the Pakistani government have sponsored a significant flow of arms to Kashmiri militants [from arms bazaars in the North West Frontier Province], as well as an extensive training program.

While in support of Pakistani claims, its states that "the human rights record of the Indian government in Punjab and Kashmir is appalling. Abuses in Kashmir are clearly on the rise." The US government has also supported the claim that anti-India terror groups exist in India. India claims that there are also other Afghan, Egyptian, Yemeni and Bangladeshi terrorists active in Jammu and Kashmir. The Council on Foreign Relations states that Pakistan's military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) both include personnel who sympathize with-or even assist-Islamist militants adding that "ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, among other outfits." In a recent infiltration bid, a Pakistan Army officer was shot dead, with India citing that this was clear and conclusive evidence of Pakistani involvement in the insurgency. The UN Security Council has also confirmed the existence of terrorist groups based in [Pakistani] Kashmir and urged Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups which had been operating in Kashmir and killing innocent people.

According to the Indian news site Rediff.com, British Government had stated in 2002 that there is a 'clear link' between Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and three major militant groups An article in The Guardian had uncovered evidence that Pakistani militants were openly raising funds and training new recruits and that the ISI's Kashmir Cell was instrumental in funding and controlling the militant outfits. Richard Bennett, a British military and intelligence analyst states that the ISI has armed and trained generations of Islamist extremists and has directed many of their attacks both within the Kashmir and in India's major cities. Indian sources also allege that there are between 2,600 to 3,000 militants receiving training in camps across Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. During a peace summit between former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian former-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in January 2004, Islamabad assured India that it would do everything possible to curb the activities any training camps on its territory. However, violence has continued in Kashmir despite a 3 year long peace process between India and Pakistan. There were as many as 166 incidents in June 2005 alone in which some 201 people have died.

According to Indian sources there are about 37 training camps in Pakistan, 49 in Azad Kashmir and 22 in Afghanistan. The FBI also has produced images of camps operating in Pakistan. India claims that every year thousands of armed insurgents infiltrate into Indian-administered Kashmir and carry out attacks against Indian Security Forces and Kashmiri civilians. In June 2005, the Indian Army had foiled at least 72 infiltration attempts along the Line of Control in Kashmir. India alleges that despite the commitments made by Pervez Musharraf, Islamabad has done little to stop the training camps on its soil. According to India, most of the militants in Kashmir come from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yemen and Bangladesh. Not all Kashmiri separatists and militant organizations share the same ideology. Some fight in the name of religion, some are pro-Pakistan and some favour an independent Kashmir. While the vast majority of militants are Muslims, one report indicated a minority of fighter (40 to 50) are Hindu militants who have either taken up arms or provided safe cover for militants.

Human rights violations

Human Rights Violations by India

A 1996 Human Rights Watch report accuses the Indian military and Indian-government backed paramilitaries of "committ[ing] serious and widespread human rights violations in Kashmir." One such alleged massacre occurred on January 6, 1993 in the town of Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident as such: "In retaliation for the killing of one soldier, paramilitary forces rampaged through Sopore's market setting buildings ablaze and shooting bystanders. The Indian government pronounced the event 'unfortunate' and claimed that an ammunition dump had been hit by gunfire, setting off fires that killed most of the victims." In addition to this, there have been claims of disappearances by the police or the army in Kashmir by several human rights organizations.

Human Rights Violations by Militants

Islamic militants are accused of violence against the Kashmir populace. Thousands of civilian Kashmiri Hindus have been killed in Kashmir over the past 10 years by Islamic militants organisations or Muslim mobs. Human rights organisations put the figure of the number killed since the late 80's at 11,000. Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits have emigrated as a result of the violence. Estimates of the displaced varies from 170,000 to 700,000. Thousands of Pandits have to move to Jammu because of terrorism.

Militant Acts

1989 kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed daughter of the then Home Minister of India Mufti Sayeed.
1995 kidnapping of western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir six foreign trekkers from Anantnag district were kidnapped by Al Faran, One was beheaded later, one escaped and other four remain untraced presumable killed.
Wandhama Massacre - In January 1998, 24 Kashmiri Pandits living in the village of Wandhama were massacred by Pakistani militants. According to the testimony of one of the survivors, the militants dressed themselves as officers of the Indian Army, entered their houses and then started firing blindly. The incident was significant because it coincided with former US president Bill Clinton's visit to India and New Delhi used the massacre to present a case against the alleged Pakistan-supported terrorism in Kashmir.
Sangrampora Killings - On March 22, 1997, 7 Kashmiri Pandits were killed in Sangrampora village in the Budgam district.
2001 terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly On October 1, 2001, a bombing at the Legislative Assembly in Srinagar killed 38.
Qasim Nagar Attack - On July 13, 2003, armed militants believed to be a part of the Lashkar-e-Toiba threw hand grenades at the Qasim Nagar market in Srinagar and then fired on civilians standing nearby killing twenty-seven and injuring many more.
Assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone - Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party Hurriyat Conference leader, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen during a memorial rally in Srinagar. The assassination resulted in wide-scale demonstrations against the Indian forces for failing to provide enough security cover for Mr. Lone.
July 20, 2005 Srinagar Bombing - A car bomb exploded near an armoured Indian Army vehicle in the famous Church Lane area in Srinagar killing 4 Indian Army personnel, one civilian and the suicide bomber. Militant group Hizbul Mujahideen, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Budshah Chowk attack - A militant attack on July 29, 2005 at Srinigar's city centre, Budshah Chowk, killed 2 and left more than 17 people injured. Most of those injured were media journalists.
Murder of Ghulam Nabi Lone - On October 18, 2005 suspected Kashmiri militants killed Jammu and Kashmir's then education minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. Militant group called Al Mansurin claimed responsibility for the attack.
On May 3, 2006 militants massacred 35 Hindus in Doda and Udhampur districts in Jammu and Kashmir.
On June 12, 2006 one person was killed and 31 were wounded when terrorists hurled three grenades on Vaishnodevi shrine-bound buses at the general bus stand here this morning.
On July 7, 2006, over 190 people were killed and over 700 injured from bombs planted on 7 commuter trains in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists.

Indian Statistics

The following statistics were compiled by Indian Army:
Number of Kashmiri militant camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir: 49
Total number of Kashmir militant camps in Pakistan: 37
Number of Kashmiri militant camps in Afghanistan: 22 (During Taliban rule)
Number of militants* operating in Jammu and Kashmir: 3200 (1996 estimate)
Number of Kashmiri Militants in Indian jails: 125
Number of Indian civilians killed by Kashmiri Militants* since 1988: over 29,000
Number of explosions carried out by the Militants* in India: 4,730
Total number of Kashmiri Pandits displaced from the state: over 750,000
Amount of explosives recovered from Kashmiri Militants* in India: 60 tons or 30,000 kg (estimate)
Major Kashmiri Militant training camps:

Location of major Militant* camps
Muridke (near Lahore) Punjab, Pakistan
Kotli Pakistan-administered Kashmir
Muzaffarabad Pakistan-administered Kashmir
Skardu Northern Areas, Pakistan
Gultari Northern Areas, Pakistan
Tarkuti Northern Areas, Pakistan
Batrasi North West Frontier Province, Pakistan
Sufaida North West Frontier Province, Pakistan
Tanda Allabyar Sindh, Pakistan

Note: Pakistan denies the existence of such training camps on their territory, and the existence of such camps is a matter of controversy.

Recent Developments

Violent activities in the region declined in 2004. There are two main reasons for this: warming of relations between New Delhi and Pakistan which consequently lead to a ceasefire between the two countries in 2003 and the fencing of the LOC being carried out by the Indian Army. Moreover, coming under intense international pressure, Islamabad was compelled to take actions against the militants' training camps on its territory. In 2004, the two countries also agreed upon decreasing the number of troops present in the region.

Under pressure, Kashmiri militant organisations have made an offer for talks and negotiations with New Delhi, which was accepted by India. India's Border Security Force blamed the Pakistani military for providing cover-fire for the militants whenever they infiltrated into Indian territory from Pakistan. However, ever since the ceasefire has come into action, the militants have received no back-up from Pakistani Military, which has contributed significantly to the decline in cross-border terrorism in the state. Even the recently elected Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari admitted that the militants operating in Kashmir were indeed terrorists"

The insurgents who initially started their movement as a pro-Kashmiri independence movement, have gone through a lot of change in their ideology. Most of the insurgents portray their struggle as a religious one. Indian analysts allege that by supporting these insurgents, Pakistan is trying to wage a proxy war against India while Pakistan claims that it regards most of these insurgent groups as "freedom fighters" rather than militants. Internationally known to be the most deadly theatre of conflict, nearly 10 million people, including Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists have been fighting a daily battle for survival.

Militancy and Military

Due to the presence of these numerous anti-India insurgent groups India has been compelled to deploy massive number of troops in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir for the task of counter insurgency. New Delhi has never made an official count, but military analysts estimate that anywhere from 30,000 to nearly 33,000 security personnel are most likely involved, supported by thousands of Indian paramilitary groups such as the Rashtriya rifles, and the Romeo Force (all a part of Indian army). Stimson.org notes of the Indian Armed forces in Kashmir that:

Times Online reports that around 250,000 Indian troops are stationed in Kashmir, while Pravda.RU, a widely read Russian News source notes that 350,000-600,000 troops may be deployed in Kashmir.

Militant Groups

India and Pakistan

A 1994 report by Human Rights Watch group lends support to both Indian and Pakistani charges. In support of Indian claims, it states that "There is compelling evidence that elements of the Pakistani government have sponsored a significant flow of arms to Kashmiri militants [from arms bazaars in the North West Frontier Province], as well as an extensive training program.

Pakistan describes the separatists as "freedom fighters" and says that it supports their effort for the cause of the Kashmiris only morally and diplomatically. Pakistan however admits that there has been 'cross border infiltration of militants' across the line of controls LOC. In 2002, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf tried to clamp down on the militants operating from Pakistan. India, however, claims that Islamabad supports these groups financially and militarily. Sources have maintained that Pakistan's intelligence organisation, Inter Services Intelligence, is the main supplier of funds and arms to these groups; a claim that Islamabad has dismissed. According to the Indian news site Rediff.com, British Government had stated in 2002 that there is a 'clear link' between Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and three major militant groups. An article in The Guardian had uncovered evidence that Pakistani militants were openly raising funds and training new recruits and that the ISI's Kashmir Cell was instrumental in funding and controlling the militant outfits. Richard Bennett, a British military and intelligence analyst states that the ISI has armed and trained generations of Islamist extremists and has directed many of their attacks both within the Kashmir and in India's major cities.

Indian sources also allege that there are between 2,600 to 3,000 militants receiving training in camps across Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. During a peace summit between former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian former-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in January 2004, Islamabad assured India that it would do everything possible to curb the activities any training camps on its territory. However, violence has continued in Kashmir despite a 3 year long peace process between India and Pakistan. There were as many as 166 incidents in June 2005 alone in which some 201 people have died.

Present Situation in Kashmir

After the september 11 attack on the United States, life on the street of Srinagar, the summer capital, which had been limping back to normalcy, once again saw a change. Though the situation seems normal in the daytime, the nighttime hours are tense and abnormal. Those living near the Line of Control (LOC) have shifted to safer places. Villages dotting the LOC have been mined, and the presence of security troops has increased manifold. The fear of war between India and Pakistan, despite the recent de-escalation of tension, continues to keep the countries' respective armies and weapons face-to-face on the 1,100-kilometer disputed LOC and the international border. In this situation, mothers continue to wait for family members that do not return in time. The warrens and walkways of Srinagar and its surroundings remain scorched and stationary. People still prefer to not celebrate night marriages.

The daytime veneer of normalcy seems increasingly dangerous as the underlying hatred continues to brew. It is just a matter of time before the volcano of enmity erupts on the streets if the government's policy to win Kashmiris does not surface, or if meaningful dialogue between Pakistan and Indian leadership fails to take off.

Present Actors in the Conflict

The twelve-year-old armed struggle that laid the foundation in Kashmir under the slogan "Independent Kashmir" has melted into Islamic jihad, spearheaded by radical leaders bent on installing the rule of Allah. But after September 11, the Kashmiri Muslim militants, as well as separatist leaders and their sympathizers, are rethinking the role of foreign Islamic militants in Kashmir. Is the presence of foreign militants going to help or hurt the freedom struggle? This question is being debated on the streets of Srinagar, and public opinion is divided. The new generation is in favor of foreign elements, while saner elements say their role is over. This was recently witnessed on the death anniversary of Molvi Farooq, on May 21, 2002, where Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone was shot dead. A four-hour procession and speeches were punctuated by pro-Jihad and pro-foreign militant slogans despite the Hurriyat leadership's discouraging of such actions. The seventy-one-year-old Lone, who earlier had said the role of foreign militants was over, paid the price for his words, creating renewed fear amid the moderate leadership. Indian officials presently believe that some one thousand-plus Muslim mercenaries, mostly Pakistani- and Pashtun-speaking Afghans, are leading the campaign and have given a new thrust to the decade-old separatist campaign that shows no signs of ending.

Guerrillas, who are expert in mountain warfare and can live for months in stocked caves, claim they have a following of thousands pitted against a huge reservoir of Indian army, paramilitary and Kashmir police. Carrying ample arms and ammunition, the first thing guerrillas do is to construct a camouflaged bunker in the mountains; sometimes they even buy temporary truce with the security troops. The main fear that foreign militants may have links with the Taliban of Afghanistan is proving to be truer as there has been an increase of attacks on security positions after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The post-Afghanistan repercussion has seen fissures among the groups of militants in Kashmir, and internecine clashes were reported between local and foreign militants. The second actors are local Muslim militants who number about three thousand, according to Mr. A.K. Suri, police chief of Jammu and Kashmir. Most of these militants are also pro-Pakistan but are somehow people-friendly. For example, the Hizbe-ul Mujahideen militant outfit is divided. One is preaching hard-line Islam and is directly under the control of Pakistan, while the second-led by Majid Dar, who is camping in Kashmir and is considered a moderate-may play an important role in the future. Dar does not want foreign militants to control the Kashmir movement. This group is also flexible and does not believe in Islamic rule in Kashmir despite its slogan that Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan, but they are ready to compromise on something less.

The third actors are the separatist political amalgam of some twenty-three outfits known as the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC is not presently enjoying a marked respect among the local populace as it has not been able to give anything but death and destruction to the masses. Still, the APHC constitutes the main actors in the theater of the conflict, and these actors share the same emotions as common people on the street. Without Hurriyat participation there is no solution possible in Kashmir. Professor Abdul Gani Bhat says, "we live in the masses and not in the bunkers … some people might be angry with us but they understand our limitations."

Three of the executive members of APHC, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yaseen Malik and Abdul Aziz, long with dozens of second and third-line leaders, are in Indian jails. The fourth important actors are Indian security forces, which are present in large number and do not have a good human rights record. After September 11 the security troops felt more concerned about the continuing violence in Kashmir, but became morally encouraged after the United States declared two top militant outfits as terrorists. Indian security troops posted in Kashmir now have more pressure from New Delhi to control the militancy. An international campaign has been launched to prove that Kashmiri militancy constitutes cross-border terrorism. Though the vigil on the villages dotting the LOC has increased to check the infiltration, any tactical change in the militancy is yet to be seen.

Insurgency in Kashmir-Changing Tactics

At first sight, there seems to be no marked change in the militants' actions in Kashmir; however, more foreign militants are getting killed. The pro-Pakistani groups are still visibly controlling the militancy but the strategy is changing; local militants with hard-line Islamic ideology are seen in the forefront. Outfits use different names to maintain the discipline of the militant cadre and the distribution of money and weapons they receive from their elders based in either Pakistan or other Islamic countries.

The banning of the two terrorist organizations will hardly make a difference; as evidenced since 9/11, local militant outfits such as al Umar Mujahideen, Tehrik ul Mujahideen, and Jamiat ul Mujahideen are more hostile, recruiting local young Muslim boys mostly from rural and poor areas. After the declaration of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), locals have been scared to give hideouts to foreign militants. If security troops were to find a foreign militant hiding in a house, the house would surely be blasted and the militant killed. In recent encounters, militants were seen hiding in the mosques. In fact, there has been a proliferation of mosques in Kashmir. One cursory survey suggests that more than three thousand new mosques have been built across the valley since 1990.

Prevailing Flux in Kashmir

The Kashmir movement for independence remains on the front burner but there are no leaders available to carry the movement forward. Those still in Kashmir are too scared to act as leaders due to radical militants and their supporters. Unlike in the early nineties, the present Islamic militant groups have a limited following among the locals.4 These armed guerrilla groups have no political party. According to one survey, the role of Jamaat-i-Islami, which once had less than 10 percent support, is losing its ground. The main scare, however, remains the growth of the Wahabi and Khilafat type of Islam and the strengthening of its roots in Kashmir. Already several organizations named after social workers are new milestones in Kashmir.

Several orphanages and medical centers are being financed through unaccounted money, which is routed to Kashmir from Gulf countries. Two dozen top businessmen and social workers were arrested this year for acting as conduits for hawala (illegal transition) money. Police recovered large sums of money in July 2002 from a commander of Hizbe-ul Mujahideen and a journalist. On their disclosure, a few separatist leaders were arrested for collecting and forwarding hawala money for separatist activities. Two top leaders of the Hurriyat are also in jail for allegedly receiving hawala money. Police say more money has been pumped into Kashmir from Islamic countries since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to Indian intelligence reports, every executive member of the Hurriyat is getting Rs. 700,000 per month.

Another activity of the fundamentalist Islamic group is to rope important, influential, and rich people into its fold as role models in society. Several such people are falling prey to this design, either intentionally or unintentionally.

One should know that Kashmir's decade-old freedom struggle is being used intelligently by fundamentalists to change the kind of Islam in Kashmir. This is a dangerous trend but no one agrees or suggests ways to curb it because it is not visible to the naked eye. This policy received body blows but did not change after the fall of the Taliban. One important observation is that the population of the Kashmir valley is now 99.5 percent Muslim. There are no minorities left. Scattered massacres of minorities in the last five years of militancy act as a shield for the return of Hindu migrants. Hindus are encouraged to sell their properties and are getting a good amount of money from Muslim Kashmiris.

The bleeding valley has seen an increase in the construction of mosques across the state. The architecture of these mosques features domes and minarets, unlike earlier times when mosques had stupatype ceilings resembling Buddhist or Hindu temples. These mosques are also used as a resting place for militants and have provided jobs for hundreds of unemployed youth as preachers, priests, or caretakers of the religious places.

Thus, Islamic militant groups in the valley are seen differently by unemployed and underdeveloped6 youth, who silently respect the militants because they die for a cause. Youth are told that Muslims of the outside world are fighting for Kashmir's independence and dying for them.

The disappearance of Osama bin Laden and Maulana Omar is fast turning into a myth of invincibility and stories are floating around about how Allah has helped them to disappear. Islamic clerics in Kashmir are using these stories while preaching to the youth in the rural mosques. The new generations of Kashmiris born in this atmosphere are fast learning the new rules of life, least realizing that these groups have some different hidden agenda.

The lack of jobs and rehabilitation for former militants7 is increasing the sympathy for foreign militants. Post-9/11 situations have also seen the recycling of Kashmiri Muslim militants in Kashmir.8 Young, jobless boys have limited vision and take the recourse of Islam for salvation. Private discussions among Kashmiri intellectuals reveal a worry about the unseen powers that are forcing their womenfolk to observe purdah (wearing of the veil). These forces are also trying to change the style of education in Kashmir. Some places named after Hindu culture, such as Anantnag and Gulshan Nagar, have been renamed as Islamabad and Gulshanabad. Ideologically, the locals do not agree with this type of growing Islamic chemistry but are throttled to defend their own culture lest they be killed either in the name of an informer or infidel.

One of the professors at Kashmir University said, "we are afraid that our culture, both social and religious, is being invaded by outsiders and fear that the new generation is fast learning the Wahabi and Khilafat type of Islam." The well-read and secular-minded in Kashmir recall the last century of Afghan rule in Kashmir, which has been described by historians as the worst rule in history. Also, the tribal raid of late 1947 in Jammu and Kashmir is still fresh in the minds of local people. Poonch, Rajouri and Uri, the three border towns of the Indian Himalayan state, have several memorials that recount heroic tales of the legends who died fighting to save the chastity of their womenfolk and to save their native land. Locals now consider the Indian forces to be more or less in the same league.

The Role of Indian Troops in Kashmir

Security troops are content, their claims concerning the linkage of terrorism in Kashmir to Pakistan and to Afghanistan having been vindicated (this is the slogan one hears after visiting any security camp or office). This sore victory is seen as a great morale booster; the ruling political leaders' statement in Delhi to wage a war against Pakistan is like a drip of dextrose to the sagging morale of the security troops. But there is a sense of something missing. Enmity exists between troops and the local populace, and every incident forces them to further dislike each other. The post-Afghanistan situation gives more confidence to the security troops, who consider Kashmir terrorism to be similar to that of Afghanistan. Security troops want the world to allow them to crush the militancy in Kashmir but do not want to see any other peace-keeping force on their land to monitor their actions. The local population continues to consider the paramilitaries as outsiders. Troops, on the contrary, consider Muslims supportive of militancy. No one is working to bridge the gap, which has turned into a deep cavity. Incidents such as September 11 and the ensuing war in Afghanistan have led to more fissures. The misunderstanding increases with every passing day. After the December 13 attack on the Indian parliament, Kashmiris have felt scared to travel outside Kashmir because hotels and guest houses in Delhi and other places ask Kashmiris to register with local police.

In Srinagar and across the Himalayan state, more than 350,000 troops are directly or indirectly involved in counter-insurgency operations. With the new threat of war and now assembly elections, the number has increased by 150,000. Indian troops remain alert on the rugged, porous and snow-capped borders. In towns their vigil has multiplied. One of the surveys conducted by students of mass-media communication shows that more than 90 percent of the security troops, including the paramilitary, are from outside Kashmir.

Locals Understand the Language of Survival

Locals have learned how to get by and prefer to keep their young ones away from the troops lest they be identified as militants or sympathizers and arrested and interrogated. One hardly finds a Muslim youth that has not faced some sort of interrogation or been paraded in front of informers in the infamous "crack-downs" (search and cordon operations). Hundreds of young boys are missing in custody. Presently, two organizations of affected persons are fighting for their rights in court. (In private, the soldiers admit they can only scare the young boys and let them go. They too are equally scared of the militants.)

Separatist Groups and the General Populace in Kashmir

Islamic guerrilla leaders were once proud to exhibit they had fought against the Russians in Afghanistan. It was like a certificate of advanced training in guerrilla tactics for the Mujahideen. Before 9/11, guerrilla leaders used to compare the situation time and time again with what was happening in Afghanistan, considering themselves a part of the Muslim Umma and boasting to implement Islamic rule not only in Kashmir but on the whole planet. Today they speak less of Afghanistan and do not want to compare their insurgency with the Taliban lest the Kashmiri struggle too will have to suffer. Islamic guerrilla leaders say they are struggling only for the freedom of Kashmir. Some separatist leaders say they do not want Hindu-dominated areas of Jammu or Buddhist-dominated areas of Ladakh. These separatists outrightly reject that any al-Qaeda member is present in Kashmir, unlike in 2001 when every burial procession of a militant killed in an encounter would attract noisy pro-Islamic and pro-Taliban slogans. Under the surface, one finds that the sympathetic tone for the Afghan Mujahideen continues. For instance, locals silently pray for their sacrifices in their hideouts and vow to take revenge. Although the lack of verbalizing about Afghanistan or Islamic militants is a tactical change, a layer of hatred is swelling underneath that could, over time, burst out in one way or another.

"Even Prophet Muhammed bought peace with the infidels on their terms and conditions for ten years till He defeated them … Inshaallaha! We will do the same," said Mushtaq Sopori, an active member of the al Hadees sect of Islam in Kashmir that promotes mosques and educational institutions across the valley. As the relationship between India and Pakistan spirals downward, security troops continue to arrest hard-line overground activists in Kashmir. More than a dozen Jamaat-i-Islami and APHC leaders and activists were arrested in a four-month period in 2002 under the new law of POTA.

A diabolic shift is distinctly visible. The future policy or strategy of the active radical groups in Kashmir will definitely be more clandestine. There is a fear that Kashmir Muslim teenagers will be the future members of the fidayeen (suicidal squad) if steps for the solution of the Kashmir problem are not properly addressed. Secondly, intellectuals are beginning, for the first time, to compare the Kashmir issue to other Muslim struggles and blaming the West. One strong view, held by Kashmiri Muslim intellectuals who acknowledge the existence of radical Islam, holds that such movements can best be seen as an extreme response to the intrusion of the West, which has seldom tried to solve problems such as those in Palestine, Bosnia or Kashmir. Kashmiri politicians also want America and its allies fighting in the war against terrorism in the backyard of Kashmir, to learn from the mistakes of the British Empire. Kashmiri politicians blame the British for not tying up the loose ends of the Kashmir issue, which have, since 1947, festered between the two South Asian rivals to such a degree that today even the British government is suffering. "What could have been solved in two meetings then is leading into a nuclear war," said Nazir Ronga, president of the Kashmir Lawyers Association.

Most grievances of the Kashmiri Muslims describe Western imperialism against the Islamic world like the introduction of Israel into the Middle East and the threat to Islamic societies by the spread of what is often seen as "corrupt Western culture." In this view, the terrorist acts of September 11 were regrettable but understandable, flowing from the widespread rage against the West found in many Muslims. The terrorists were drawn from a much larger pool of discontented and angry Muslims. "'Good' Muslims do not approve of acts of terrorism, which are widely regarded as acts of self-defense, and are thus defendable morally," says another leading Muslim advocate in Srinagar.

Most locals in Kashmir were surprised after the September 11 terrorist attacks but some took pride in it. "That Muslims are ready to die in the name of Allah to defend Islam is seen in itself as a unity among Muslims across the globe. It is an act of sacrifice and achievement for Islam and we should be happy that the younger generation of Muslims worldwide is learning from the elder Muslims how to defend Islam against the unfaithful. They are not falling prey to corrupt Western culture," says a professor of a college in Sopore town, North Kashmir.

The implications of such a view are quite specific, showing that Kashmiris are not happy with the attack on Afghanistan but they cannot criticize it openly lest they too be dubbed as terrorists by the international community. The only way to release their anger is to criticize the West and its policies against Muslims.

"The West must stop pursuing a policy with a double standard. It must change its policies toward Israel, it must support oppressed Muslim groups around the world, especially in Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya, and it must abandon its support for reactionary and oppressive Islamic regimes." These arguments carry much weight in Kashmir today because Muslims see India as an ally of Israel. They feel Israel is helping Indian security forces in counter-insurgency operations. Kashmiri people are suffering at the hands of Indian security troops who are mostly from the other states of India.

Hundreds of human rights abuses have been registered against the troops but seldom are actions taken against them. Since the fall of the Taliban, locals have demanded more vociferously that Asia Watch and Amnesty International be allowed to visit Kashmir as they feel troops have been given more power in Kashmir since September 11 and are not accountable to their superiors. The charge was outrightly denied by the troops' superiors and India does not allow the entry of the two organizations.

New Reasoning Emerges in Kashmir after 9/11

With the fall of the taliban and the installation of a new government in Afghanistan, a fresh reasoning is emerging among Muslim separatist leaders: that the Kashmir movement should no more have the influence of foreign Islamic militants lest the world declare them too as terrorists. Professor Abdul Gani Bhat, chairman of the APHC, for the first time asked India and Pakistan to freeze the Kashmir issue. Farooq Abdullah, chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, has also moved rapidly to cash in on the confusion. The chief minister called for strikes across the LOC on terrorist camps, which has been endorsed by nearly all political parties (ruling an opposition) to go all offensive against Pakistan and the terrorist groups. Observers feel that Farooq wants to remain more loyal than the king and can please New Delhi in all respects to stay in power. Farooq used the issue for the state elections held in September and October 2002 to sweep the elections once again and rule for another six years. New Delhi had resisted his move and tried to rope in some separatists but failed. Americans had pressured India by demanding that the elections be held under governor's rule and that international observers be allowed to monitor the elections, but these demands were not met by India.

The Afghanistan situation has already weakened the position of separatist organizations; in the coming year, separatists cannot think of participating in the elections or they will face a miserable defeat because at this stage they cannot bargain with New Delhi. Thus, all the bridges and contacts New Delhi gained with separatists through interlocutors have been burned. The Hurriyat has recently agreed to participate in elections but for the representative character, considering these elections as the first step for negotiating with Indians. Another thought of school emerging in the valley is that a fresh epoch will begin for Kashmir once the situation in Afghanistan completely settles. The moderate and suffocated intellectual class, with a cautious optimism and crossed fingers, feels it is the right time for the international community to mediate and settle the Kashmir issue. Their voices suggest that the West should no longer sit on the fence and helplessly watch the dangerous trends emerge in Kashmir since the present visible opportunity may not exist in the future. The truth remains that any serious peace process would need much greater commitment; otherwise, the proliferation of weapons, terrorism, sectarianism and fundamentalism will grow in South Asia.

After nearly a decade of violence in Kashmir, the September 11 attacks on the United States and the fate of the Taliban regime are forcing the locals to visualize a modernistic reasoning to resolve and mend the dispute between the two South Asian archrivals. Such a resolution will not only keep Islamic fundamentalism out of South Asia but will also allow Kashmiris to live a respectable life free from fear. To exclude the dimension of the ongoing Kashmir problem from any permanent political solution would be folly and would lay the groundwork to reap another generation of violence from the war-scorched soil of Kashmir. Kashmir should be seen as the overarching concern; otherwise, the world will again have to assemble to resolve the unfinished partition left over by the British in 1947.

Focal Issue

The general concern of separatist leaders is that they are ready for any respectable negotiation, but New Delhi will have to keep in mind the fact that fifty thousand to eighty thousand Muslim families have lost their loved ones in the last twelve years. Also, more than one hundred thousand Muslim families have indirectly suffered. The main argument by these moderate separatist leaders is that they are accountable to and will not be pardoned by the Kashmiri masses if they compromise with India by participating in the election just for the sake of the civilian government administration. "Compromise at what cost?" asks Yaseen Malik, chief of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front.

Conclusions

The security situation in the kashmiri valley is at an alarming juncture. Meanwhile, a renewed series of attacks on the security positions by the militants in spring and summer of 2002, including a fidayeen attack on the State Assembly and Indian parliament house in New Delhi, has been a morale boost to the otherwise sagging militancy in Kashmir. The past experience of the Indian intelligence suggests that militants may soon do something spectacular to attract international attention and to keep the local populace under fear prior to the elections. Intelligence officers say whenever pressure builds up among the militants, they try to ward it off by initiating some action. The lesson to be learned from the post-Afghanistan situation is that if a vacuum is allowed in a conflict-like situation, then radical groups who rule with a religion-and-gun ideology will take advantage of the circumstances. In the case of Kashmir, all sides in the conflict have no solution to the problem. So for personal gain, all parties drag on the strife with no concrete objectives. The longer the conflict continues, the more polarized the sides become. In Kashmir, boys are no longer boys; they are becoming militant and fluent in the language of the gun. There is hardly a child in Kashmir who has not seen the deadly automatic assault rifle or a dead body.

The hatred is not surprising, as more than thirty-five thousand people have been killed in the continuing decade-long conflict. Troops have killed more than fifteen thousand militants and wounded hundreds more. Also, more than thirty-five thousand people were arrested under charges of supporting or participating in the militancy. Thousands of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims have been forced to flee the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Distrust between the security troops and the local population is complete. One wonders how the Hindu and Muslim communities will again co-exist in Kashmir, even if the conflict ends.

Hardly any research is being done either in Kashmir or in other parts of India to tackle the Kashmir situation. "Some of the non-resident Kashmiris have become spokespersons of the Kashmir cause in the United States or in other European countries where they would be unimportant and jobless without the Kashmir issue." These organizations also collect large sums of money in the name of jihad in Kashmir and would like to see the conflict continue.

As the Kashmir uprising drags on, one of the outcomes is the growing enmity between Hindus and Muslims, which had never erupted previously. Today, if the fate of Kashmiris moves us, it is because it has become a twentieth-century saga. One feels an eerie premonition and vulnerability before the spectacle. What happens in Kashmir seems both a reversion and a forecast. Kashmiri masses are sandwiched between reversion and forecast- not knowing what their future is or which side they should support. They condemn the continuing massacres in Kashmir but do not want to blame anyone. They are leaderless and tired of the ongoing violence. Today, Kashmir brings hope to none. The environment of hatred begets hostility and vice-versa. Kashmir is no longer a magical place. In these circumstances of continuing hostility and non-accommodation, the role of a third party (or parties) becomes a must.

The key to an effective American policy in South Asia depends on Washington's engagement with India and Pakistan. India is an emerging major power and Pakistan, despite its internal economic and political problems, is also a significant state. Musharraf is trying hard to bring economic stability to his country. Washington, since the fall of the Taliban, is assisting them by lifting sanctions and providing billions of dollars as loans and donations. The United States is also keeping a vigil to reduce the risk of accidental war between India and Pakistan. Three developments in Kashmir that have partially come out of the ashes of September 11 have influenced Kashmiri perceptions and have helped, I believe, ripen the Kashmir Conflict for resolution. First, the defeat of fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan that use terror as a weapon definitely has ramifications in Kashmir, where such elements have been trying to impose their ideology. Such forces should not be allowed to grow in Kashmir; now is the right time to nip the devil in the bud.

Second, a space has been created for the voice of Kashmir's indigenous people to once again take center stage. Indigenous Kashmiris are already re-energizing, emboldened by the expectation that the international fight against terrorism will not just target terrorist groups but will also promote an atmosphere of reconciliation and justice in Jammu and Kashmir. Indigenous Kashmiris expect a well meaning and ultimately peaceful solution to the conflict by encouraging dialogue between New Delhi and Kashmiri leaders.

Third, as a result of coalition building, Kashmir does have some hope that the West can engage both India and Pakistan in a dialogue stressing the need to resolve this dispute by emphasizing an incremental peace process that does not necessary mean independence from or accession to Pakistan.

Insurgency of Militants in Kashmir Valley

The village of Chitisinghpura is in the southeastern corner of the valley of Kashmir, a few miles from the highway that runs from the capital, Srinagar, across high mountains to the Indian plains. A steep, winding, dusty road takes you to a high plateau where, beyond a few miles of rice fields, the village lies in a little hollow muffled by pine, walnut, and chenar trees.

It has none of the wretchedness you associate with rural India. In fact, the brisk stream of cool, clear water that divides the village, the meadowed bank with the bathing cabin of rough timber and the leafless willows and the grazing stray cow suggest the romance of an isolated and self-sufficient pastoral community. The villagers are apple, almond, and rice farmers. Some of them own transport businesses—there is enough money around for the village to have two gurudwaras, domed prayer halls with courtyards, one for each side of the village. The houses are large in the expansive Kashmiri way, unplastered bricks stacked in timber frames, exposed lofts bulging with hay; each house has its own fenced-in compound where chickens run around vegetable patches; television antennae loom over the corrugated iron roofs.

The serenity of the place at first glance seems unreal: elsewhere in the valley of Kashmir, which is ruled by India, the Indian military has been fighting since 1990 a particularly brutal war with thousands of Muslim guerrillas. Almost all of the guerrillas have been trained in Pakistan by Islamic fundamentalists, and are fighting for integration of the Muslim-dominated valley with Pakistan, even though a majority of the four million Muslims who live precariously amid the violence caused by guerrillas and the Indian security forces in the valley prefer independence.

But the secular guerrilla outfits that were fighting for independence in the early years of the insurgency have long been overwhelmed by such Pakistan-based Islamic guerrilla groups as Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba, which also recruit jihad-inspired citizens of Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight in Kashmir. India, which has fought two wars with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965 and almost came close to a nuclear war in 1990, sees itself as fighting a "proxy war" with Pakistan in Kashmir, and the present Indian government in Delhi, which is dominated by Hindu nationalists, has sent close to half a million soldiers to Kashmir to suppress the insurgency.

This makes the Hindus in the valley very vulnerable, and approximately 130,000 Hindus, almost the entire Hindu population of the valley, migrated to India after a few hundred of them were killed by Muslim guerrillas in 1990. More recently, in early August, unidentified gunmen, alleged by the Indian government to be Pakistan-backed guerrillas, massacred over a hundred Hindus. But Chitisinghpura is populated mostly by Sikhs, who form just over 2 percent of the population of Kashmir, and have managed to maintain their neutrality all through the last ten years.

This explains why the community has never before been targeted at any time by either the Indian army or the Muslim guerrillas; it also explains why the Sikhs of Chitisinghpura were, before this spring, equally, if uneasily, cordial with both the guerrillas, who often visited the village looking for food, and the soldiers from nearby Indian army camps, who came on routine patrols.

Most of the Sikh families were at home on the evening of March 20, 2000, preparing for supper, watching the extended coverage of Bill Clinton's visit to the subcontinent, and weren't at all surprised when about seventeen men with guns and dressed in army fatigues showed up and ordered the males to come out of their houses. Most people thought it was a "crackdown"—the word had gone into the Kashmiri language after years of the Indian army's cordon-and-search operations.

The Sikhs were made to squat before the gurudwaras—and this happened on both sides of the village—and were asked to produce their identity cards. The Sikhs complied; there was not much cause for suspicion at the time: the armed men in fatigues, who appeared to be from the Indian army, seemed to be carrying out the formality of checking the number of men in the village.

But there were some Sikhs who suspected something unusual was about to happen and hid themselves in their houses. None of the armed men came to look for them; there were enough people outside.

Identity cards checked, the armed men stepped back; there was a single shot, and suddenly the men raised their guns and started firing at the Sikhs. In the end, thirty-five men were shot dead on both sides of the village; all, except one, on the spot, on the muddy, hay-littered ground in front of the gurudwaras. It was the largest such killing by execution in Kashmir since the beginning of the anti-India insurgency in 1990.

We heard the news from Abbas early next morning. He is a Muslim, the Srinagar correspondent of an Indian newspaper. The dignity and solidity of his bearing—his tall, well-built frame, the elegantly cut Kashmiri jackets he wore—made him reassuring to be with in the city where everyone—the tense crowds in the streets, the jumpy soldiers in their bunkers, and the passionate Muslims speaking of the atrocities of Indian rule in bare, dark rooms—seemed to be on edge. A mutual acquaintance had asked him to help me out during my stay in Srinagar; and he had done so dutifully, but not without a certain wariness, which I put down to some slight resentment: We weren't the first or last of the inexperienced, and possibly biased, journalists from India he had been asked to assist.

His voice on the phone was calm. In the days we had been in Srinagar, relatively and unsettlingly quiet days, the news of sporadic custodial killings and gun battles between Indian security forces and guerrillas and land-mine blasts coming in only from other places in the valley, we had often heard him say, "If you live here, you have to be prepared for anything. Anything can happen anytime in Kashmir." His words with their tinge of melodrama had made me wonder if he saw a certain glamour in his job, in the dangerous nature of the world he worked and lived in, like the reticent taxi driver who had been quick to point me toward the vegetable market where seventeen Muslim civilians had been blown to bits a few days before by a bomb.

Something even bigger had now happened; and Abbas was as serene as always. He had no details yet, but he thought we should leave immediately for the village. When he arrived half an hour later at my hotel with two other Kashmiri journalists, his mood was light. The atmosphere inside the battered Ambassador was already one of good-humored banter; and the jokes and repartee in Kashmiri, which I couldn't follow, got louder after each encounter with the frankly contemptuous Indian soldiers at roadblocks, who poked AK-56 muzzles through hastily rolled-down windows, demanded identity cards, and wanted to know where we were going and for what.

In little villages alongside the road men in blue and black cloak-like pherans stood in worried little circles and glanced nervously, out of the corner of their eyes, at the cars racing past them. In the rice and saffron fields, stubbly and glittering with frost, soldiers stood with their backs to the road, light machine guns slung over their shoulders. Outlined against the blue misty mountains in the distance, they were like hunters from a nineteenth-century sketch.

At the village itself, where there was nothing they could do, they looked more casual, the elite commandos almost dandyish in their black headdress and bullet-proof overalls, sheepishly standing where some angry Sikhs had barred their way to the village. There were tiny shards of glass on the ground: some car windows had already been smashed by the Sikhs and a photographer roughed up, his camera lens broken. The soldiers had watched it all and done nothing; they now quietly watched the Sikhs rage at the senior officers from the army and police who had begun to arrive, their cars disgorging more and more men in fatigues.

The Sikhs were mostly survivors from the night before; mostly middle-aged men, who had stayed in their homes when the armed men came. Others were from nearby villages and had been in Chitisinghpura since dawn. No one had stirred out of his house for close to an hour after the massacre; then some men had come out and seen the corpses and trudged several miles in the dark to the nearest police station. The police arrived seven hours after the massacre, but could find no clues to the identity of the killers. But the Sikhs standing before the policemen now had already assumed that the killers were Muslim guerrillas. They were shouting at once, beating their chests, feeding upon each other's energy. The army and police officers heard them expressionlessly. "Give us guns and then we'll deal with these Muslims," a man with a long gray beard kept shouting. "They know what we did with them in 1947. We are not cowards like the Kashmiri Hindus! Do they think they can throw us out of Kashmir?! We'll show them!" And then, spittle growing at the corner of his mouth, he added, "This is a country we have ruled." The historical reference—to the early nineteenth century, when Sikh governors sent out by the king of Punjab had ravaged the valley and tormented the Muslims—made, just for a brief moment, the Kashmiri Muslim policeman before him flinch.

More journalists and government people arrived. The Sikhs wouldn't let anyone pass, and continued to curse and lament. Behind them, a frightful clamor, as of a thousand crows, arose from the top of the hill where the bigger gurudwara was. It was the sound of weeping and wailing women, and it seemed to bewilder the roosters in the village, who were to go on dementedly for several hours after dawn, their exultant cries hanging discordantly in the air with the grief and despair of the women.

All through the long drive to the village, we had wondered about this moment. It was strange, after all the dread-filled anticipation, to come up against what appeared, for reasons then unclear, a familiar sight: the corpses lined up on the ground against the walled fence of the courtyard, grieving women around them, a hectic gaggle of photographers who were soon to send images of this remote Himalayan village into the world.

We walked to the other side of the village, where, in front of the smaller gurudwara, the armed men had shot seventeen of the thirty-five dead men. More bodies were being brought from here to the gurudwara where the widows and journalists had gathered: men trudging up and down the steep, muddy slopes littered with chicken feathers and straw, balancing on their shoulders improvised wooden stretchers that appeared to have been hammered together overnight. The bodies slithered around on the stretchers, and the blood leaking from them left bright large stains on the freshly planed wood: it was as if the rough way the bodies were handled came out of the manner, and scale, of death, more than a dozen men shot while they squatted before the gurudwara's scraggly fence of corrugated iron and barbed wire.

In the end, there was only one body left to carry; and it took some time because the young wife of the deceased held her husband's head in her lap and wouldn't let go. A young girl in a long red mirror-work skirt, probably her daughter, stood by her side, freshly awakened and staring uncomprehendingly first at her dead father and then at her mother, who kept calling out a name as she wept and kept caressing, with rough, calloused hands, her husband's face.

Outside the bigger gurudwara stood the police and army men, spiffily dressed, already stiff in anticipation of high-level visits from Delhi; the bored, silent groups of local journalists; the women and children warming themselves before a tiny fire after the long night of grief; the photographers and cameramen competing for the best view of the courtyard; the eager young journalists from New Delhi looking for blood; the cries of the roosters still incongruously mingling with the wailing of the widows—somehow the occasion demanded a more appropriate response.

And so when the Sikhs, growing in numbers by the minute as the news spread across the valley, each new arrival bringing his own outrage to the village, abused and drove out the first VIP, a senior state minister, stoned his car, shattered his windscreen, his bodyguards let loose a few rounds into the air from their AK-47s and caused temporary panic because some people thought that the guerrillas had attacked. Men began sprinting across the forest outside the village; the commandos threw themselves on the damp ground and prepared to shoot. No guerrillas showed up, of course. But the little commotion assuaged the growing need for drama and suddenly there was relief all around, and the commandos appeared less dandyish and more sheepish when they got up with muddy stains on their bullet-proof overalls.

But something suspect lay in that need for drama, which, in the few hours it took to broadcast the TV images of the widows, was to be amplified all across India. There had been a small war in Kashmir the previous summer when Pakistan-backed infiltrators, many of them regular Pakistan army recruits, occupied high mountain positions past the border. Hundreds of Indian soldiers had died while trying to dislodge them; and the media, slicker but also much more coarse after ten years of economic liberalization, had brought about a general intoxication with war in millions of middle-class Indian homes. Opinion polls in English-language newspapers had shown much of the middle class demanding an all-out invasion of Pakistan; letters in the popular press had even called for a nuclear bombardment of Pakistan. The media itself had joined in the frenzy, with young, awkwardly helmeted reporters shouting into microphones over the noise of artillery fire, "You have got to be here to know what it is like!"

And that need for drama, for swift, brutal responses to brutality, wasn't going to be appeased by Bill Clinton's condemnation of the massacre. When I left the village and went back to Srinagar later that day, the groups of worried Muslims I had passed in the morning had been broken up. They were already in roped-off enclosures, squatting on the ground while soldiers searched their houses. Buses were being stopped and passengers lined up and interrogated by the side of the road: a multitude of little crackdowns were going on in the region.

Three days after the killing, while Clinton was still in India, a jubilant-looking senior bureaucrat in New Delhi announced a "major breakthrough" on Indian television: the Indian army and police had just arrested, he said, a man called Yaqub Wagay, one of the few Muslim residents of Chitisinghpura, who had provided valuable information about the Sikh killings. Another "major breakthrough" came two days later when five "foreign mercenaries" allegedly identified by Wagay as the killers of the Sikhs—guerrillas from Pakistan and Afghanistan—were killed in an "encounter" during a joint army- police assault on a lone hut on top of a hill in a remote village, not far from Chitisinghpura, called Panchalthan. This was what needed to be done after the massacre to appease public outrage in India—the Sikhs had been rioting for three days in Jammu City—and the army and policemen in Kashmir, men more confident in their ability to manipulate the media after the war last year when false stories about Pakistani brutality and Indian courage had been tirelessly retailed, had known what to do.

The "encounter" with foreign mercenaries was reported on the front pages of the Indian newspapers, and the matter was seen to have ended there. But soon the government's story ran into unexpected problems. There had been no post-mortem of the five men killed in the "encounter" at Panchalthan. The frightened local villagers were bullied into quickly burying the badly charred corpses; but soon afterward they came across clothes and personal items near the burial site that had been left burning by the soldiers. These items now became evidence contradicting the government's story.

Within just three days after the killings, seventeen Muslims had strangely gone missing from the villages around Chitisinghpura. Three of them had been kidnapped before witnesses by armed men in a red Maruti van that was later discovered to have been one of the several vehicles seized by the district police and parked in the district police station. The son of one of the missing men heard about the discovery of half-burnt personal items in Panchalthan; he traveled to Panchalthan and found his father's identity card and ring among the items. More items were identified, as villagers came forward to testify that the five men had been fired upon at close range, soaked with kerosene, and then set alight.

The relatives of the five murdered Muslims walked in a procession several miles to the district headquarters to appeal for a public exhuming of the bodies. After a week of protests, the demonstrations grew larger and then a crowd of five thousand Muslims was fired upon by the police. Nine more men died; among the dead was the son of one of the murdered civilians, the one who had traveled to Panchalthan and made the first connection between the missing men and the half-burnt personal items.

When the bodies were finally exhumed, almost two weeks after the murders, they were discovered to have been badly defaced. The chopped-off nose and chin of one man—a local shepherd—turned up in another grave. The body of a local sheep and buffalo trader was headless—the head couldn't be found—but was identified by the trousers that were intact underneath the army fatigues it had been dressed in. Another charred corpse—that of an affluent cloth-retailer from the city of Anantnag, presumably kidnapped and killed because he was, like the other four men, tall and well-built and could be made to resemble, once dead, a "foreign mercenary"—had no bullet marks at all. Remarkably, for bodies so completely burnt, the army fatigues that they were dressed in were almost brand new.

We had left Srinagar by then. We followed the events from Delhi, where they merged into the general atrociousness of the news emanating from Kashmir, news that was reported fitfully and sparingly, often in single columns, in the Indian press, which was concerned from the very beginning of the anti-India insurgency not to report anything damaging to the "national interest." The news of the massacre had lasted for barely half a day when it was overtaken by Clinton's reaction to it, his harder line against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, which emerged as the most important aspect of the affair. The circumstances of the massacre, the identity of the killers, were left unexplored.

In Chitisinghpura, I had spoken to some elderly Sikhs standing around a small tea shack. They were wary of me and couldn't tell me much: they had heard the orders for them to come out, they had stayed put in their homes, and then they had heard the gunfire and cries of pain. They couldn't imagine who the killers might have been. This was Kashmir: no one really knew what was going on. The armed men could have been sent by the Indian army; it could have been the Muslim guerrillas. They did remember that the men spoke Urdu and Punjabi (a meaningless clue since many Indians and Pakistanis and Kashmiris speak the two languages), and that some of them were drunk.

The wariness of these elderly men had much to do with their new sense of vulnerability to both the guerrillas and the Indian soldiers in their isolated setting—a vulnerability that remains. Just a few days after the killings, almost all of the Sikhs in the village whom we had seen so stridently blaming the Muslim guerrillas on the morning after the massacre had migrated to India. More recently, the Sikh association formed to protect Sikhs after the killings have begun to talk about the possible involvement of Indian security forces. All the Pakistan-based guerrilla outfits have continued to deny their involvement in the Chitisinghpura killings, and to blame Indian security forces for them. There have been no further attacks on the Sikhs in the valley—and the questions about why Muslim guerrillas should attack civilian members of a community they have not bothered for over a decade, why they should do so hours before Clinton's arrival in India and thereby invite international opprobrium and discredit their cause, haven't been satisfactorily answered.

There are other intriguing facts. Of the twelve other Muslim civilians that went missing around the same time as the murdered five, four were spotted at, and eventually rescued by local villagers from, an army camp near Panchalthan. It is quite likely they had been kidnapped for the same reason the five murdered men were: to be presented, once dead, as "foreign mercenaries" responsible for the killings of the Sikhs. The fate of the rest is still unknown, and as with many missing Muslims in Kashmir they are likely to show up in one of the daily police lists of "killed militants." Meanwhile, the family of Yaqub Wagay, the Muslim man arrested in Chitisinghpura for allegedly assisting the "foreign mercenaries" in the killings of the Sikhs, has refused to put up bail for him out of fear that he'll be murdered as soon as he's out of prison. A senior Kashmiri official connected with the inquiry told me that Wagay was innocent, and had been with four other men, including a Sikh, when the massacre took place. Wagay is the Indian government's glaringly weak link between the killings in Chitisinghpura and the "encounter" at Panchalthan, which makes him just as likely to be killed in prison as outside it.

The Indian failure to identify or arrest even a single person connected to the killings or the killers, and the hastiness and brutality of the Indian attempt to stick the blame on "foreign mercenaries" while Clinton was still in India, only lends weight to the new and growing suspicion among Sikhs that the massacre in Chitisinghpura was organized by Indian intelligence agencies in order to influence Clinton, and the large contingent of influential American journalists accompanying him, into taking a much more sympathetic view of India as a helpless victim of Islamic terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan: a view of India that some very hectic Indian diplomacy in the West had previously failed to achieve.

That view is what the Indian government offered again in early August, when more than a hundred people, mostly Hindu, were killed in Kashmir, a week after the biggest pro-Pakistan guerrilla outfit, the Hizbul Mujahideen—which, interestingly, was held responsible by the Indian government in March for the killings in Chitisinghpura—declared what turned out to be a very brief cease-fire.

It is still not clear—and probably won't be for some time—what actually happened, even during the most widely reported of the recent killings in Pahalgam, the Kashmir town where, according to the Indian government, two pro-Pakistan guerrillas killed more than thirty Hindu pilgrims. Later reports said that the two suspected guerrillas were killed by soldiers of the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), one of the Indian paramilitary organizations in Kashmir, soon after they assaulted a heavily guarded military camp; and in the fifteen to twenty minutes it took the CRPF to kill the guerrillas seven people died in the cross fire. The Indian prime minister himself, on a visit to Pahalgam, was confronted with hostile survivors who accused the CRPF of looting and killing pilgrims and Muslim shopowners of Pahalgam for almost forty-five minutes after the two suspected guerrillas had been shot dead.

In another mysterious incident reminiscent of Chitisinghpura, gunmen in uniform were seen massacring nineteen migrant laborers, the poorest and most defenseless people in Kashmir, a few hours after the killings in Pahalgam. But there was hardly any follow-up coverage; and few people know who killed thirty-five people, some of them Muslims, in the remote jungles of Doda in South Kashmir in early August, since the reports about the murders seemed based on nothing more reliable than press statements put about by the Indian police and army.

The Indian government blamed guerrilla outfits working "at the behest of Pakistan"; the intention behind the killings, it said, was to disrupt the peace process. But it is not clear why Pakistan, which has long bankrolled the Hizbul Mujahideen and which brought about its declaration of cease-fire, should cancel its own moves by organizing killings in Kashmir, particularly at a time when the world's attention was fixed on the region. It is more likely that one or more guerrilla outfits opposed to the cease-fire acted without Pakistan's supervision or approval. The Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, accused Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is mostly composed of fanatical holy warriors from Pakistan and Afghanistan. But that organization, which, along with the Hizbul Mujahideen, was also blamed for killing the Sikhs of Chitisinghpura, condemned the killings and rejected the possibility that its recruits might have murdered civilians—a disavowal that is in contrast to its usual eagerness in claiming attacks on the Indian military and police, such as the recent bombing in Srinagar, which killed thirteen army and policemen, and which was claimed by both Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba. There is, as yet, no convincing evidence linking them to any of the more than six separate incidents of extreme violence against civilians. These killings thus take their place, along with the murder of the Sikhs, with some very relevant but ultimately obscure and unexplained incidents in Kashmir's recent history.

As it turned out, the massacres in early August weren't what undermined the cease-fire, which continued for another week before breaking down over the Indian government's refusal to include Pakistan in any discussion of Kashmir. This failure was inevitable. The Hindu nationalists, to whom the Mujahideen's unilateral cease-fire came as a shock, could not have risked alienating much of their middle-class constituency by talking to General Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, who is held chiefly responsible in India for the disastrous battles between Pakistan-backed infiltrators and the Indian army in Kashmir last year, in which hundreds of Indian soldiers died. The massacres were presented by an aggrieved-seeming Mr. Vajpayee to Bill Clinton as another reason why he can't sit across the negotiating table from General Musharraf.

What has long been clear is that the Indian government does not wish to involve Pakistan or any other country in what it considers to be an internal matter. In the first fifty years of its existence, the Indian state has several times defused secessionist uprisings across India without any external assistance, through locally produced carrots and sticks, a blend of force and appeasement. You can see the same gradualistic strategy at work in Kashmir, where the government has attempted in the last few years to win over at least some representatives of the disaffected population: some of the most corrupt and rich men in Kashmir are former guerrillas. At the same time, it has tried to crush militarily those fundamentalist outfits operating from Pakistan who believe, somewhat fancifully, that jihad, if pursued vigorously enough, might force India to concede Kashmir.

However, the insurgency in Kashmir, unlike previous insurgencies in Punjab and Assam, pits India against an unstable, traditionally hostile, and now nuclear-armed neighbor. This means that even if India were to succeed in pacifying Kashmir on its own, the possibility of a calamitous war in South Asia would remain.

A more enduring peace can only be reached through three-way talks between India, Pakistan, and the representatives of Kashmir. In this respect, the cease-fire was a good beginning; its immense popularity among Muslims in Kashmir certainly made all the warring sides aware of the need for change. But the Indian government, as much as the jihad-minded guerrillas, seems to prefer the status quo in Kashmir. The failure of the cease-fire means not only that it has managed to avoid talking to Pakistan. It has intensified its campaign to internationally demonize Pakistan, which includes trying to persuade the USState Department to put Pakistan on its list of terrorist states. By parleying, however briefly and fruitlessly, with the Hizbul Mujahideen, it has also managed to present itself before the world as being flexible and open-minded about Kashmir while creating the possibility of a severe rupture between the largest guerrilla outfit and the more hard-line Islamic groups that stress the futility of any kind of negotiations with the Indian government and want to carry on their jihad against India.

The number of atrocities on both sides in Kashmir is so high, and the situation in general so murky, that it is hard to get to the truth, to confirm, for instance, India's claim, in both late March and early August, that Muslim terrorists are always responsible for them. Few people in India even talk of Chitisinghpura anymore; it did not come up when the senior bureaucrat we had seen on television in March accusing the Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba of killing the Sikhs traveled to Srinagar in early August to talk to the guerrillas about ground rules for the short-lived cease-fire. And the forgetfulness and murkiness will remain: the recent killings will soon be supplanted by something bigger; there will be the usual exchange of allegations between India and Pakistan, the usual outrage and condemnation around the world; and no more than a few people will know what is really going on.

At present, what supports India's forcefully articulated sense of victimhood after the incidents of March and August is the basic fear and distrust in the West of anything related to Islamic extremism. The United States refused to join India in blaming Pakistan for the recent killings in Kashmir, but the State Department has kept up its pressure on Pakistan to rein in the Kashmiri guerrillas and their Islamic fundamentalist sponsors in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The cease-fire by the Hizbul Mujahideen is believed to have been a result of some gentle arm-twisting of the Pakistan government by the State Department.

The involvement of the State Department is also hinted by the speed with which the Indian government responded, after its initial silence, to the cease-fire. Since the cease-fire broke down, it has repeatedly declared its willingness to talk to any guerrilla outfit without involving Pakistan. There is an immediate incentive for the Indian government in working up a certain amount of enthusiasm about any US-mediated dialogue with the guerrillas: some of the more significant American sanctions imposed on India after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998 are still in place. And then the Hindu nationalists, who now claim that India chose the wrong and losing side in the cold war, and many of whose richest patrons belong to the 800,000-strong Indian- American community, are keen on building a strong military and economic relationship with the United States. The cautiously pro-India policies now followed by the United States derive from the assumption that India, since it is more stable and economically stronger than Pakistan, would be a reliable ally in South Asia. The assumption may well prove true; but it makes the government of Hindu nationalists much too complacent, and ends up undermining the already fragile safeguards for civil liberties in India's imperfect democracy.

The government has been steadily indifferent to the several requests from human rights organizations and Indian political parties for an independent probe into the massacres of March and August. In the Indian parliament, the Union Law Minister asked members from opposition parties to drop their demand for an inquiry into the recent killings since it only helped Pakistan "point accusing fingers at India." A spokesman of the BJP exhorted members of parliament to instead "concentrate on exposing the evil designs of Pakistan."

The Indian media, which usually shares such blinkered nationalism, is unlikely even to attempt to find out the truth behind the killings. A few hours after the murder of the Sikhs in March, the premier TV channel was already asserting, though its correspondent had yet to reach the site, and none of the police and army officers assembled could offer a clue, that the killings were the work of Pakistan-backed guerrillas; and this was to become the general Indian view. Later, the news of the army's killing the five "foreign mercenaries" at Panchalthan was reported in the same unquestioning way. The protests of the villagers against Indian officials were hardly mentioned by the Indian press until unarmed demonstrators were fired upon and nine men died, and then the news was lost again.

There is no point in blaming the Kashmiri journalists who represent Indian newspapers in the valley. All of them know from experience what their bosses in Delhi will or will not publish. And it isn't easy even on the rare occasion that they have full liberty to investigate; the threat of violence from the guerrillas and the Indian security forces is ever-present, and can't be underestimated: several journalists exploring human rights violations have been murdered, many more beaten up and threatened. One's own capacity for exposing oneself to human distress on this scale turns out to be small. The figures alone are numbing. More than 30,000 people, mostly Muslims—and these are conservative figures—have been killed, maimed, or disappeared in the last ten years. The Indian army and police have lost a few thousand men, while they have killed many more Muslim guerrillas and civilians. There is hardly a family among the four million-strong Muslim population of the valley which hasn't been affected by either side. Abbas said, while we discussed possible stories we could cover, "You must do widows and orphans." I had foolishly asked, "Where can I find them?" Abbas had let the remark go; he simply said, "Anywhere." And it was true: widows and orphans were as ubiquitous as graveyards and ruins in the valley.

But I did other things; and after each of my travels around the city and the valley I came back to the hotel room, relieved that the day's work was over, and that I could retreat for some hours at least from the world around me, from the stories—of torture (one hospital alone witnessed 250 cases of death by acute renal failure, caused by putting human bodies under heavy rollers in the army's interrogation centers called Papa 1 and Papa 2), of summary executions, rapes, kidnappings, and arson—stories that came out unprompted in the most casual of conversations with Kashmiris, and that formed the grisly background to life in the valley.

The oldest among Kashmiris often claim that there is nothing new about their condition; that they have been slaves of foreign rulers since the sixteenth century when the Moghul emperor Akbar annexed Kashmir and appointed a local governor to rule the state. In the chaos of post-Moghul India, the old empire rapidly disintegrating, Afghani and Sikh invaders plundered Kashmir at will. The peasantry was taxed and taxed into utter wretchedness; the cultural and intellectual life under indigenous rulers that had produced some of the greatest poetry, music, and philosophy in the subcontinent dried up. Barbaric rules were imposed in the early nineteenth century: a Sikh who killed a Muslim native of Kashmir was fined nothing more than two rupees. Victor Jacquemont, a botanist and friend of Stendhal who came to the valley in 1831, thought that "nowhere else in India were the masses as poor and denuded as they were in Kashmir."

But that background of constant suffering can remain invisible to the casual visitor; the physical beauty of the place—enhanced by the valley's isolation from the rest of the world, and more tempting for foreign adventurers—is still, after ten years of violence, overwhelming. All through my stay, memories of previous trips kept bubbling up, visits made in less troubled times, just before the insurgency began in 1990, especially that first visit which for me—as for anyone who had never been away from the hot dusty Indian plains—was the first exhilarating revelation of beauty.

We hadn't then really noticed the Kashmiris. They did appear very different with their pale, long-nosed faces, their pherans, their strange language, so unlike any Indian language. They also seemed oddly self-possessed. But in the enchanting new world that had opened before me—the big, deep blue skies and the tiny boats becalmed in vast lakes, the cool trout streams and the stately forests of chenar and poplar, the red-cheeked children at roadside hamlets and in apple orchards, the cows and sheep grazing in wide meadows, and, always in the valley, the surrounding mountains with their mysterious promise—in so private an experience of beauty it was hard to admit the inhabitants of the valley, hard to acknowledge the more prosaic facts of their existence: the dependence upon India, the lack of local industry, the growing number of unemployed, educated youth.

Then, as the years passed, the news from Kashmir took its place with the other news—equally bad, of murders and destruction—from Punjab and the Northeast: the distant struggles that were, ultimately, marginal to one's own life in a very large and deprived country where almost everyone is struggling. In any event, one couldn't always get the necessary information about Kashmir. There were some good books published by small imprints; but you had to search hard for them. To read what was reported in the press was to be told that Pakistan had fomented trouble in Kashmir, and the Indian army was taking care of it. It was to understand that there really wasn't a problem except one of law and order, which the relevant military and paramilitary organizations would soon deal with. The missing physical details had to be imagined; and they turned out to be much grimmer than we once could have thought.

Srinagar's big hotel, with its vast lawns and nude trees overlooking the lake, was empty in March; but the staff still felt obliged to work themselves up each morning, like the Indian papers, into cheerful falsehoods: "Everything is fine today, sir. There is no problem at all, there is as much violence here as in any Indian city."

In their softly lit, carpet-muffled offices, with trays of tea and biscuits reg-ularly brought in by uniformed servants, Indian officials presented statistics about the number of guerrillas killed, and the number of guns, rocket launchers, and grenades seized. In a gloomy room, the carpet and curtains and sofa upholstery dark with grime, piles of unread newspapers in one corner, a member of the Kashmir Bar Association presented me with some counterstatistics about the number of Muslims killed (80,000 in his estimation), tortured, raped, or gone missing.

A day before we arrived, a senior guerrilla from one of the pro-Pakistan outfits had been shot dead. But weariness—there had been too many killings of that sort—and the fear of being fired upon by the Indian police or army kept the public mourners in their homes; the streets remained clear of the thousands of grieving men who had once taken the corpses of "martyrs" to the graveyards that were now scattered everywhere in the city, often adjacent to destroyed houses, a sudden swarm of green headstones and irises in the dusty, broken streets.

The festival of Eid came and went, but the shops still closed early, the tense busyness abruptly giving way to silence and darkness, and each evening, in little stockades beside the roads, sheep with purple paint on their back restlessly awaited slaughter. The long boulevard along the lake, filled in my memory with vacationers, remained deserted and dusty, the hotels on the boulevard serving as barracks for paramilitary soldiers. The houseboats cowered under the snow-capped mountains to the north, the jaunty names on their gables—Miss England, Manhattan Adventure—as gaudily ironical as the Bright Career Institute sighted in an alley full of spectacularly ruined houses, heaps of bricks that had already been plundered for wood. Filth lay in small mounds everywhere in the alleys and bazaars of the gray old city—the stronghold of the pro-Pakistan guerrillas—where Indian soldiers stood alert in their improvised bunkers at every bend and corner. The bunkers seemed like little traps, their sandbag walls roofed with corrugated iron and blue weatherbeaten tarpaulin, with LMG muzzles pointing out from little squarish holes between the sandbags, behind which you occasionally saw the frightened eyes in dark faces, the helplessness of soldiers in this hostile setting, hundreds of miles away from home, somehow made more poignant by the "Happy Eid" messages painted in Urdu on little cardboards stuck to the sandbags. And everywhere on the narrow roads you saw, and hastily stepped aside to make way for, the big machine-gun-topped trucks in fast-moving convoys of three or four, often flying the defiant banners—"India Is Great"—of a besieged army.

The military controlled the roads, but the pro-Pakistan guerrillas were still at large in the countryside, the forests and hollows, the hills and flatlands of the valley. The myths once attached to them had been embellished: they now came out of nowhere—detonated a landmine, ambushed a convoy, fired and threw hand grenades at street patrols—and then disappeared. The soldiers and the policemen emerged from the shock and blood to rage against whomever they could. The victims were often civilians who just happened to be around when the guerrillas struck. Whole towns and villages had been laid waste in this way: shops and bazaars burned, houses razed, people shot at random.

It was how Jalaluddin's copy shop at Pattan, a small town few miles north of Srinagar, came to be destroyed by local policemen. The guerrillas had come early in the morning, shot one policeman on the main street and then disappeared out of sight. First, the policemen came looking for the guerrillas, and accused the Muslim shopkeepers of helping the guerrillas escape. Then, before the shopkeepers could pull down their shutters and escape themselves, more policemen came, this time with cans of petrol. Jalaluddin's shop was the first to be set alight possibly because it was very new: he had only recently brought the copy machine and Honda generator from Delhi, a long and difficult journey during which he had to bribe his way past more than one roadblock.

The fire had quickly spread to the adjacent shops in the ramshackle row of single rooms lining the highway, footwear and grocery stores, computer and typing institutes, shaky in structure, quick to combust with their wooden frames. The smell of burnt wood was still in the air when we went to Pattan two days later.

"If you live in Kashmir, you have to be prepared for anything," Abbas had said, and Jalaluddin, and other young men, had already moved beyond rage, hoping now to receive compensation from the government for the destruction of their property large enough to enable them to rebuild their shops. The men—well-educated and articulate, and handsome, with sharp features and artlessly staring eyes in the Kashmiri manner—were matter-of-fact about the lack of options. There were no jobs to be had if you couldn't afford large bribes to government officials: 50,000 rupees simply to get fourth-class employment as a chaprasi (servant), the low-paid connection with a despised government that then exposed you and your family to the fury of the guerrillas.

You didn't have to be involved with the guerrillas to have your property destroyed: the police and the security people knew all about the young men who had gone over to Pakistan; they had all their updated records. The arson was yet another way of asserting their power. An old man, short and squat, with dull, bloodshot eyes in a round, puffy face, came and stood behind Jalaluddin as he spoke. He was the owner of the house that the fire had consumed, and had been lucky to get out with his wife, five daughters, and two grandsons. It was his story that the young men began to tell me—the cousin who had been killed in an "encounter," the son, a banana-seller in the bazaar, whom the police had kidnapped and then returned after a ransom payment of 5,000 rupees.

The young men insisted on showing me the extent of the destruction. The copy shop had been completely gutted, the wooden beams charred and swollen into a kind of delicate filigree. The cream-colored xerox machine lay on the floor, the shiniest and most expensive thing in the shop, and it was with lingering solicitude that Jalaluddin turned it over and around to show the shattered glass and blackened underside. One of the walls had collapsed, exposing the derelict shell, larger when seen from above, of the adjacent burnt house, where a garish poster of a Swiss chalet remained on one of the bare walls, the broadbrushed sentiment on it still legible: "A smile works magic like the sun and makes things bright for everyone."

The Muslim middle class in the valley still largely consists of people connected to the government as elected or non-elected officials, and during the insurgency it hadn't stopped carving out private profits from public works: if anything, the violence and instability, the constant destruction and rebuilding, has offered more opportunities of raiding the state exchequer. Jammu, the Hindu-majority city outside the valley, is full of newly built mansions of senior ministers and bureaucrats; in remote villages in the valley, corruption finding its own level everywhere, the massive new houses of local petty officials stand apart from the enclosing shabbiness.

Twenty miles south of Srinagar, past steep slopes and startlingly panoramic views of pear and apple orchards and rice fields and the tall mountains on the horizon, lies the hillside town of Charar-e-Sharif. It was here that, to the great grief of Kashmiris, both Hindu and Muslim, the shrine of Kashmir's fifteenth-century patron saint, Sheikh Nuruddin, was burned down in 1995 during the fighting. In Kashmir, Islam escaped the taint it acquired elsewhere in the subcontinent from forced conversions and temple-destroying during the several centuries of invasions and conquests by Muslims from Arabia and Central Asia. It came to the valley in the fourteenth century by way of Central Asian and Persian missionaries, and, blending well with earlier Hindu and Buddhist cultures, took on a uniquely Kashmiri character; it was to become known not for invaders, but for the Sufi saints whom both Hindus and Muslims revered. Sheikh Nuruddin was one of the earliest and greatest of these saints.

It wasn't clear who started the fire: the guerrillas, some from Pakistan, who, contemptuous of the pacificism of Sufi Islam, had turned the shrine into a bunker, or the Indian army, which had laid a siege around the shrine. But the destruction was international news, and for some months various Kashmiri political and religious outfits as well as the government repeatedly promised to rebuild the shrine very fast.

Five years later, when we visited them, Charar-e-Sharif and its inhabitants appeared overtaken by events in the valley. The rebuilding amounted to an ungainly corrugated-iron roof over unpainted walls in the middle of a slushy field. A lot of money had been collected from shocked devotees; the government had pitched in; but little work was done, the funds for it disappearing, as with all delayed reconstruction projects, into many pockets.

The part of the town that had been destroyed and partly rebuilt was still a mess of rubble and open gutters and uncollected garbage. A few new houses and shops had come up: small, bare, windowless rooms, often with plastic sheets as doors, where ancient men sat embroidering wicker baskets for kangris (the little earthenware pots with charcoal embers that Kashmiris keep under their pherans), their thin legs drawn up against the walls, a hookah quietly smoldering beside them.

Word of my presence in the town quickly spread. The car, the notebook, and the camera had their own associations here, and now, as we prepared to leave, about forty men appeared before the tiny stationery store where we had been talking to some schoolchildren (there are about twenty schools in the thinly populated region). The men had walked four miles from their village, across the hilly countryside, after hearing that an official-seeming person was in town. The pipes in their area had burst and there had been no water for eight days now. They had trudged to the assistant engineer's office but had found it locked; they had gone to the local police station but hadn't been allowed a hearing; they were now melting the snow in the gullies for water but there wasn't much snow left from the winter. Raggedly dressed, large holes gaping from their pherans, their thickly bearded faces white with dust, they seemed to have emerged out of an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century scene of wretchedness in the valley—of the kind that would have made Victor Jacquemont conclude that nowhere in India were the masses as poor and denuded as in Kashmir.

The continuing backwardness of Kashmir, its failure, or inability, to join the modern world and find new identities for itself: it was what the commissioner of Srinagar, an official of the central Indian government, had spoken to me about at his house; and, more indirectly, what Abbas had said when he told me on the very first day I met him that his ancestors had come to Kashmir from Samarkand in Central Asia.

Their connection to the Islamic world outside India was often exaggerated by leaders of Indian Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it was one way of holding on to an idea of personal and collective worth amid the general degradation of the Muslim community under colonialism. What struck me, however, was that Abbas, whose work as a correspondent for a major Indian newspaper gave him status, even prestige, in Kashmir, even needed to make the claim. But it was really an idea of dignity and selfhood that he was affirming—an idea that could take on a special urgency among such thoroughly trampled-upon people as the Kashmiris.

The troubles began, Kashmiris say, with foreign rule. After the Moghuls, Afghans, and Sikhs, the valley fell in the mid-nineteenth century to a petty Hindu feudal chief who had helped the British defeat the Sikhs. The British ceded the entire state—the valley together with Hindu-majority Jammu, and Buddhist-dominated Ladakh and the northwestern parts that later were to come under Pakistani rule, is slightly smaller than Great Britain—to the Hindu feudal chief for a meager sum of 7.5 million rupees. The sale is still a source of rage and shame for Kashmiris.

Things didn't improve much under the new Hindu rulers. In 1877, a famine killed one third of the population. Thousands of underfed, underclothed Muslims died while carrying rations on their backs for troops in remote Himalayan outposts. Even prostitutes paid one hundred rupees as tax to the maharajah; Muslims found slaughtering cows were banished to the remote Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean. Muslims were rarely given jobs; the administration was staffed overwhelmingly by the small minority of Hindus (about 4 percent of the population in the valley). The maharajah and his Hindu courtiers built up fabulous private fortunes.

The son of the last Hindu maharajah of the state, Karan Singh, records a Buddha-like epiphany in his autobiography. Born in 1931 at the Hotel Martinez in Cannes, an entire floor of which had been taken over by his father, he spent his childhood in Kashmir more or less free of contact with Muslims and poverty. His father, Hari Singh, was fond of shooting and hunting and racing; also, it is said, of London prostitutes. Life in his palace was an endless search for entertainment. As Singh writes, "We spent hours working up lists for lunch and dinner parties, seating plan and menus." Once his father asked a friend to take Singh around the city and show him the kingdom he would one day inherit. The friend drove him to the Muslim majority areas, and pointed at the dilapidated buildings and shabbily dressed men on the streets, and said, "These are your people." Karan Singh was astonished.

The more astonishing thing about this event is its date, in the 1930s. Barely ten years later, India was free of both colonial rule and the maharajahs; the Muslim elite of India were to demand and receive a separate homeland in the form of Pakistan; and the maharajah of Kashmir, faced with a choice between joining India or Pakistan, was to reluctantly accede to India, which had adopted a secular, democratic, and egalitarian constitution, giving to Indians a new idea of themselves, of their past and potential.

But such was the course of Indian history until then that it was mostly Hindus who took up these opportunities, who saw in modern education and the modern world the possibilities of personal and communal development. The Muslims of India, whose political power had been comprehensively destroyed by the British, and many of whose leaders remained trapped by fantasies of recapturing their old glory in India, took some time before even attempting to catch up with the Hindus.

In all this time, the Muslims of Kashmir, cut off from larger events and trends in British-ruled India, and held down by the tiny Hindu minority of rulers and administrators, were barely able to move at all. Illiteracy and poverty were widespread; political opposition to the Hindu maharajah was met with brutality. As in India, a few educated Muslims were left to carry the burden of their country's humiliation and backwardness.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is a group playing an active role in the Iraqi insurgency. Initially led by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006, it is now believed to be led by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (presumed to be the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri).

The group is a direct successor of al-Zarqawi’s previous organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad). Beginning with its official statement declaring allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network in October 2004, the group identifies itself as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (“Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers”).

AQI is one of Iraq’s most feared militant organisations and many experts regard it as the United States’ most formidable enemy in the country. Others suggest that the threat posed by AQI is exaggerated and some scholars claim that a “heavy focus on al-Qaeda obscures a much more complicated situation on the ground.”

Goals and umbrella organizations

In a July 2005 letter to al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War, which included expelling U.S. forces from Iraq, establishing an Islamic authority (caliphate), spreading the conflict to Iraq’s secular neighbors and engaging in battle with Israel. Consistent with their stated plan, the affiliated groups were linked to regional attacks outside Iraq, such as the Sharm al-Sheikh bombings in Egypt. In January 2006, AQI created an umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgents in Iraq. However, its efforts to recruit Iraqi Sunni nationalists and secular groups were undermined by its violent tactics against civilians and its extreme Islamic fundamentalist doctrine. Because of these impediments, the attempt was largely unsuccessful.

AQI used to claim its attacks under the MSC, until mid-October 2006 when Abu Ayyub al-Masri declared the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another front which included the Shura Council factions. The AQI now claims its attacks under the ISI, and claims it’s answering to the supreme emir (leader) of the organization, Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi. According to a study compiled by US intelligence agencies, the ISI have plans to seize power and turn the country into a Sunni Islamic state.

Strength and activity

The group’s strength is unknown, with estimates that have ranged from 850 to several thousand full-time fighters. In 2006, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that AQI’s core membership was in a range of “more than 1,000.” (These figures do not include the other six AQI-led Salafi Jihadi groups organized in the Islamic State of Iraq.) The group is said to be suffering high manpower losses (including from its many “martyrdom” operations), but for a long time this appeared to have little effect on its strength and capabilities, implying a constant flow of volunteers from Iraq and abroad.

According to both the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and the Defense Intelligence Agency reports AQI accounted for 15 percent of attacks in Iraq. However, the Congressional Research Service noted in its September 2007 report that attacks from al-Qaeda are less than two percent of the violence in Iraq and criticized the Bush administration’s statistics, noting that its false reporting of insurgency attacks as AQI attacks has increased since the “surge” operations began. In March 2007, the U.S.-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed al-Qaeda in Iraq attacks for that month and concluded Al-Qaeda in Iraq had taken credit for 43 out of 439 attacks on Iraqi security forces and Shiite militias, and 17 out of 357 attacks on U.S. troops. They seemed to favor suicide and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, typically using cars and other motor vehicles.

According to a 2006 U.S. Government report, this group is most clearly associated with foreign terrorist cells operating in Iraq and has specifically targeted international forces and Iraqi citizens. According to the report, most of AQI’s operatives were not Iraqi, but instead were coming through a series of safe houses, the largest of which is on the Iraq-Syrian border. AQI’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the United States Department of State alleges that the group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.

According to the June 2008 CNN special report, al-Qaeda in Iraq is “a well-oiled organization (...) almost as pedantically bureaucratic as was Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party”, including collecting new execution videos long after they stopped publicising them, with a network of spies even in an American bases. According to the report, Iraqis (many of them former members of Hussein’s secret services) now effectively run al-Qaeda in Iraq and “foreign fighters’ roles seem mostly relegated to the cannon fodder of suicide attacks.” The exception from this is the organization’s top leadership, which is still dominated by non-Iraqis.

Rise and decline

The Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led terrorist group Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which had already gained notoriety for a series of indiscriminate bombings and for graphic videos of hostage executions, officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network in a letter in October 2004. That same month, AQI kidnapped and murdered the Japanese citizen Shosei Koda. In November, al-Zarqawi’s network was the main target of the U.S. Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, but its leadership managed to escape the American siege and subsequent storming of the city. On December 19, al-Qaeda bombed a Shiite funeral procession in Najaf and the main bus station in nearby Karbala, killing at least 60 in the Shiite holy cities in one of its many sectarian attacks. The group also reportedly took responsibility for a September 30 bombing directed at U.S. forces that killed 35 children and seven adults in Baghdad.

In 2005, IQI largely focused on executing high-profile and coordinated suicide attacks, claiming responsibility for numerous attacks which were primarily aimed at Iraqi civilians. The group launched attacks against voters during the Iraqi legislative election in January, a combined suicide and conventional attack on the Abu Ghraib prison in April, and the coordinated suicide attacks outside the Sheraton Ishtar and Palestine Hotel in Baghdad in October. In July, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and execution of Ihab Al-Sherif, Egypt’s envoy to Iraq. A July 2005 three-day series of suicide attacks, including Musayyib marketplace bombing, left at least 150 people dead and more than 260 wounded. Al-Zarqawi also claimed responsibility for the September 14 series of more than a dozen bombings in Baghdad, including the massacre of mostly Shiite unemployed workers, which killed about 160 people and injured 570 in a single day, as well a series of mosque bombings which killed at least 74 people the same month in Khanaqin.

The attacks blamed on or claimed by al-Qaeda in Iraq kept increasing in 2006. In one of the incidents, two American soldiers (Thomas Lowell Tucker and Kristian Menchaca) were captured, tortured and beheaded by the ISI; in another, four Russian embassy officials were abducted and executed. Iraq’s al-Qaeda and its umbrella groups were blamed for multiple attacks targeting Iraqi Shiites, some of which AQI claimed responsibility for. The U.S. also claimed the group was at least one of the forces behind the wave of chlorine bombings in Iraq which affected hundreds of people (albeit with few fatalities) through the series of crude chemical warfare attacks between late 2006 and mid-2007. During 2006, several key members of the AQI were killed or captured by American and allied forces, including al-Zarqawi himself, killed on June 7, 2006, his spiritual adviser Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman, and the alleged “number two” deputy leader Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi.

The high-profile attacks linked to the group continued through early 2007, as the AQI-led Islamic State claimed responsibility for attacks such as the March assassination attempt on Sunni Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Salam al-Zaubai, the April Iraqi Parliament bombing, and the May capture and subsequent execution of three American soldiers. In May, ISI leader al-Baghdadi was declared to have been killed in Baghdad, but his death was later denied by the group (later, al-Baghdadi was declared by the U.S. to be non-existent). There were also conflicting reports regarding al-Masri. In March-August, coalition forces fought a major Battle of Baqubah as part of the largely successful attempts to wrest the Diyala Governorate from AQI-aligned forces. Through 2007, the majority of the suicide bombings targeting civilians in Iraq were routinely identified by the military and government sources as being the responsibility of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, even when there was no claim of responsibility (as was in the case of the 2007 Yazidi communities bombings, which killed some 800 and injured more than 1,500 people in the most deadly terrorist attack in Iraq to date).

As of 2008, a series of U.S. and Iraqi offensives managed to drive out the AQI-aligned insurgents from their former safe havens such in Diyala (see Diyala campaign) and Al Anbar Governorates and the embattled capital of Baghdad to the area of the northern city of Mosul, the latest of the Iraq War’s major battlegrounds. The struggle for control of Ninawa Governorate (Ninawa campaign) was launched in January 2008 by U.S. and Iraqi forces as part of the large-scale Operation Phantom Phoenix aimed at combating al-Qaeda activity in and around Mosul, as well as finishing off the network’s remnants in central Iraq that escaped Operation Phantom Thunder in 2007.

Other activities

Inciting Sectarian Violence through Terrorism

Attacks against civilians often targeted the Iraqi Shia majority in an attempt to incite sectarian violence and greater chaos in the country. Al-Zarqawi purportedly declared an all-out war on Shiites while claiming responsibility for the Shiite mosque bombings. The same month, a statement claiming to be by AQI rejected as “fake” a letter allegedly written by al-Zawahiri, in which he appears to question the insurgents’ tactics in attacking Shiites in Iraq. In a December 2007 video, al-Zawahiri defended the Islamic State in Iraq, but distanced himself from the crimes against civilians committed by “hypocrites and traitors existing among the ranks”.

U.S. and Iraqi officials accused AQI of trying to slide Iraq into a full-scale civil war between Iraq’s majority Shiites and minority Sunni Arabs with an orchestrated campaign of a civilian massacres and a number of highly provocative attacks against high-profile religious targets. With attacks like the first al-Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra, the deadly one-day series of bombings which killed at least 215 people in Baghdad’s Shiite district of Sadr City, and the second al-Askari bombing, they seemed to have succeeded in provoking Shiite militias to unleash a wave of retaliatory attacks, resulting in a plague of death squad-style killings and spiraling further sectarian violence which escalated in 2006 and early 2007.

Operations outside Iraq

AQI claimed an attempted chemical bomb plot in Amman, Jordan in April 2004. On December 3, 2004, AQI also attempted to blow up an Iraqi-Jordanian border crossing, but failed to do so (in 2006, a Jordanian court sentenced Zarqawi (in absentia) and two of his associates to death for their involvement in the plot). AQI also increased its presence outside Iraq by claiming credit for three attacks in 2005. In the most deadly attack, suicide bomb 2005 Amman bombings killed 60 people in Amman, Jordan, on November 9, 2005. They also claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks that narrowly missed the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ashland in Jordan and which also targeted Eilat in Israel, and the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in December. In addition, Lebanese-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam, which was defeated by Lebanese government forces during the 2007 Lebanon conflict, was linked to AQI and led by Zarqawi’s former companion who had fought in Iraq.

Criminal enterprises

The group has long raised money through the various organized crime activities like ransoming kidnapping victims, car theft (sometimes killing drivers), counterfeiting, and hijacking fuel trucks that bring them tens of millions of dollars. According to an April 2007 statement by the rival insurgent faction, the group was demanding money in return for “protection”, killing members of wealthy families when not paid. According to both U.S. and Iraqi sources in May 2008, the Islamic State of Iraq was stepping up its racketeering campaigns as their strictly militant capabilities were on the wane (with especially lucrative activity said to be coming from oil rackets centered on the industrial city of Bayji). According to U.S. military intelligence sources, the group resembles a “Mafia-esque criminal gang.”

Conflicts with the other Sunni militant groups

The first reports of a split and even armed clashes between AQI/MSC and other insurgent Sunni groups date back to 2005. In the summer of 2006, local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups, including the prominent Islamist-nationalist group Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), began to speak of their dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and its tactics, and openly criticized the foreign fighters for their deliberate targeting of civilians. In September 2006, thirty Anbar tribes formed their own local alliance called the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), directed specifically at countering al-Qaeda-allied (“terrorist”) forces in the province, openly siding with the government and the U.S. troops.

By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgents had begun battling with their former allies in AQI in order to retake control of their communities. In early 2007, forces allied to al-Qaeda in Iraq committed a series of attacks against Sunnis critical of the group, including the February 2007 attack in which scores of people were killed when a truck bomb exploded near a mosque in Fallujah. Al-Qaeda also supposedly played a vital role in the assassination of the leader of the Anbar-based insurgent group 1920 Revolution Brigade (military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement). In April 2007, the IAI spokesman accused the ISI of killing at least 30 members of the Islamic Army, as well as members of the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna and Mujahideen Army insurgent groups, and called on Osama bin Laden to personally intervene to rein in al-Qaeda in Iraq. The following month, the government stated that AQI leader al-Masri was killed by ASC fighters. Four days later, AQI released an audio tape in which a man claiming to be al-Masri warned Sunnis not to take part in the political process (later in May the U.S. forces announced the release of dozens of Iraqis who were tortured by AQI as a part of the group’s intimidation campaign), but also said that reports of internal fighting between Sunni militia groups were “lies and fabrications”.

By June 2007, the growing hostility between foreign-influenced religious extremists and Sunni nationalists led to open gun battles between the groups in Baghdad. The Islamic Army, however, soon reached a ceasefire agreement with AQI (yet still refused to sign on to the ISI). There were also reports that Hamas of Iraq insurgents were involved in assisting U.S. troops in their Diyala Governorate operations against al-Qaeda in August 2007. In September 2007, AQI claimed responsibility for the assassination of three people including Sunni sheikh Adbul-Sattar Abu Risha (leader of the Anbar “Awakening council”). That same month, a suicide attack on a mosque in the city of Baqubah killed 28 people, including members of Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, during a meeting at the mosque between tribal, police and guerilla leaders. Meanwhile, the U.S. military began arming moderate insurgent factions on the promise to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq instead of the Americans.

By December 2007, the strength of the “Awakening” movement irregulars (also called “Concerned Local Citizens” and “Sons of Iraq”) was estimated at some 65,000-80,000 fighters. Many of them were former insurgents (including even alienated former AQI supporters), now being armed and paid by the Americans specifically to combat al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq. As of July 2007, this highly controversial strategy proved so far to be effective in helping to secure the Sunni districts of Baghdad and the other hotspots of central Iraq and route out al-Qaeda-aligned militants.

Al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden, remains “the most serious terrorist threat” to the United States according to the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The report assessed that the organization was regrouping and regaining strength in Pakistan’s tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. The group is wanted by the United States for its September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as a host of lesser attacks. To escape the post-9/11 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s central leadership is believed to have fled eastward into Pakistan, securing a safe haven in loosely governed areas there. Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell told the Senate Armed Services Committee in his February 2008 annual threat assessment report that al-Qaeda’s “central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component.”

Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden. It seeks to rid Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes. After al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, attacks on America, the United States launched a war in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda’s bases there and overthrow the Taliban, the country’s Muslim fundamentalist rulers who harbored bin Laden and his followers. “Al-Qaeda” is Arabic for “The Base.”

What are Al-Qaeda’s Origins?

Al-Qaeda grew out of the Services Office, a clearinghouse for the international Muslim brigade opposed to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the 1980s, the Services Office—run by bin Laden and the Palestinian religious scholar Abdullah Azzam—recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign mujahadeen, or holy warriors, from more than fifty countries. Bin Laden wanted these fighters to continue the “holy war” beyond Afghanistan. He formed al-Qaeda around 1988.

Leaders

According to a 1998 federal indictment, al-Qaeda is administered by a council that “discussed and approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations.” At the top is bin Laden. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, is thought to be bin Laden’s top lieutenant and al-Qaeda’s ideological adviser. Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan who was captured by Pakistani authorities in 2002 but managed to escape from U.S. prison in Afghanistan in 2005, has emerged as the public face of al-Qaeda and another top-level leader. Some counterterrorism experts consider him a top strategist and a theological scholar, arguing that his religious scholarship makes him one of the most effective promoters of global jihad. This article quotes Jarret Brachman, a former analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency who is now research director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: “I think he has become the heir apparent to Osama bin Laden in terms of taking over the entire global jihadist movement.”

Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an Egyptian, is an original member of al-Qaeda’s leadership council and has been a trusted adviser to bin Laden for more than a decade. He served time in prison in the early 1980s with deputy leader al-Zawahiri for their role as conspirators in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Another important figure is Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian, who is believed to be under house arrest in Iran along with some other top leaders of the organization. These include Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, an Egyptian and financial officer of al-Qaeda, and Saad bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son and possible successor. Adel and Abdullah are wanted for their role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 200 people. The Washington Post profiles some other top leaders within the network.

The Jordanian radical Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who established the Sunni Muslim extremist group al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and directed a series of deadly terror attacks in Iraq—including the beheadings of kidnapped foreigners—was also associated with al-Qaeda. Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004, and bin Laden praised Zarqawi as “the prince of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. air strike near Baghdad in 2006. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, one of al-Zawahiri’s disciples since joining the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1982, succeeded Zarqawi as AQI leader.

U.S. officials say several top al-Qaeda leaders are in their custody. These include a senior lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah, who was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, a senior commander in Afghanistan. In March 2003, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and al-Qaeda’s treasurer, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, were also captured in Pakistan. They, along with four others detained at Guantanamo Bay, were charged with murder, terrorism, and violating rules of war in February 2008.

Besides being detained, several senior leaders in the network have died or have been killed in the U.S.-led war against terrorists. A senior al-Qaeda commander, Muhammad Atef, died in the U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan. Media reports said Abu Obaidah al-Masri, a senior al-Qaeda leader believed to be involved in the 2005 London subway and bus bombings and in planning attacks in Afghanistan, died of hepatitis in Pakistan in April 2008. In April 2006, Abdul Rahman al-Muhajir and Abu Bakr al-Suri, two of al-Qaeda’s top bomb makers (PDF), were killed in Pakistan. In January 2008, Abu Laith al-Libi, al-Qaeda’s senior military commander and a key link between the group and its affiliates in North Africa, was killed in Pakistan’s tribal areas in a secret U.S. missile strike. GlobalSecurity.org lists senior leaders who were detained or killed.

There is no single headquarters. From 1991 to 1996, al-Qaeda worked out of Pakistan along the Afghan border, or inside Pakistani cities. Al-Qaeda has autonomous underground cells in some 100 countries, including the United States, officials say. Law enforcement has broken up al-Qaeda cells in the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Albania, Uganda, and elsewhere.

To escape the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s leadership once again sought refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas after September 11, 2001. Magnus Ranstorp, an expert on Islamist terrorism, told Radio Free Europe in September 2007 that al-Qaeda is now “exponentially much stronger” than before. Bin Laden, along with some other members of the organization, is thought to be hiding in Pakistan along the Afghan border. Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore says bin Laden’s group is training most of the terrorist groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas. ”Al-Qaeda considers itself as the vanguard of the Islamic movement,” Gunaratna says, and it has introduced its practice of suicide bombings to both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban. One such bombing killed former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 at an election rally. But recent events have turned Pakistanis against al-Qaeda and bin Laden. In a poll (PDF) released in February 2008, Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based nonprofit group, found that only 24 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin Laden in 2008 as compared to 46 percent in August 2007. Similarly, al-Qaeda’s popularity dropped from 33 percent to 18 percent.

Size of Organisation

It’s impossible to say precisely, because al-Qaeda is decentralized. Estimates range from several hundred to several thousand members. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2007 report on terrorism, while the largest concentration of senior al-Qaeda members now reside in Pakistan, the network incorporates members of AQI and other associates throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, and Central Asia who “continue working to carry out future attacks against U.S. and Western interests.”

The international crackdown that followed the 9/11 attacks greatly cut into al-Qaeda’s resources and many of al-Qaeda’s former leaders were captured or killed, leading experts to question the relevance of al-Qaeda’s central leadership. This Backgrounder points out how in these years al-Qaeda transformed from what was once a hierarchical organization with a large operating budget into an an ideological movement. Whereas al-Qaeda once trained its own operatives and deployed them to carry out attacks, it is just as likely to inspire individuals or small groups to carry out attacks, often with no operational support from the larger organization. Experts say al-Qaeda is able to spread its ideology effectively through the internet and al-Sahab, its media wing.

Is Al-Qaeda Connected to other Terrorist Organizations?

Yes. Among them:

Egyptian Islamic Jihad
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)
Jama’at al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Iraq)
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria) (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)
Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)

These groups share al-Qaeda’s Sunni Muslim fundamentalist views. Some terror experts theorize that al-Qaeda, after the loss of its Afghanistan base, may be increasingly reliant on sympathetic affiliates to carry out its agenda. Intelligence Chief McConnell in his February 2008 testimony to the Senate said “AQI remains al-Qa’ida’s most visible and capable affiliate.” The 2007 NIE assessed that al-Qaeda’s association with AQI helped it to “energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.”

Intelligence officials and terrorism experts also say that al-Qaeda has stepped up its cooperation on logistics and training with Hezbollah, a radical, Iran-backed Lebanese militia drawn from the minority Shiite strain of Islam.

What major attacks has al-Qaeda been responsible for?

The group has targeted American and other Western interests as well as Jewish targets and Muslim governments it sees as corrupt or impious—above all, the Saudi monarchy. Al-Qaeda linked attacks include:

The February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq petroleum processing facility, the largest such facility in the world, in Saudi Arabia.
The July 2005 bombings of the London public transportation system.
The March 2004 bomb attacks on Madrid commuter trains, which killed nearly 200 people and left more than 1,800 injured.
The May 2003 car bomb attacks on three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The November 2002 car bomb attack and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli jetliner with shoulder-fired missiles, both in Mombasa, Kenya.
The October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen.
Several spring 2002 bombings in Pakistan.
The April 2002 explosion of a fuel tanker outside a synagogue in Tunisia.
The September 11, 2001, hijacking attacks on four U.S. airplanes, two of which crashed into the World Trade Center, and a third of which crashed into the Pentagon.
The October 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing.
The August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Al-Qaeda is suspected of carrying out or directing sympathetic groups to carry out the December 2007 bomb and suicide attacks in Algiers; May 2003 suicide attacks on Western interests in Casablanca, Morocco; the October 2002 nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia; and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Pakistani President Musharraf blames al-Qaeda for two attempts on his life in December 2003.

Plots linked to al-Qaeda that were disrupted or prevented include: a 2001 attempt by Richard Reid to explode a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight; a 1999 plot to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport; a 1995 plan to blow up twelve transpacific flights of U.S. commercial airliners; a 1995 plan to kill President Bill Clinton on a visit to the Philippines; and a 1994 plot to kill Pope John Paul II during a visit to Manila.

How is al-Qaeda connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing?

There are strong links. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the militant cleric convicted in the 1993 plot, once led an Egyptian group now affiliated with al-Qaeda; two of his sons are senior al-Qaeda officials. And Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was convicted of masterminding the 1993 attack, planned al-Qaeda’s foiled attack on American airliners over the Pacific Ocean. He is also the nephew of the former senior al-Qaeda terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is now in U.S. custody.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya is a radical group that seeks to install an Islamic regime in place of the secular Egyptian government. According to the State Department’s 2007 Country Report on Egypt, the group is responsible for the deaths of dozens of foreign tourists in Egypt in the 1990s. It has been listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department since 2001. Although the group has not carried out an attack in over a decade and the Egyptian-based leadership has rejected violence, some members of a more extreme faction are alleged to have connections to al-Qaeda. A spiritual leader who is aligned with the extreme faction of Jamaat, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, was convicted and jailed in the United States as the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center attacks.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya, which means “the Islamic Group,” is Egypt’s largest Islamist militant organization and has a presence both in Egypt and abroad. As a radical offshoot of the much older and more grassroots-oriented Muslim Brotherhood, the group has been active since the 1970s. According to the State Department, Jamaat attracts young unemployed graduates and students from urban areas but operates primarily in the southern governorates of Egypt.

Historically, members have campaigned to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic regime. Jamaat used violence within the country to influence a popular movement supporting an Islamic regime and refused to consider a political compromise. The group is best known for the Luxor attack in 1997 that killed fifty-eight foreign tourists and four Egyptians. Attacks on tourists, however, put the group on the fringe of society as the country began to suffer economically from a decrease in tourism. Tourism officials said that the Luxor attack cost Egypt an estimated 50 percent of its average $3.7 billion tourism revenue in 1998, reported the BBC. It is estimated that it took two years for tourism to rebound to the pre-Luxor attack numbers. Following a violent campaign of attacks against the Egyptian government, Coptic Christians, tourists, and other targets, Jamaat al-Islamiyya has largely honored a March 1999 cease-fire with the Egyptian government.

Jamaat targeted foreign tourists in Egypt in many attacks on the grounds that they represent the seeping of Western characteristics, such as secularism, into Egyptian culture. The anti-secularism sentiment led some members, mainly the exiled people who are affliated with al-Qaeda, from the regime-change doctrine towards a broader anti-Western campaign. Jamaat al-Islamiyya, as an organization, has not specifically attacked U.S. citizens or facilities, but “disaffected” members have expressed intentions to attack the United States and are known to have joined al-Qaeda and trained at its camps in Afghanistan, the State Department said in its 2005 Country Report on Egypt. The Jamaat spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, is serving a life sentence in the United States for his involvement in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. (In April 2002, the Justice Department charged that Rahman tried to direct further terrorist operations from his cell in Minnesota.)

The loosely organized Jamaat was not active in 2007 and has not claimed responsibility for any recent attacks. The State Department says that the external wing, composed of exiled Egyptians, still seeks to overthrow the government and replace it with an Islamic regime.

Despite remaining classified as the largest militant group in Egypt, Jamaat’s senior leadership in the country has largely denounced violence over the last several years. In August 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri, an associate of Osama bin Laden, announced that Jamaat al-Islamiyya had merged with al-Qaeda. Jamaat leadership in Egypt quickly rejected the claim, according to the State Department. The faction of Jamaat leadership that adhered to two cease-fires in the late 1990s “declared the use of violence misguided and renounced its future use” in March 2002 although members abroad rejected this dramatic shift in ideology, says the State Department.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya members collaborated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad on the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and, according to the State Department, is suspected in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1995. Selected other attacks have been attributed to the group by press reports:

A 1992-1993 series of attacks killed dozens;
The 1992 assassination of a radical Islam opponent, Farag Foda, was claimed by Jamaat;
A September 1997 ambush near the Egyptian Museum in Cairo killed nine German tourists and their driver;
A November 1997 attack on a resort in Luxor killed fifty-eight tourists and four Egyptians in a shooting spree.

After a 1997 cease-fire Jamaat unofficially split into two factions. One group, led by Mustafa Hamza, agreed to the cease-fire. Rifa’i Taha Musa and his followers supported the militant operations. Musa, in the following year, signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa that called for attacks on the United States. According to the State Department, Musa went missing in 2001 several months after publishing a book justifying militant operations that produce mass casualties.

Since Zawahiri asserted an al-Qaeda connection with Jamaat, the people opposed to the cease-fire separated from the group and Jamaat “has since concentrated its efforts on revising its former extremist worldview and distinguishing itself from al-Qaeda,” wrote the Jamestown Institute in a 2006 report. The State Department claims that al-Qaeda and other Afghan militant groups support Jamaat.

Egypt has waged a bitter campaign of state violence, mass arrests, and financial crackdowns against Jamaat al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other Islamist groups during much of the 1990s. Experts say the government has largely succeeded in stopping them from carrying out terrorist attacks inside Egypt. But human rights groups say that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s regime has often used torture as part of its crackdown and sometimes has taken family members of Islamist leaders hostage.

Hundreds of Islamists were released from Egyptian prisons in the autumn of 2003. Among those set free was Jamaat al-Islamiyya leader Karam Zuhdi, who expressed regret for his collaboration with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1981 assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. As a political gesture, President Mubarak’s government timed the release of Zuhdi and Islamists to coincide with the 30th anniversary of Egypt’s 1973 war with Israel.

Yes. The disputed majority Muslim region has its own local terrorist groups, but most of the recent terrorism there has been conducted by Islamist outsiders who seek to claim Kashmir for Pakistan. A spate of Islamist cross-border attacks into Indian-held territory and the December 2001 storming of the Indian parliament in New Delhi have reinforced Kashmir’s standing as the key bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Both states have nuclear weapons, making Kashmir one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.

Yes. Many terrorists active in Kashmir received training in the same madrasas, or Muslim seminaries, where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters studied, and some received military training at camps in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Moreover, the Kashmiri terrorists’ leadership has al-Qaeda connections. The leader of the Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen group, Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, signed al-Qaeda’s 1998 declaration of holy war, which called on Muslims to attack all Americans and their allies. Maulana Masood Azhar, who founded the Jaish-e-Muhammad organization, traveled to Afghanistan several times to meet Osama bin Laden. Azhar’s group is suspected of receiving funding from al-Qaeda, U.S. and Indian officials say.

Yes, experts say. Pakistan, which used to back Islamist militants in Kashmir, changed course after September 11. After the December 2001 attack on India’s parliament, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf promised to crack down on terrorist groups active in Kashmir. In response, members of these extremist groups have gone underground, taken other names, and formed new, ad hoc configurations. Experts say some of these militants have branched out into attacks on Shiite and Christian minorities, American facilities, and other Western targets in Pakistan.

After Delhi and Islamabad agreed to launch a landmark bus service in February 2005 across the ceasefire line dividing Kashmir, militants vowed to target the service. In April of the same year, one bus survived a grenade attack.

India now holds about two-thirds of the disputed territory, which it calls Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls about one-third, which it calls Azad (meaning “free”) Kashmir. China also controls two small sections of northern Kashmir.

Kashmir been a constant source of tension since 1947, when the British partitioned their imperial holdings in South Asia into two new states, India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, incorporating the majority Muslim province of Kashmir is a basic national aspiration bound up in its identity as a Muslim state. Meanwhile, India sees the province as key to its identity as a secular, multiethnic state. India and Pakistan fought three wars over the region in 1947, 1965, and 1971. At least 35,000 people have died in political violence in Kashmir since 1990.

The State Department lists three Islamist groups active in Kashmir as foreign terrorist organizations: Harakat ul-Mujahedeen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The first group has been listed for years, and the other two were added after the December 2001 Indian parliament attack. All three groups have attracted Pakistani members as well as Afghan and Arab veterans who fought the 1980s Soviet occupation of nearby Afghanistan.

Harakat ul-Mujahedeen (“Islamic Freedom Fighters’ Group”) was established in the mid-1980s. Based first in Pakistan and then in Afghanistan, it has several thousand armed supporters in Pakistan and Kashmir. Harakat members have participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Burma, Tajikistan, and Bosnia.
Jaish-e-Muhammad (“Army of Muhammad”) was established in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani cleric. Jaish, which attracted Harakat members, has several hundred armed supporters in Kashmir and Pakistan.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Pure”), active since 1993, is the military wing of the well-funded Pakistani Islamist organization Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad, which recruited volunteers to fight alongside the Taliban. India says that over the last several years, the group has split into two factions, al-Mansurin and al-Nasirin. There is wide speculation that Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the July 11, 2006 string of bombings on Mumbai’s commuter railroad, though a spokesman for the group denied any involvement.

Since Pakistan outlawed these groups, attacks in Kashmir and Pakistan have been carried out under other guises. One group calling itself al-Qanoon or Lashkar-e-Omar is thought to be a coalition of members of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other Pakistan-based Islamist groups, including the anti-Shiite Lashkar-e-Jhangvi organization. Another new militant group reported to have emerged is the Save Kashmir Movement (SKM).

Al-Qaeda in South Africa

Terrorist activity in North Africa has been reinvigorated in the last few years by a local Algerian Islamist group turned pan-Maghreb jihadi organization: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A Sunni group that previously called itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq. Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group’s leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated, and better-financed direction. Long categorized as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria’s military government, AQIM claims to be the local franchise operation for al-Qaeda, a worrying development for a region that has been relatively peaceful since the bloody Algerian civil war of the 1990s drew to a close. European officials are taking AQIM’s international threats seriously and are worried about the growing number of Europe-based cells, states this Europol Report (PDF).

AQIM originated as an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. Its insurrection began after Algeria’s military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 when it seemed that the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. In 1998, the group declared its independence from another terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), believing the GIA’s brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The GSPC gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting the government while avoiding the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The group has since surpassed the GIA in influence and numbers to become the primary force for Islamism in Algeria.

A government amnesty program and a persistent counterterrorism campaign by the Algerian army significantly decreased the number of local terrorists, which at its highest point in the 1990s was estimated as high as 28,000. According to the U.S. State Department, which compiles yearly statistics on terrorist groups, AQIM’s membership is now in the hundreds.

But there are indications that terrorism in North Africa is on the rise and that AQIM is using the Iraq war and other unpopular Western policies to recruit new membership. “Despite the official happy talk,” says Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based foreign affairs consultant, “kidnappings by Islamists to raise money for their cause are a routine occurrence in Algeria. And not a day goes by without terrorists’ attacking military personnel, government employees, or ordinary civilians, whom they regard as allies of the government.”

Collusion between AQIM and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a 2007 report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC’s early formation. Many of the group’s founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially approved GSPC’s merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006. AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name.

Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria’s secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a theocracy based on Islamic law that for twelve centuries spanned the Muslim world. Counterterrorism experts, however, say the group’s folding into the global al-Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq. “Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself,” said Henry A. Crumpton, U.S. ambassador for counterterrorism, during April 2006 Senate subcommittee testimony.

Algerian authorities consider the name change to be a last-ditch attempt to revitalize a domestic insurgency. However, AQIM’s vocal support of al-Qaeda and declaration of solidarity (PDF) with Islamic extremists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya indicate broader intent. “Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother,” AQIM’s current leader, Abdelmalek Droukdal, said in a July 2008 interview with the New York Times. In keeping with this statement, the group has issued several communiqués that expand its targets—originally the Algerian military and France—to include the United States. AQIM has accused America of propping up the “apostate” Algerian regime and leading a crusade against Muslims.

AQIM employs conventional terrorist tactics (PDF) in Algeria, including guerilla-style ambushes against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, according to the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment.

In December 2006, the group attacked two buses carrying contractors near Algiers, wounding several foreign nationals. Four months later, the group killed twenty-three people with twin bombings in Algiers. One of the bombs exploded outside the prime minister’s office, a move CFR Senior Fellow Steven A. Cook describes as “a major escalation.” In December 2007, the group was behind a double suicide bombing in Algiers that killed forty-one people, including seventeen UN staff members. These attacks, as well as a June 2008 twin suicide bombing of an army outpost, suggest the group is relying more on suicide attacks as its preferred method. The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism says this development is a nod to al-Qaeda and a wish to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq.

Some experts warn the group’s growing confidence could increase its willingness to target Westerners both inside and outside Algeria. The group has called for jihadis who can’t reach the battlefields of Iraq to target Jews, Christians, and apostates (PDF) in their own regions. AQIM has taken over, and some say revitalized, many Europe-based cells of the former GIA for both fundraising and recruiting. In spite of its growing global presence, some experts doubt AQIM’s ability to carry out a Qaeda-scale attack. “They haven’t done anything spectacular,” says Hugh Roberts, an expert on North African politics and former head of the International Crisis Group’s North Africa project. “They have not actually pulled off a single terrorist attack in Europe in the eight years they’ve existed. And that’s a fact that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the group is a major threat.”

On the other hand, Bruce Reidel, a former CIA counterterrorism official now with the Brookings Institution, writes that AQIM has been steadily building up its capability to carry out attacks in Western Europe and even North America. In June 2008, Spanish authorities uncovered a terrorist cell in Spain, arresting eight men and detaining ten accused of providing logistical and financial support to AQIM. This follows French police uncovering a similar cell in the outskirts of Paris in December 2007. Arrests of suspected terrorists with ties to AQIM have been made throughout Europe in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Some analysts point to thwarted attacks and arrests of AQIM-linked terrorists as evidence the group is capable of attacks in Western Europe.

After the 1979-1989 insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan, hundreds of North African volunteers known as “Afghan Arabs” returned to the region and radicalized Islamist movements. Most of the group’s main leaders are believed to have trained in Afghanistan. Abdelmalek Droukdal, also known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, is the current chief of the group. University-educated as a science student and well known for his bomb-making abilities, he has led the group since 2004, when its previous leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed in a firefight with Algerian forces.

Amari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak el-Para because he was trained as an Algerian paratrooper, is a former leader of the group that remains an important figure. Saifi is best known for organizing the lucrative 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in the Algerian Sahara. He was known as the “Bin Laden of the desert” and classified as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the United States, a title shared by top al-Qaeda commanders before he was captured in Chad in 2004 and eventually extradited to Algeria. In February 2008, AQIM militants kidnapped two Austrian tourists in Tunisia and listed el-Para’s release as one of their demands. Algerian courts recently sentenced him to death, though the last execution in the country occurred in 1993.

Smuggling and petty crimes are a lucrative source of income, according to the CPT report. The porous, unpoliced borders of the Sahara region make smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, and arms particularly easy. Europe-based cells provide funds to AQIM through drug dealing, counterfeiting money, and other illegal activities, French and Italian police forces reported to Europol in 2008. The ransom paid as a result of the 2003 kidnapping provided a significant windfall for the group. To continue its tradition of self-financing, writes counterterrorism consultant Olivier Guitta, AQIM operatives may be turning more to kidnapping as a source of income. The group reportedly requested five million pounds for the ransom of two Austrian tourists in 2008. Algerian authorities have accused Iran and Sudan of giving material support to AQIM, but experts say that is unlikely.

Yes. AQIM has funneled North African insurgents to Iraq to fight as suicide bombers, foot soldiers, and mid-level commanders, says Hunt. Although counting foreign fighters is difficult, Evan Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq, although the vast majority are still of Saudi and Jordanian origin. Adil Sakir al-Mukni, a key link between AQIM and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was deported by the Syrian government in 2005 for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq. AQIM reportedly called on the Zarqawi network to attack French nationals in Iraq and applauded the 2005 killing of two Algerian diplomats there.

The Armed Islamic Group, known by its French acronym, GIA, waged a violent war against Algeria’s secular military regime during the 1990s. Though terrorism continues to plague Algerian society, the GIA’s role in current violence appears to have abated. The GIA grew out of a 1992 decision by Algeria’s military government to cancel an election in which it appeared that a moderate, mainstream Muslim party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was headed for victory. The backlash took many forms, including formation of the Islamic Salvation Army, a militant group linked with the FIS. But the separate and more radical GIA soon gained a notorious reputation for mayhem and murder, targeting those affiliated—even remotely—with the military and the government, as well as innocents and foreign nationals. The GIA vowed to raze the secular Algerian government and, in its place, establish a Muslim state ruled by sharia, or Islamic law. The ensuing civil war ranked as one of the most violent in the world during the 1990s but petered out in 2002 following a cease-fire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army, a group that never condoned the civilian violence perpetrated by the GIA. While the GIA is now largely defunct, it remains designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. Algerian and Western counterterrorism officials say that many members may have defected in recent years and joined al-Qaeda or its sister organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

One of the GIA’s leaders, Antar Zouabri, has proclaimed: “in our war, there is no neutrality. Except for those who are with us, all others are renegades.” International press during the 1990s focused on the large number of journalists and intellectuals who were beheaded or whose throats were slit during Algeria’s civil war. GIA leaders were quoted as saying, “those who fight against us by the pen will die by the sword.” Journalists were considered to be supporters of the military regime and a secular society. The GIA had enormous animosity toward the media, and particularly Algerians who wrote in French, the language of the former colonial power. The extremist Islamic background of the GIA also included a disdain for liberated women. Women not wearing the hijab, or headscarf, women in professional careers, or women who refused mu’ta, the practice of temporary marriages of pleasure, were often murdered. The GIA was especially known for—and received much criticism for—killing the female relatives and children of the military. The group justified this by citing an extremist concept called takfir, which is a form of excommunication. In these cases, takfir was used to label a Muslim associated with the military regime as an infidel and therefore game for attack.

The group also expressed a vehement opposition to the presence of foreigners in Algeria. During the civil conflict, over 120 foreign nationals were killed by the GIA. France, which supported the military government, became a target as well. The GIA orchestrated international terrorist attacks in the country, most notably the 1994 hijacking of an Air France plane and the bombing of two Paris Metro stations the following year. Other Western countries were also accused of meddling in Algerian affairs; in 1995 the GIA issued a threatening communiqué demanding that all Western embassies and foreigners leave the country.

Jews, Christians, and even moderate Muslims were also among the GIA’s targets. Al Ansar, or The Supporters, a weekly GIA newspaper with headquarters in Europe, frequently published inflammatory rhetoric against Jews and Christians. Several Muslims who professed their wish to use diplomacy with the government were killed and their deaths publicized to set an example. The wantonness with which the GIA killed Muslims contributed significantly to its demise.

Like lots of violent Islamic movements around the world, many militants in the GIA appear to trace their radicalization to Afghanistan, where they fought as mujahedeen, or Islamic guerillas, against the Soviet army from 1979 to 1989. As Afghan returnees, these radicals sought to transplant the idea that secular government is, by definition, illegitimate and repeat their success in Afghanistan against the Algerian regime. Other GIA members included advocates of violent political change who were disenchanted with the moderate FIS’s reliance on rigged political processes. William B. Quandt, a former senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, categorized the GIA as “a home-grown phenomenon,” facilitated by the training of the mujahedeen. Several other experts agree that the GIA rose to such massive proportions due to a general disaffection with the political environment of the time.

But as a group, the GIA only became coherent in 1992 when the military preempted the FIS electoral victory. Many members of the FIS were arrested and several paramilitary groups formed in response to the government’s crackdown. The GIA emerged as one of several radical FIS splinter factions and quickly became the dominant terrorist organization in the country. By 1994, it was recruiting upwards of five hundred young men a week into its ranks.

The U.S. State Department dates the GIA’s last significant terrorist attack to 2001, but this is debated. Some sources attribute the group with unclaimed terrorist attacks up until 2005, though the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is the more likely culprit. The Salafists, who ultimately became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, eclipsed the GIA in numbers and popularity in 1998 by denouncing indiscriminant violence against civilians-a trademark of the GIA. The Salafists subsequently subsumed most of the GIA’s networks and financial resources in Europe. The final blows came in 2004, when Algerian police forces launched a widespread crack down on all local terrorist groups. Over four hundred members of both the GIA and the Salafists were arrested in that sweep.

Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, one of the chief ideologues of the global jihad movement, writes that leaders of al-Qaeda extolled the GIA’s actions to further popularize global jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a prominent al-Qaeda leader, even provided religious justification for the GIA’s violent tactics. On the other hand, some experts say that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden distanced himself and al-Qaeda from the GIA and instead supported the more popular GSPC, further contributing to the GIA’s decline.

Leaders of Al-Qaeda

Abu Sayyaf, whose name means “bearer of the sword” in Arabic, is a militant organization based in the southern Philippines. It seeks a separate Islamic state for the country’s Muslim minority. The White House says Abu Sayyaf is a terrorist organization that boasts of ties to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network, as well as the Indonesian network of Jemaah Islamiyah.

How did Abu Sayyaf form?

In the early 1990s, Abu Sayyaf split from the Moro National Liberation Front, one of the two major Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines, which were then trying to come to terms with the central government in Manila. The group’s first major attack came in 1991, when an Abu Sayyaf grenade killed two American evangelists.

Who organized Abu Sayyaf?

Its first leader was Abdurajak Janjalani, a Philippine Muslim who fought in the international Islamist brigade in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi businessman living in the Philippines, provided crucial financing and organizational support for Abu Sayyaf in its early years. From 1998 to 2006 the group was led by Khadaffy Janjalani, who took over the leadership position when his older brother Abdurajak was killed.

What is the status of the Abu Sayyaf leadership?

Abu Sayyaf suffered major losses of leadership in 2006 and 2007. In September 2006 Khadaffy Janjalani was killed in a clash with troops on Jolo Island. In January 2007, U.S.-backed Philippine troops killed Abu Sulaiman, a senior Abu Sayyaf commander and Janjalani’s likely successor. Romeo Ricardo, chief of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group, said that the two leaders were the main contacts (AP) to Middle Eastern donors who provided funding to the group and to Islamic militants in Indonesia. Radullan Sahiron, a one-armed septuagenarian and senior leader in the group, was promoted to the top leadership position in January 2007. However, it was unclear how active a role he would play in Abu Sayyaf’s operations. In a June 2008 article, Zachary Abuza, a leading scholar on terrorism in Southeast Asia, writes that Abu Sayyaf now lacks “any semblance of central leadership” (PDF).

What kinds of terrorist acts does Abu Sayyaf commit?

Historically, Abu Sayyaf has engaged in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion. In February 2004, the group planted a bomb in a passenger ferry docked off the coast of Manila, killing more than one hundred people. The Philippine government is in the middle of a military offensive against Abu Sayyaf rebels in the south in efforts to quell the group’s attacks against civilians.

Previous Abu Sayyaf attacks include:

A May 2001 incident when Abu Sayyaf kidnapped twenty people, including three Americans, at a Philippine resort and demanded ransom payments. Abu Sayyaf beheaded one of the American captives and held the other two Americans—a Christian missionary couple—hostage on Basilan Island in the southern Philippines. In June 2002, U.S.-trained Philippine commandos tried to rescue the couple and a Filipino nurse being held with them. Two of the hostages were killed in the shoot-out, and one, the American missionary Gracia Burnham, was freed;
In August 2002, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped six Filipino Jehovah’s Witnesses and beheaded two of them.

According to a 2007 Congressional Research Service report (PDF), Abu Sayyaf reoriented its strategy during the leadership of Khadaffy Janjalani. Janjalani deemphasized kidnapping for ransom and instead emphasized developing capabilities for urban bombings. Since March 2004, the Philippine government reportedly has uncovered several Abu Sayyaf plots to carry out bombings in Manila, and the report adds that Jemaah Islamiyah had trained about sixty Abu Sayyaf members in bomb assembling and detonation by mid-2005. But according to Abuza, Abu Sayyaf is low on funds, and has recently reverted back to kidnapping for ransom.

Does Abu Sayyaf target Americans?

Yes, although most of its victims are Filipinos. In addition to the kidnapping in 2001 in which an American was beheaded, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped an American Bible translator on a southern Philippine island in 1993. In 2000, Abu Sayyaf captured an American Muslim visiting Jolo Island and demanded that the United States release Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Ramzi Yousef, who were jailed for their involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. “We have been trying hard to get an American because they may think we are afraid of them,” a spokesman for Abu Sayyaf said. “We want to fight the American people.” Abu Sayyaf has also captured local businesspeople and Philippine schoolchildren, but Western hostages make for larger ransom payments.

Where does Abu Sayyaf operate?

Abu Sayyaf mostly operates in the southern Philippines, specifically in the Sulu Archipelago and the easternmost island of Mindanao. But the group has acted in other parts of the Philippines, and in 2000, its members crossed the Sulu Sea to Malaysia for a kidnapping. Since 2001, Philippine military operations, supported by the United States, have weakened Abu Sayyaf on Basilan Island and in the Sulu islands southwest of Baslian.

How big is Abu Sayyaf?

Estimates vary. Counterterrorism efforts by the Philippine government seem to have pressured the group in recent years: In 2007, the government killed 127 members of Abu Sayyaf and captured an additional thirty-eight. But Abu Sayyaf has been improving ties with regional organizations, like Jemaah Islamiyah and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an Islamic separatist group dating from the 1970s located in the southern Philippines. Thus, even though Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength fell from an estimated one thousand in 2002 to between two hundred and four hundred in 2006, the capabilities of the organization may be growing.

What is Jemaah Islamiyah?

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a militant Islamist group active in several Southeast Asian countries that’s seeking to establish a pan-Islamic state across much of the region. Anti-terror authorities struck a blow against Jemaah Islamiyah (“Islamic Organization” in Arabic) when they arrested its operational chief, Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin, also known as Hambali, in Thailand August 2003. More recently, authorities in Jakarta arrested JI’s leader, Abu Dujana, and seven other group members in June 2007. JI is alleged to have attacked or plotted against U.S. and Western targets in Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The most recent attack believed to have been carried out by JI operatives came on October 1, 2005, when a series of suicide bombings killed at least nineteen people and wounded more than 100 in Bali, a beachfront city and international tourist destination.

Have authorities pursued Jemaah Islamiyah?

Authorities in the region have arrested more than 200 members of the group for allegedly planning an October 12, 2002, bombing that killed 202 people at a Bali nightclub. Three of the four main suspects behind the bombing have been sentenced to death in Indonesia. JI is also suspected in the August 5, 2003, car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed twelve, and the September 9, 2004, attack, which apparently targeted the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Before the Bali bombing, Indonesian authorities had not aggressively investigated the group, though Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines had cracked down on it. After the Bali attack, the United States—which suspects the group of having ties to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network—designated Jemaah Islamiyah a foreign terrorist organization.

Has Jemaah Islamiyah targeted Americans or American interests?

Yes. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said in January 2003 that “information indicates that Hambali was involved in a 1995 plot to bomb eleven U.S. commercial airliners in Asia and directed the late-2001 foiled plot to attack U.S. and Western interests in Singapore,” referring to Jemaah Islamiyah’s plans to attack the U.S., British, and Israeli embassies in December 2001. In the most recent Bali attacks, two Americans were reportedly wounded.

Why hadn’t the United States designated Jemaah Islamiyah a foreign terrorist organization before the Bali bombing?

Because of reluctance to anger Indonesian public sentiment. While Singapore and Malaysia would have supported adding the group to Washington’s list earlier, the United States had been trying to secure Indonesia’s cooperation on the war on terror without alienating its Muslim political parties or undermining its then-moderate president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general who was elected Indonesia’s president in October 2004, has done more to clamp down on JI and other Islamic extremist groups than his predecessor, experts say. The first Bali bombing also spurred Indonesia to acknowledge the extent of its terrorism problem, and the U.S. designation followed. Listing Jemaah Islamiyah as a foreign terrorist organization restricts the group’s finances and its members’ travel.

Does Jemaah Islamiyah have links to al-Qaeda?

Probably, but experts disagree on the extent of them. Some U.S. officials and terrorism experts refer to JI as al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian wing and say the group is capable of opening a second front against U.S. interests in the region. Other experts argue the two terrorist groups are not that closely linked and add that Jemaah Islamiyah’s regional goals do not fully match al-Qaeda’s global aspirations. Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s alleged spiritual leader, denies the group has ties to al-Qaeda, but has expressed support for Osama bin Laden. A Qaeda operative arrested in Indonesia reportedly told U.S. investigators that Bashir was directly involved in Qaeda plots.

At the very least, a few individuals have been linked to both groups. Hambali is the Jemaah Islamiyah leader thought to be most closely linked to al-Qaeda. He allegedly has been involved in several terrorist attacks and plots in the region. Some experts say he may have delegated some of his operational responsibilities while he was being pursued by Indonesian and other intelligence services. Other individuals with suspected ties to both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have been detained in the region, and some have been turned over to U.S. investigators.

What is the size of Jemaah Islamiyah?

It’s unclear. Experts say the group has cells operating throughout Southeast Asia, including in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and possibly the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. Weak central authority, lax or corrupt law enforcement, and open maritime borders in some of these countries ease JI’s ability to operate throughout the region. It is unclear how crackdowns in several countries since the Bali bombings have affected the group. Officials estimate the size of JI may vary from several hundred to a few thousand members.

When was Jemaah Islamiyah founded?

The name Jemaah Islamiyah dates to the late 1970s, but experts aren’t certain if the name referred to a formal organization or an informal gathering of like-minded Muslim radicals—or a government label for Islamist malcontents. The group has its roots in Darul Islam, a violent radical movement that advocated the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country and also home to Christians, Hindus, and adherents of other faiths. Darul Islam sprang up as the country emerged from Dutch colonial rule in the late 1940s, and its followers continued to resist the postcolonial Indonesian republic, which it saw as too secular. Some experts say JI was formed by a small handful of Indonesian extremists exiled in Malaysia in the late 1980s. In its early years, JI renounced violence, but the group shifted tactics in the late 1990s because of suspected links with al-Qaeda figures in Afghanistan.

Who is the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah?

Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian of Yemeni descent, is thought to be the group’s spiritual leader—and, some speculate, an operational leader as well. Bashir joined Darul Islam in the 1970s and was imprisoned in Indonesia for Islamist activism. In 1985, after a court ordered him back to prison, Bashir fled to Malaysia. There, he recruited volunteers to fight in the anti-Soviet Muslim brigades in Afghanistan and sought funding from Saudi Arabia while maintaining connections with former colleagues in Indonesia.

After the Indonesian dictator Suharto stepped down in 1998, Bashir returned home to run a pesantren—a Muslim seminary—in Solo, on the Muslim-majority island of Java. He also took up leadership of the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, an Islamist umbrella group. Bashir has denied involvement in terrorism. Following the October 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesian officials demanded Bashir submit to questioning about that and earlier attacks. In 2003, he was convicted of treason, but the charge was soon after overturned by the Jakarta High Court and, in April 2004, Bashir was released from prison. Citing new evidence, Indonesia authorities re-arrested Bashir the same day. On March 5, 2005, he was acquitted of charges that he participated in the 2003 attacks in Jakarta but was found guilty of conspiracy for the 2002 Bali bombings and sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison, which the U.S. and Australian governments criticized as too lenient.

Who are the other leadership figures?

Among Southeast Asia’s most-wanted terrorists are Azhari Husin and Mohammed Noordin Top, both Malaysian-born members of Jemaah Islamiyah. Husin, a Britain-educated engineer and explosives expert, and Top, a former accountant, are allegedly behind the attacks of the Marriott and Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

Until his arrest in 2003, Hambali played the most important leadership role in Jemaah Islamiyah, according to U.S. and Asian intelligence officials. He was the group’s operational chief, they say, and was closely involved in several terrorist plots. U.S. officials announced August 14, 2003, that he was arrested by Thai authorities in Ayutthaya, about sixty miles north of Bangkok, and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. State Department says Hambali was the head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s regional shura, its policymaking body, and suspected of being al-Qaeda’s operations director for East Asia. The State Department in January 2003 froze Hambali’s assets and the assets of another suspected terrorist, Mohamad Iqbal Abdurraham, also known as Abu Jibril. The department said that, until his arrest in Malaysia in June 2001, Abu Jibril was “Jemaah Islamiyah’s primary recruiter and second-in-command.”

What prior attacks has Jemaah Islamiyah been linked to?

The group—or individuals affiliated with it—is thought to be tied to several terrorist plots. Among them:

The October 1, 2005, suicide bombings in Bali that killed at least nineteen people.
The September 2004 suicide car bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta that killed three people and left more than 100 wounded.
The August 2003 car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed twelve people.
The October 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the predominantly Hindu island of Bali that killed 202 people, most of them foreign tourists from Australia and elsewhere. Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, a forty-one-year-old mechanic from East Java, was convicted on August 8, 2003, for buying the vehicle used in the main explosion and buying and transporting most of the chemicals used for the explosives. He was the first of thirty-three suspects arrested for the bombings to be convicted.
A December 2000 wave of church bombings in Indonesia that killed eighteen. Asian and U.S. officials say Hambali had a hand in these attacks, and Indonesian officials arrested J.I. leader Bashir for questioning in connection with this anti-Christian campaign.
A December 2000 series of bombings in Manila that killed twenty-two people. The State Department says Hambali helped plan these attacks. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a Bashir follower, reportedly confessed to a role in the bombings. In April 2002, he was convicted in the Philippines on unrelated charges of possessing explosives.
A 1995 plot to bomb eleven U.S. commercial airliners in Asia that, the State Department says, Hambali helped plan.

How have Southeast Asian countries dealt with Jemaah Islamiyah?

It varies. Singapore and Malaysia, two countries with strong central governments, have outlawed the group and arrested suspected members. Singapore, for example, foiled a JI plot to attack U.S., British, and Israeli embassies in Singapore. The Philippines, which has struggled to contain Abu Sayyaf, another local Islamist militant group with suspected Qaeda ties, has also pursued Jemaah Islamiyah. These three countries have shared intelligence with the United States and sometimes turned over suspects. By comparison, Indonesia had done little until the Bali bombing.

How has Indonesia dealt with Jemaah Islamiyah?

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the government spent months resisting pressure from its neighbors and the United States to detain alleged JI leaders. Many Indonesian authorities questioned whether the group even existed. Indonesia also resisted U.S. and Asian government requests to arrest Hambali, then JI’s suspected operations leader, and he eventually went underground.

Some Indonesian officials said that targeting the extremist group could generate public sympathy for it and help build a following for Bashir and JI in the otherwise largely moderate Muslim country. Indonesia-watchers said the government was also worried about appearing to cave in to U.S. demands and so antagonize Islamic political parties. Following the Bali bombing, however, Indonesia changed its tune, passing new antiterrorism legislation and ordering Bashir’s arrest.

Have these security measures had any effect on Jemaah Islamiyah’s operations?

It’s unclear. Some experts say the recent attacks in Bali, which consisted of three bombers strapped with ten kilograms each of tightly packed explosives and steel ball bearings, were considerably smaller in scale and less sophisticated than previous attacks by JI. That might suggest the group is lacking outside funding, says Zachary Abuza, assistant professor of political science and international relations at Simmons College. “Maybe they simply just cannot afford to purchase trucks or minivans to use in large operations,” he said in an October 2 interview with ABC’s The World Today. Other experts say security crackdowns and arrests of key JI leaders have created a schism within the group between a radical branch that advocates violent jihad and a more mainstream one that favors more peaceful means to achieving its aims.

General Overview

Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist network led by Usama bin Laden [the “Osama” spelling is deprecated, because there is no letter “O” in Arabic). Established around 1988 by bin Laden, al-Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. To continue the holy war beyond Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems “non-Islamic” and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.

In February 1998, al-Qaeda issued a statement under banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens—civilian or military—and their allies everywhere. Al-Qaeda would merge with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) of Ayman al-Zawahiri in June 2001.

After al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, attacks on America, the United States launched a war in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda’s bases there and overthrow the Taliban, the country’s Muslim fundamentalist rulers who harbored bin Laden and his followers. “Al-Qaeda” is Arabic for “the base.”

In an al-Qaeda house in Afghanistan, New York Times reporters found a brief statement of the “Goals and Objectives of Jihad”:

Establishing the rule of God on earth
Attaining martyrdom in the cause of God
Purification of the ranks of Islam from the elements of depravity

In 1998, several al-Qaeda leaders issued a declaration calling on Muslims to kill Americans—including civilians—as well as “those who are allied with them from among the helpers of Satan.”

Activities

Tactics include assassination, bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, suicide attacks, et al. Numerous reports and public bin Laden proclamations indicate strong desire to obtain and utilize biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Targets tend to be prominent symbols (public buildings, embassy and military personnel, etc.) of the United States, its allies, and moderate Muslim governments. According to the former CIA Director George J. Tenet, “Usama Bin Ladin’s organization and other terrorist groups are placing increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is linked closely to Bin Ladin’s organization and has operatives located around the world—including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. And, there is now an intricate web of alliances among Sunni extremists worldwide, including North Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians. Some of these terrorists are actively sponsored by national governments that harbor great antipathy toward the United States.”

The group has targeted American and other Western interests as well as Jewish targets and Muslim governments it saw as corrupt or impious — above all, the Saudi monarchy. Al-Qaeda linked attacks include:

May 12, 2003 car bomb attacks on three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
November 2002 car bomb attack and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli jetliner with shoulder-fired missiles, both in Mombasa, Kenya
October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen Several spring 2002 bombings in Pakistan
April 2002 explosion of a fuel tanker outside a synagogue in Tunisia
September 11, 2001, hijacking attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
October 12, 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing in Aden, Yemen killing 17 crew members and wounding 39.
August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Al-Qaeda is suspected of carrying out or directing sympathetic groups to carry out the May 2003 suicide attacks on Western interests in Casablanca, Morocco; the October 12, 2002 nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia; the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; and a series of incidents in Saudi Arabia against U.S. targets from 1995 to 1996

Plots linked to al-Qaeda that were disrupted or prevented include: a 2001 attempt by Richard Reid to explode a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight; a 1999 plot to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport; a 1995 plan to blow up 12 transpacific flights of U.S. commercial airliners; a 1995 plan to kill President Bill Clinton on a visit to the Philippines; and a 1994 plot to kill Pope John Paul II during a visit to Manila.

Any information about Al-Qaeda’s U.S. operations has come from investigations following the September 11 attacks and the December 1999 foiled Los Angeles airport attack. Interrogations of captured al-Qaeda terrorists are occurring at Guantanamo Bay and from additional undisclosed locations. The extent to which valuable intelligence or information about al-Qaeda’s organization is being provided is not known.

In the federal indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was apprehended in August 2001, prosecutors described how the hijackers lived in the United States for months before the attacks—renting apartments, taking flight classes, joining health clubs, and living off funds wired from overseas.

On 29 October 2004, four days before the U.S. presidential election, al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden had threatened new attacks on the United States. He appeared in a video broadcast on the Arab TV network Al Jazeera claiming responsibility for the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. Speaking in a calm but strong voice, the terrorist leader referred to the following week’s U.S. election, telling Americans their security did not depend on President Bush or Democratic candidate John Kerry or al-Qaeda, but would depend on government policies.

Bin Laden said al-Qaeda decided, in his words, to destroy New Yorks’ World Trade towers in 2001 and listed several factors that motivated the attack, including frustration over what he called America’s pro-Israeli Middle East policies. He said Israel’s bombing attacks on Beirut in 1982 gave him the idea of targeting New York’s skyscrapers.

Al-Qaeda’s Operations Manual

In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda produced the Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, a detailed how-to guide for using handguns, explosives, and biological and chemical weapons, in print and on CD-ROM. Materials belonging to a captured al-Qaeda operative in England detailed techniques for forgery, surveillance, and espionage.

Location/Area of Operation

Al-Qaeda has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks.

Coalition attacks on Afghanistan since October 2001 have dismantled the Taliban–al-Qaeda’s protectors–and led to the capture, death, or dispersal of al-Qaeda operatives. Some al-Qaeda members at large probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests. Other known areas of operation: United States, Yemen, Germany, Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda is a multi-national network possessing a global reach and has supported through financing, training and logistics, Islamic militants in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Kosovo, the Philippines, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen, and now Kosovo. Additionally, al-Qaeda has been linked to conflicts and attacks in Africa, Asia, Europe, the former Soviet Republics, the Middle East, as well as North and South America.

The headquarters of al-Qaeda are not known anymore.

From 1991 to 1996, al-Qaeda worked out of Sudan.
From 1996 until the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, al-Qaeda operated out of Afghanistan and maintained its training camps there.
U.S. intelligence officials now think al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is trying to regroup in lawless tribal regions just inside Pakistan, near the Afghan border, inside Pakistani cities or in Iran.
In May 2003, administration officials claimed that senior al-Qaeda figures were in Iran and urged Tehran to apprehend them. Sa’ad bin Laden, Usama bin Laden’s son, in an October 2003 report, is said be among those in Iran.
Al-Qaeda has autonomous underground cells in some 100 countries, including the United States, officials say. Law enforcement has broken up al-Qaeda cells in the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Albania, Uganda, and elsewhere.

Strength

It is impossible to known precisely, due to the decentralized stucture of the organization. Al-Qaeda may have several thousand members and associates. It trained over 5,000 militants in camps in Afghanistan since the late 1980s. It also serves as a focal point for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, some members of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

External Aid

Bin Laden, member of a billionaire family that owns the Bin Ladin Group construction empire, is said to have inherited tens of millions of dollars that he uses to help finance the group. Al-Qaeda also maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. US efforts to block al-Qaeda funding has hampered al-Qaeda’s ability to obtain money.

Al-Qaeda has cooperated with a number of known terrorist groups worldwide including:

• Armed Islamic Group

• Salafist Group for Call and Combat and the Armed Islamic Group

• Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Egypt)

• Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya

• Jamaat Islamiyya

• The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

• Bayt al-Imam (Jordan)

• Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)

• Asbat al Ansar

• Hezbollah (Lebanon)

• Al-Badar

• Harakat ul Ansar/Mujahadeen

• Al-Hadith

• Harakat ul Jihad

• Jaish Mohammed-JEM

• Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam

• Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan

• Laskar e-Toiba-LET

• Moro Islamic Liberation Front (the Philippines)

• Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)

• Al-Ittihad Al Islamiya-AIAI (Somalia)

• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

• Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)

These groups share al-Qaeda’s Sunni Muslim fundamentalist views. Some terror experts theorize that Al-Qaeda, after the loss of it Afghanistan base, may be increasingly reliant on sympathetic affiliates to carry out it agenda. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts also say that al-Qaeda has stepped up its cooperation on logistics and training with Hezbollah, a radical, Iran-backed Lebanese militia drawn from the minority Shiite strain of Islam.

Al-Arabiyah television reported on 20 October 2004 that Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad hadr released a statement claiming it has officially joined the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Al-Jazeera broadcast a statement by the group identifying itself as Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers). Iraq is commonly known as the land of the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates. The statement has not been verified. Usama bin Laden’d 29 October 2004 video broadcast on the Arab TV network Al Jazeera made no mention of Zarqawi, suggesting that the report a few days earlier that Zarqawi and Bin Laden had joined forces were in error.

Selected key members

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (October 30, 1966 – June 7, 2006), born Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh was a Jordanian militant Islamist who ran a militant training camp in Afghanistan. He became known after going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of bombings, beheadings and attacks during the Iraq War.

He formed al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, in the 1990s, and led it until his death in June 2006. Zarqawi took responsibility, on several audio-and videotapes, for numerous acts of violence in Iraq including suicide bombings and hostage executions. Zarqawi opposed the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world as well as the West’s support for and the existence of Israel. In late 2004 he joined al-Qaeda and pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. After this al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and al-Zarqawi was given the Al-Qaeda title, “Emir of Al Qaeda in the Country of Two Rivers”.

In September 2005, he declared “all-out war” on Shia in Iraq after the Iraqi government offensive on insurgents in the Sunni town of Tal Afar. He dispatched numerous suicide bombers throughout Iraq to attack American soldiers and areas with large concentrations of Shia militias. He is also responsible for the 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan.

Biography

Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh, is believed to have been al-Zarqawi’s real name. “Abu Musab” literally translates to “Musab’s father,” while the surname “al-Zarqawi” translates as “man from Zarqa.” Zarqawi was a native of the Jordanian city of Zarqa, located approximately 21 kilometers (13 miles) northeast of the capital Amman. The son of a native Jordanian family (al-Khalayleh of the Beni Hassan tribe), Zarqawi grew up in the Jordanian city of Zarqa amidst poverty and squalor.

In 1989, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan to join the insurgency against the Soviet invasion, but the Soviets were already leaving by the time he arrived; where he met and befriended Osama bin Laden while there. Instead of fighting, he became a reporter for an Islamist newsletter. There are reports that in the mid-1990s, Zarqawi traveled to Europe and started the al-Tawhid paramilitary organization, a group dedicated to installing an Islamic regime in Jordan. Zarqawi was arrested in Jordan in 1992, and spent five years in a Jordanian prison for conspiring to overthrow the monarchy to establish an Islamic caliphate. He was arrested for possessing explosives. While in prison, he attempted to draft his cell mates into joining him to overthrow the rulers of Jordan. “You were either with them or against them. There was no gray area,” a former prison mate told Time magazine in 2004. Zarqawi became a feared leader among inmates there. In prison he met and befriended Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, who, in 2005, published a book on Zarqawi and al-Qaeda’s strategy.

Upon his release from prison in 1999, Zarqawi was involved in an attempt to blow up the Radisson Hotel in Amman, where many Israeli and American tourists lodged. He fled Jordan and traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghanistan border. In Afghanistan, Zarqawi established a militant training camp near Herat, near the Iranian border. The training camp specialized in poisons and explosives. According to Jordanian officials and court testimony by jailed followers of Zarqawi in Germany, Zarqawi met in Kandahar and Kabul with Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders after travelling to Afghanistan. He asked them for assistance and money to set up his own training camp in Herat. With al-Qaeda’s support, the camp opened and soon served as a magnet for Jordanian militants.

Jordanian and European intelligence agencies discovered that Zarqawi formed the group Jund al-Sham in 1999 with $200,000 of start up money from Osama bin Laden. The group originally consisted of 150 members. It was infiltrated by members of Jordanian intelligence, and scattered before Operation Enduring Freedom. However, in March 2005, a fragment of the group carried out a bombing in Doha, Qatar. Sometime in 2001, Zarqawi was arrested in Jordan but was soon released. He was later convicted in absentia and sentenced to death for plotting the attack on the Radisson SAS Hotel.

After the September 11 attacks, Zarqawi again traveled to Afghanistan and joined Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters resisting the U.S.-led invasion. He was allegedly wounded in a U.S. bombardment. In the summer of 2002, Zarqawi settled in northern Iraq, where he joined the Islamist Ansar al-Islam group that fought against the Kurdish-nationalist forces in the region. He became a leader in the group, although the extent of his authority has not been established. According to Perspectives on World History and Current Events (PWHCE), a not-for-profit project based in Melbourne, Australia, “Zarqawi was well positioned to lead the Islamic wing of the insurgency when the March 2003 invasion took place. Whether he remained in Ansar al-Islam camps until April 2003 or laid the preparations for the war during extensive visits to Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle is uncertain, but clearly he emerged as an important figure in the insurgency soon after the Coalition invasion.” The possibility of Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq before March 2003 (according to a Bill O’Reilly article, as advanced above) was used by the Bush Administration to justify the Iraq invasion; recently declassified Pentagon documents reveal that there was no substantial link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

Zarqawi is believed to have had three wives. His first wife, Oum Mohammed, was a Jordanian woman who was around 40 years of age when Zarqawi died in June 2006. She lived in Zarqa, Jordan along with their four children, including a 7-year-old son, Musab. She had advised Zarqawi to leave Iraq temporarily and give orders to his deputies from outside the country. “He gave me an angry look and said, ‘Me, me? I can’t betray my religion and get out of Iraq. In the name of God, I will not leave Iraq until victory or martyrdom’” she quoted al-Zarqawi as saying. Zarqawi’s second wife, Isra, was 14 years old when he married her. She was the daughter of Yassin Jarrad, a Palestinian Islamic militant, who is blamed for the killing in 2003 of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the Iraqi Shia leader. She bore him a child when she was 15 and was killed along with Zarqawi and their child, Abdul Rahman. Also killed was a five year old unidentified girl. His third wife was an Iraqi who might have perished in the airstrike with al-Zarqawi, Zarqawi was the most wanted man in Jordan and Iraq, having participated in or masterminded a number of violent actions against Iraqi, Jordanian and United States targets. The U.S. government offered $25 million U.S. dollars reward for information leading to his capture, the same amount offered for the capture of bin Laden before March 2004. On October 15, 2004, the U.S. State Department added Zarqawi and the Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group to its “list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations” and ordered a freeze on any assets that the group might have in the United States. On February 24, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice’s FBI also added al-Zarqawi to the “Seeking Information – War on Terrorism” list, the first time that he had ever been added to any of the FBI’s three major “wanted” lists.

On June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed in an American air strike 1.5 miles (2.41 km) north of Hibhib, near the city of Baquba, Iraq. Also killed was his spiritual adviser Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi and four others, including his wife and their child. He died from internal bleeding at 7:04/05pm, 50–55 minutes after the air strike, of injuries sustained in the bomb blasts. FBI tests later confirmed Zarqawi’s identity. On June 15, 2006, it was confirmed that Egyptian Islamic Jihad militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri would succeed Zarqawi as head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi insurgency.

Known Attacks

Attacks Outside Iraq

Zarqawi’s first major attempt at a terrorist attack occurred in 1999 after his release from prison. He was involved in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman in 1999 because it was frequented by many Israeli and American tourists. He failed in this attempt and fled to Afghanistan and then entered Iraq via Iran after the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001. From Iraq he started his terrorist campaign by hiring men to kill Laurence Foley who was a senior U.S. diplomat working for the U.S. Agency for International Development in Jordan. On October 28, 2002, Foley was assassinated outside his home in Amman. Under interrogation by Jordanian authorities, three suspects confessed that they had been armed and paid by Zarqawi to perform the assassination. U.S. officials believe that the planning and execution of the Foley assassination was led by members of Afghan Jihad, the International Mujaheddin Movement, and al-Qaeda. One of the leaders, Salim Sa’d Salim Bin-Suwayd, was paid over $27,858 U.S. dollars for his work in planning assassinations in Jordan against U.S., Israeli, and Jordanian government officials. Suwayd was arrested in Jordan for the murder of Foley. Zarqawi was again sentenced in absentia in Jordan; this time, as before, his sentence was death.

Zarqawi also helped plan a series of deadly bomb attacks in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003. U.S. officials believe that Zarqawi trained others in the use of poison (ricin) for possible attacks in Europe. Zarqawi had also planned to attack a NATO summit in June 2004. According to suspects arrested in Turkey, Zarqawi sent them to Istanbul to organize an attack on a NATO summit there on June 28 or June 29 of 2004. On April 26, 2004, Jordanian authorities announced they had broken up an al-Qaeda plot to use chemicals weapons in Amman. Among the targets were the U.S. Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister’s office and the headquarters of Jordanian intelligence. In a series of raids, the Jordanians seized 20 tons of chemicals, including blistering agents and nerve gas. and numerous explosives. Also seized were three trucks equipped with specially modified plows, apparently designed to crash through security barricades. Jordanian state television aired a videotape of four men admitting they were part of the plot. One of the conspirators, Azmi Al-Jayousi, said that he was acting on the orders of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi. On February 15, 2006, Jordan’s High Court of Security sentenced nine men, including al-Zarqawi, to death for their involvement in the plot. Zarqawi was convicted of planning the entire attack from his post in Iraq, funding the operation with nearly $120,000 U.S. dollars, and sending a group of Jordanians into Jordan to execute the plan. Eight of the defendants were accused of belonging to a previously unknown group, “Kata’eb al-Tawhid” or Battalions of Monotheism, which was headed by al-Zarqawi and linked to al Qaeda. Zarqawi was believed to have masterminded the 2005 Amman bombings that killed about seventy people in three hotels, including several officials of the Palestinian Authority and members of a Chinese defense delegation.

Attacks inside Iraq

The Weekly Standard reports that, before the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi ran a “terrorist haven” in Kurdish northern Iraq, and organized the bombing of a Baghdad hotel. According to a March 2003 British intelligence report, Zarqawi had set up “sleeper cells” in Baghdad before the Iraq war. The report stated “Reporting since (February) suggests that senior al Qaeda associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be activated during a U.S. occupation of the city...These cells apparently intend to attack U.S. targets using car bombs and other weapons. (It is also possible that they have received [chemical and biological] materials from terrorists in the [Kurdish Autonomous Zone]),...al Qaeda-associated terrorists continued to arrive in Baghdad in early March.”

In May 2004, a VHS was released showing a group of five men beheading American civilian Nicholas Berg, who had been abducted and taken hostage in Iraq weeks earlier. The CIA claimed that the speaker on the tape wielding the knife that killed Berg was al-Zarqawi. The video opens with the title “Abu Musa’b al-Zarqawi slaughters an American.” The speaker states that the murder was in retaliation for US abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison (see Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal). Following the death of al-Zarqawi, CNN spoke with Nicholas’ father and long-time anti-war activist Michael Berg, who stated that al-Zarqawi’s killing would lead to further vengeance and was not a cause for rejoicing.

Zarqawi is also believed to have personally beheaded another American civilian, Olin Eugene Armstrong, in September 2004

United States officials also implicated Zarqawi for over 700 killings in Iraq during the invasion, mostly from bombings. Since March 2004, that number rose to the thousands. According to the United States State Department, Zarqawi was responsible for the Canal Hotel bombing of the United Nations Headquarters in Iraq on August 19, 2003. This attack killed twenty-two people, including the United Nations secretary general’s special Iraqi envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Zarqawi’s biggest alleged atrocities in Iraq included the attacks on the Shia shrines in Karbala and Baghdad in March 2004, which killed over 180 people, and the car bomb attacks in Najaf and Karbala in December 2004, which claimed over 60 lives. Zarqawi is believed by the former Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq to have written an intercepted letter to the al-Qaeda leadership in February 2004 on the progress of the “Iraqi jihad.” However, al-Qaeda denied they had written the letter. The U.S. military believes Zarqawi organized the February 2006 attack on the Al Askari Mosque in Samarra, in an attempt to trigger sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq.

In a January 2005 internet recording, Zarqawi condemned democracy as “the big American lie” and said participants in Iraq’s January 30 election were enemies of Islam. Zarqawi stated “We have declared a bitter war against democracy and all those who seek to enact it...Democracy is also based on the right to choose your religion [and that is] against the rule of God.”

On April 25, 2006 a video appearing to show Zarqawi surfaced. In the tape, the man says holy warriors are fighting on despite a three-year “crusade”. U.S. experts told the BBC they believed the recording was genuine. One part of the recording shows a man-who bears a strong resemblance to previous pictures of Zarqawi-sitting on the floor and addressing a group of masked men with an automatic rifle at his side. “Your mujahideen sons were able to confront the most ferocious of crusader campaigns on a Muslim state,” the man says. Addressing U.S. President George W. Bush, he says: “Why don’t you tell people that your soldiers are committing suicide, taking drugs and hallucination pills to help them sleep?” “By God,” he says, “your dreams will be defeated by our blood and by our bodies. What is coming is even worse.” The speaker in the video also reproaches the U.S. for its “arrogance and insolence” in rejecting a truce offered by “our prince and leader,” Osama Bin Laden. The United States Army aired an unedited tape of Zarqawi in May 2006 highlighting the fact that he did not know how to fix a jam on his M249 Squad Automatic Weapon. Zarqawi was also shown to be wearing New Balance tennis shoes in the video, which contradicts his anti-American beliefs while indicating a lack of more rugged, durable boot. The aim of the video was to remove the myth surrounding Zarqawi and to question his prowess as a military leader.

Attempts to Provoke U.S. Attack on Iran

A document found in Zarqawi’s safe house indicates that the group was trying to provoke the U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the insurgency in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq. “The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether America is serious in its animosity towards Iran, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the West in general, of the real danger coming from Iran...” The document then outlines six ways to incite war between the two nations.

Alleged Links to al-Qaeda

After the 2001 war in Afghanistan, Zarqawi appeared on a U.S. list of most-wanted al-Qaeda terrorists still at large in early 2002.

According to the Washington Post and some other sources, he formally swore loyalty (Bay’ah) to bin Laden in October 2004 and was in turn appointed bin Laden’s deputy. Zarqawi then changed the name of his Monotheism and Jihad network to “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” (Tamzim al-Qaeda wa’l-Jihad fi Balad al-Rafidayn)

Pre U.S. Invasion of Iraq

Before the invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi was the leader of an Islamic militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda. In an interview on Al-Majd TV, former al-Qaeda member Walid Khan, who was in Afghanistan fighting alongside Zarqawi’s group explained that from the day al-Zarqawi’s group arrived, there were disagreements, differences of opinion with bin Laden. Saif al-Adel, now bin Laden’s military chief, was an Egyptian who attempted to overthrow the Egyptian government saw merit in Zarqawi’s overall objective of overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. He intervened and smoothed the relations between Zarqawi and Al Qaeda leadership. It was agreed that Zarqawi will be given the funds to start up his training camp outside the Afghan city of Herat, near the Iranian border.

Zarqawi’s group continued to received funding from Osama bin Laden and pursued “a largely distinct, if occasionally overlapping agenda,” according to The Washington Post. Counterterrorism experts told the Washington Post that while Zarqawi accepted al-Qaeda’s financial help to set up a training camp in Afghanistan he ran it independently and while bin Laden was planning September 11, Zarqawi was busy developing a plot to topple the Jordanian monarchy and attack Israel.

The Washington Post also reported that German Intelligence wiretaps found that in the fall of 2001 that Zarqawi grew angry when his members were raising money in Germany for al-Qaeda’s local leadership. “If something should come from their side, simply do not accept it,” Zarqawi told one of his followers, according to a recorded conversation that was played at a trial of four alleged Zarqawi operatives in Duesseldorf.

At least five times, in 2000 and 2001, bin Laden called al-Zarqawi to come to Kandahar and pay bayat — take an oath of allegiance—to him. Each time, al-Zarqawi refused. He did not believe that either bin Laden or the Taliban was serious enough about jihad. When the United States launched its air war inside Afghanistan, on October 7, 2001, al-Zarqawi joined forces with al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the first time. He and his Jund al-Sham fought in and around Herat and Kandahar. When Zarqawi finally did take the oath in October 2004, it was after eight months of negotiations.

In April 2007, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released his memoir titled At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. In the book he reveals that in July 2001, an associate of Zarqawi had been detained and, during interrogations, linked Zarqawi with al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah. Tenet also wrote in his book that Thirwat Shihata and Yussef Dardiri, “assessed by a senior al-Qa’ida detainee to be among the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s best operational planners,” arrived in Baghdad in May 2002 and were engaged in “sending recruits to train in Zarqawi’s camps.”

Post U.S. Invasion of Iraq

During or shortly before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Zarqawi returned to Iraq, where he met with Bin Laden’s military chief, Saif al-Adel (Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi), who asked him to coordinate the entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq through Syria. Zarqawi readily agreed and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow of Arab Islamists were infiltrating Iraq via Syria. Although many of these foreign fighters were not members of Tawhid, they became more or less dependent on Zarqawi’s local contacts once they entered the unfamiliar country. Moreover, given Tawhid’s superior intelligence gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid operatives to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi’s lieutenants. Consequentially, Zarqawi came to be recognized as the regional “emir” of Islamist terrorists in Iraq without having sworn fealty to bin Laden.

U.S. intelligence intercepted a January 2004 letter from Zarqawi to al Qaeda and American officials made it public in February 2004. In the letter to bin Laden, Zarqawi wrote:

“You, gracious brothers, are the leaders, guides, and symbolic figures of jihad and battle. We do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you, and we have never striven to achieve glory for ourselves. All that we hope is that we will be the spearhead, the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the Islamic nation crosses over to the victory that is promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire. This is our vision, and we have explained it. This is our path, and we have made it clear. If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media, vexing the infidels and gladdening those who preach the oneness of God. On that day, the believers will rejoice in God’s victory. If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil our friendship. This is a cause in which we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad. Awaiting your response, may God preserve you as keys to good and reserves for Islam and its people.”

In October 2004, a message on an Islamic Web site posted in the name of the spokesman of Zarqawi’s group announced that Zarqawi had sworn his network’s allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The message stated that:

“Numerous messages were passed between ‘Abu Musab’ (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission. Let it be known that al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh ‘Osama bin Laden’ (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of God until there is no more discord [among the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion turns toward God...By God, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates!”

On December 27, 2004, Al Jazeera broadcast an audiotape of bin Laden calling Zarqawi “the prince of al Qaeda in Iraq” and asked “all our organization brethren to listen to him and obey him in his good deeds.” Since that time, Zarqawi had referred to his own organization as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.

In May 2007, President Bush declassified a U.S. intelligence report that stated that bin Laden had enlisted Zarqawi to plan strikes inside the U.S., and warned that in January 2005 bin Laden had assigned Zarqawi to organize a cell inside Iraq that would be used to plan and carry out attacks against the U.S. “Bin Laden tasked the terrorist Zarqawi... with forming a cell to conduct terrorist attacks outside of Iraq,” the president stated in a commencement address at the Coast Guard Academy. “Bin Laden emphasized that America should be Zarqawi’s No.1 priority.”

Terrorism experts’ view on the alliance

According to experts, Zarqawi gave al-Qaeda a highly visible presence in Iraq at a time when its original leaders went into hiding or were killed after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. In turn, al-Qaeda leaders were able to brand a new franchise in Iraq and claim they were at the forefront of the fight to expel U.S. forces. But this relationship was proven to be fragile as Zarqawi angered al-Qaeda leaders by focusing attackings on Iraqi Shia’s more often than U.S. military. In September 2005, U.S. intelligence officials said they had confiscated a long letter that al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had written to Zarqawi, bluntly warning that Muslim public opinion was turning against him. According to Paul Wilkinson, chairman of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, “A number of al-Qaeda figures were uncomfortable with the tactics he was using in Iraq...It was quite clear with Zarqawi that as far as the al-Qaeda core leadership goes, they couldn’t control the way in which their network affiliates operated.”

U.S. Officials’ view on the Alliance

In June 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded that Zarqawi’s ties to Al Qaeda may have been much more ambiguous—and that he may have been more a rival than a lieutenant to bin Laden. Zarqawi “may very well not have sworn allegiance to [bin Laden],” Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon briefing. “Maybe he disagrees with him on something, maybe because he wants to be ‘The Man’ himself and maybe for a reason that’s not known to me.” Rumsfeld added that, “someone could legitimately say he’s not Al Qaeda.”

According to the Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence released in September 2006, “in April 2003 the CIA learned from a senior al-Qa’ida detainee that al-Zarqawi had rebuffed several efforts by bin Ladin to recruit him. The detainee claimed that al-Zarqawi had religious differences with bin Ladin and disagreed with bin Ladin’s singular focus against the United States. The CIA assessed in April 2003 that al-Zarqawi planned and directed independent terrorist operations without al Qaeda direction, but assessed that he ‘most likely contracts out his network’s services to al Qaeda in return for material and financial assistance from key al Qaeda facilitators.’”(page 90)

In the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, declassified in September 2006, it asserts that “Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.”

Alleged Links to Saddam Hussein

On February 5, 2003, then Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council on the issue of Iraq. Regarding Zarqawi, Powell stated that:

“Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These Al Qaeda affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they’ve now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad.”

Abu Musab al Zarqawi recuperated in Baghdad after being wounded while fighting along with Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. According to the 2004 Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, “A foreign government service asserted that the IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) knew where al-Zarqawi was located despite Baghdad’s claims that it could not find him.”page 337 The Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence also stated “As indicated in Iraqi Support for Terrorism, the Iraqi regime was, at a minimum, aware of al-Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad in 2002 because a foreign government service passed information regarding his whereabouts to Iraqi authorities in June 2002. Despite Iraq’s pervasive security apparatus and its receipt of detailed information about al-Zarqawi’s possible location, however, Iraqi Intelligence told the foreign government service it could not locate al-Zarqawi.”

Jordanian Analysis

A Jordanian security official told the Washington Post that documents recovered after the overthrow of Saddam show that Iraqi agents detained some of Zarqawi’s operatives but released them after questioning. He also told the Washington Post that the Iraqis warned the Zarqawi operatives that the Jordanians knew where they were. The official also told the Washington Post that “‘We sent many memos to Iraq during this time, asking them to identify his position, where he was, how he got weapons, how he smuggled them across the border,’ but Hussein’s government never responded.”

This claim was reiterated by Jordanian King Abdullah II in an interview with Al-Hayat. Abdullah revealed that Saddam Hussein had rejected repeated requests from Jordan to hand over al-Zarqawi. According to Abdullah, “We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn’t respond.” King Abdullah told the Al-Hayat that Jordan exerted “big efforts” with Saddam’s government to extradite al-Zarqawi, but added that “our demands that the former regime hand him over were in vain.

One high-level Jordanian intelligence official told the Atlantic Monthly that al-Zarqawi, after leaving Afghanistan in December 2001, frequently traveled to the Sunni Triangle of Iraq where he expanded his network, recruited and trained new fighters, and set up bases, safe houses, and military training camps. He said, however, “We know Zarqawi better than he knows himself. And I can assure you that he never had any links to Saddam.”

Counterterrorism scholar Loretta Napoleoni quotes former Jordanian parliamentarian Layth Shubaylat, who was personally acquainted with both Zarqawi and Saddam Hussein:

“First of all, I don’t think the two ideologies go together, I’m sure the former Iraqi leadership saw no interest in contacting al-Zarqawi or al-Qaeda operatives. The mentality of al-Qaeda simply doesn’t go with the Ba’athist one. When he was in prison in Jordan with Shubaylat, Abu Mos’ab wouldn’t accept me, said Shubaylat, because I’m opposition, even if I’m a Muslim. How could he accept Saddam Hussein, a secular dictator?”

U.S. Conclusion

A CIA report in late 2004 concluded that there was no evidence Saddam’s government was involved or even aware of this medical treatment, and found no conclusive evidence the Saddam Hussein regime had harbored Zarqawi. A US official told Reuters that the report was a mix of new information and a look at some older information and did not make any final judgments or come to any definitive conclusions. “To suggest the case is closed on this would not be correct,” the official said.” A US official familiar with the report told Knight-Ridder that “what is indisputable is that Zarqawi was operating out of Baghdad and was involved in a lot of bad activities.” Another U.S. official summarized the report as such: “The evidence is that Saddam never gave Zarqawi anything.”

According to the 2004 Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence, “The CIA provided four reports detailing the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, a captured senior coordinator for al-Qaeda responsible for training and recruiting. Abu Zubaydah said that he was not aware of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. He also said, however, that any relationship would be highly compartmented and went on to name al-Qaeda members who he thought had good contacts with the Iraqis. For instance, Abu Zubaydah indicated that he had heard that an important al-Qaeda associate, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and others had good relationships with Iraqi Intelligence.”

A classified memo obtained by Stephen F. Hayes, prepared by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith in response to questions posed by the Senate Intelligence Committee as part of its investigation into prewar intelligence, stated the following regarding al-Zarqawi:

“Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of October 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi’s procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.”

The memo was a collection of raw intelligence reports and drew no conclusions. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed to Newsweek that the “reports [in the memo] were old, uncorroborated and came from sources of unknown if not dubious credibility.”

The 2006 Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence concluded that Zarqawi was not a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda: “Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi.” The report also cited the debriefing of a “high-ranking Iraqi official” by the FBI. The official stated that a foreign government requested in October 2002 that the IIS locate five individuals suspected of involvement in the murder of Laurence Foley, which lead to the arrest of Abu Yasim Sayyem in early 2003. The official told the FBI that evidence of Sayyem’s ties to Zarqawi was compelling, and thus, he was “shocked” when Sayemm was ordered released by Saddam. The official stated it “was ludicrous to think that the IIS had any involvement with al-Qaeda or Zarqawi,” and suggested Saddam let Sayyem go because he “would participate in striking U.S. forces when they entered Iraq.” In 2005, according to the Senate report, the CIA amended its 2004 report to conclude that “the regime did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.”page 91–92 An intelligence official familiar with the CIA assessment also told Michael Isikoff of Newsweek magazine that the current draft of the report says that while Zarqawi did likely receive medical treatment in Baghdad in 2002, the report concludes that “most evidence suggests Saddam Hussein did not provide Zarqawi safe haven before the war,...[but] it also recognizes that there are still unanswered questions and gaps in knowledge about the relationship.”

The Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office website translated a letter dated August 17, 2002 from an Iraqi intelligence official. The letter is part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom documents. The letter asks agents in the country to be on the lookout for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and another unnamed man. Pictures of both men were attached.

The letter issued the following 3 directives:

Instructing your sources to continue their surveillance of the above mentioned individuals in your area of operations and inform us once you initiate such action.
Coordinate with Directorate 18 to verify the photographs of the above mentioned with photos of the members of the Jordanian community within your area of operations.
Conduct a comprehensive survey of all tourist facilities (hotels, furnished apartments, and leased homes). Give this matter your utmost attention. Keep us informed.

The documents also contain responses to this request. One response, dated August 2002, states “Upon verifying the information through our sources and friends in the field as well as office, we found no information to confirm the presence of the above mentioned in our area of operation. Please review, we suggest circulating the contents of this message.” Another response, also dated August 2002, states “After closely examining the data and through our sources and friends in (SATTS: U R A) square, and in Al-Qa’im immigration office, and in Office, none of the mentioned individuals are documented to be present in our area of jurisdiction.”

According to ABC news, “The letter seems to be coming from or going to Trebil, a town on the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Follow up on the presence of those subjects is ordered, as well as a comparison of their pictures with those of Jordanian subjects living in Iraq. In his book At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet writes:

“...by the spring and summer of 2002, more than a dozen al-Qa’ida-affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad, with apparently no harassment on the part of the Iraqi government. They found a comfortable and secure envirnonment in which they moved people and supplies to support Zarqawi’s operations in northern Iraq.”

According to Tenet, while Zarqawi did find a safe haven in Iraq and did supervise camps in northeastern Iraq run by Ansar al-Islam, “the intelligence did not show any Iraqi authority, direction, or control over any of the many specific terrorist acts carried out by al-Qa’ida.”

Arguments Downplaying Zarqawi’s Importance

Some people have claimed that Zarqawi’s notoriety was the product of U.S. war propaganda designed to promote the image of a demonic enemy figure to help justify continued U.S. military operations in Iraq, perhaps with the tacit support of jihadi elements who wished to use him as a propaganda tool or as a distraction. In one report, the conservative newspaper Daily Telegraph described the claim that Zarqawi was the head of the “terrorist network” in Iraq as a “myth.” This report cited an unnamed U.S. military intelligence source to the effect that the Zarqawi leadership “myth” was initially caused by faulty intelligence, but was later accepted because it suited U.S. government political goals. One Sunni insurgent leader claimed on 11 December that “Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation.”

On February 18, 2006, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr made similar charges:

“I believe he is fictitious. He is a knife or a pistol in the hands of the occupier. I believe that all three-the occupation, the takfir (i.e. the practice of declaring other Muslims to be heretics) supporters, and the Saddam supporters-stem from the same source, because the takfir supporters and the Saddam supporters are a weapon in the hands of America and it pins its crimes on them.”

On April 10, 2006, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. military conducted a major propaganda offensive designed to exaggerate Zarqawi’s role in the Iraqi insurgency. Gen. Mark Kimmitt says of the propaganda campaign that there “was no attempt to manipulate the press.” In an internal briefing, Kimmitt is quoted as stating, “The Zarqawi PSYOP Program is the most successful information campaign to date.” The main goal of the propaganda campaign seems to have been to exacerbate a rift between insurgent forces in Iraq, but intelligence experts worried that it had actually enhanced Zarqawi’s influence. Col. Derek Harvey, who served as a military intelligence officer in Iraq and then was one of the top officers handling Iraq intelligence issues on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned an Army meeting in 2004 that “Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will — made him more important than he really is, in some ways.” While Pentagon spokespersons state unequivocally that PSYOPs may not be used to influence American citizens, there is little question that the information disseminated through the program has found its way into American media sources. The Washington Post also notes that “One briefing slide about U.S. “strategic communications” in Iraq, prepared for Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top U.S. commander in Iraq, describes the “home audience” as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.”

On July 4, 2006, the US Ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad, in an interview with the BBC, said that “in terms of the level of violence, it (the death of al-Zarqawi) has not had any impact at this point” and that “...the level of violence is still quite high.” But Khalilzad maintained his view that the killing had though encouraged some insurgent groups to “reach out” and join government reconcialiation talks, he believed that previously these groups were intimidated by Zarqawi’s presence.

On 8th of June 2006, on the BBC’s Question Time, the Respect Party MP George Galloway referred to Zarqawi as ‘a Boogeyman, built up by the Americans to try and perpetrate the lie that the resistance in Iraq are by foreigners, and that the mass of the Iraqi’s are with the American and British occupation’.

On August 21, 2006, Jill Carroll, a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, published part 6 of her story detailing her capitivity in Iraq. In it, she describes how one of her captors, who identified himself as Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq, conveyed to her that “The Americans were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners...So, the Iraqi insurgents went to Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge.” She continued by stating: “But as I saw in coming weeks, Zarqawi remained the insurgents’ hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever Nour/Rashid’s position. And it seemed to me, based on snatches of conversations, that two cell leaders under him-Abu Rasha and Abu Ahmed-might also be on the council. At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of directives from the council and Zarqawi.”

Pre-war Opportunities to kill Zarqawi

According to NBC News, the Pentagon had pushed to “take out” Zarqawi’s operation at least three times prior to the invasion of Iraq, but had been vetoed by the National Security Council. The council reportedly made its decision in an effort to convince other countries to join the US in a coalition against Iraq. “People were more obsessed with developing the coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the president’s policy of pre-emption against terrorists,” said former National Security Council member Roger Cressey. In May 2006, former CIA official Michael Scheuer, who headed the CIA’s bin Laden unit for six years before resigning in 2004, corroborated this. Paraphrasing his remarks, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation stated Scheuer claimed that “the United States deliberately turned down several opportunities to kill terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the lead-up to the Iraq war.” ABC added that “a plan to destroy Zarqawi’s training camp in Kurdistan was abandoned for diplomatic reasons.” Scheuer explained that “the reasons the intelligence service got for not shooting Zarqawi was simply that the President and the National Security Council decided it was more important not to give the Europeans the impression we were gunslingers” in an effort to win support for ousting Saddam Hussein.

This claim was also corroborated by CENTCOM’s Deputy Commander, Lt. General Michael DeLong, in an interview with PBS on February 14, 2006. DeLong, however, claims that the reasons for abandoning the opportunity to take out Zarqawi’s camp was that the Pentagon feared that an attack would contaminate the area with chemical weapon materials: “We almost took them out three months before the Iraq war started. We almost took that thing, but we were so concerned that the chemical cloud from there could devastate the region that we chose to take them by land rather than by smart weapons.”

Reports of Zarqawi’s Death, Detention and Injuries

Missing Leg

Claims of harm to Zarqawi changed over time. Early in 2002, there were unverified reports from Afghan Northern Alliance members that Zarqawi had been killed by a missile attack in Afghanistan. Many news sources repeated the claim. Later, Kurdish groups claimed that Zarqawi had not died in the missile strike, but had been severely injured, and went to Baghdad in 2002 to have his leg amputated. On October 7, 2002, the day before Congress voted to give President Bush authorization to invade Iraq, Bush gave a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, that repeated as fact the claim that he had sought medical treatment in Baghdad. This was one of several of President Bush’s primary examples of ways Saddam Hussein had aided, funded, and harbored al-Qaeda. Powell repeated this claim in his February 2003 speech to the UN, urging a resolution for war, and it soon became “common knowledge” that Zarqawi had a prosthetic leg.

In 2004, Newsweek reported that some “senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad” had come to believe that he still had his original legs. Knight Ridder later reported that the leg amputation was something “officials now acknowledge was incorrect.”

When the video of the Berg beheading was released in 2004, credence was given to the claim that Zarqawi was alive and active. The man identified as Zarqawi in the video did not appear to have a prosthetic leg. Videos of Zarqawi aired in 2006 that clearly showed him with both legs intact. When Zarqawi’s body was autopsied, “X-rays also showed a fracture of his right lower leg.”

Claims of Death

In March 2004, an insurgent group in Iraq issued a statement saying that Zarqawi had been killed in April 2003. The statement said that he was unable to escape the missile attack because of his prosthetic leg. His followers claimed he was killed in a US bombing raid in the north of Iraq. The claim that Zarqawi had been killed in northern Iraq “at the beginning of the war,” and that subsequent use of his name was a useful myth, was repeated in September 2005 by Sheikh Jawad Al-Khalessi, a Shiite imam.

On May 24, 2005, it was reported on an Islamic website that a deputy would take command of Al-Qaeda while Zarqawi recovered from injuries sustained in an attack. Later that week the Iraqi government confirmed that Zarqawi had been wounded by U.S. forces, although the battalion did not realize it at the time. The extent of his injuries is not known, although some radical Islamic websites called for prayers for his health. There are reports that a local hospital treated a man, suspected to be Zarqawi, with severe injuries.

He was also said to have subsequently left Iraq for a neighbouring country, accompanied by two physicians. However, later that week the radical Islamic website retracted its report about his injuries and claimed that he was in fine health and was running the jihad operation.

In a September 16, 2005 article published by Le Monde, Sheikh Jawad Al-Kalesi claimed that al-Zarqawi was killed in the Kurdish northern region of Iraq at the beginning of the US-led war on the country as he was meeting with members of the Ansar al-Islam group affiliated to al-Qaeda. Al-Kalesi also claimed “His family in Jordan even held a ceremony after his death.” He also claimed that “Zarqawi has been used as a ploy by the United States, as an excuse to continue the occupation” and saying, “It was a pretext so they don’t leave Iraq.”

On November 20, 2005, some news sources reported that Zarqawi may have been killed in a coalition assault on a house in Mosul; five of those in the house were killed in the assault while the other three died through using ‘suicide belts’ of explosives. United States and British soldiers searched the remains, with U.S. forces using DNA samples to identify the dead. However, none of those remains belonged to him.

Reportedly Captured and Released

According to a CNN report dated December 15, 2005, al-Zarqawi was captured by Iraqi forces sometime during 2004 and later released because his captors did not realize who he was. This claim was made by a Saudi suicide bomber, Ahmed Abdullah al-Shaiyah, who survived a failed suicide attempt to blow up the Jordanian mission in Baghdad in December. “Do you know what has happened to Zarqawi and where he is?” an Iraqi investigator asked Mr. Shaiyah. He answered, “I don’t know, but I heard from some of my mujahadeen brothers that Iraqi police had captured Zarqawi in Fallujah.” Mr. Shaiyah says he then heard that the police let the terrorist go because they had failed to recognize him. U.S. officials called the report “plausible” but refused to confirm it.

Zarqawi’s Death

Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006, while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse approximately 8 km (5 mi) north of Baqubah. At 14:15 GMT two United States Air Force F-16C jets identified the house and the lead jet dropped two 500-pound (230kg) guided bombs, a laser-guided GBU-12 and GPS-guided GBU-38 on the building located at 33°482 02.833 N 44°302 48.583 Eÿþ / ÿþ33.8007861, 44.5134944. Six others-three male and three female individuals-were also reported killed (see below). Among those killed were his wife and their child.

The joint task force had been tracking him for some time, and although there were some close calls, he had eluded them on many occasions. United States intelligence officials then received tips from Iraqi senior leaders from Zarqawi’s network that he and some of his associates were in the Baqubah area. The safehouse itself was watched for over six weeks before Zarqawi was observed entering the building by U.S. AFSOC 720th Special Tactics Group Combat Controllers. Jordanian intelligence reportedly helped to identify his location. The area was subsequently secured by Iraqi security forces, who were the first ground forces to arrive.

On June 8, 2006, coalition forces confirmed that Zarqawi’s body was identified by facial recognition, fingerprinting, known scars and tattoos. They also announced the death of one of his key lieutenants, spiritual adviser Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman.

Initially, the U.S. military reported that Zarqawi was killed directly in the attack. However, according to a statement made the following day by Major General William Caldwell of the U.S. Army, Zarqawi survived for a short time after the bombing, and after being placed on a stretcher, attempted to move and was restrained, after which he died from his injuries.

An Iraqi man, who claims to have arrived on the scene a few moments after the attack, said he saw U.S. troops beating up the badly-wounded but still alive Zarqawi. In contradiction, Caldwell asserted that when U.S. troops found Zarqawi barely alive they tried to provide him with medical help, rejecting the allegations that he was beaten based on an autopsy performed. The account of the Iraqi witness has not been verified. All others in the house died immediately in the blasts. On June 12, 2006, it was reported that an autopsy performed by the U.S. military revealed that the cause of death to Zarqawi was a blast injury to the lungs, but he took nearly an hour to die.

The U.S. government distributed an image of Zarqawi’s corpse as part of the press pack associated with the press conference. The release of the image has been criticised for being in questionable taste, and for inadvertently creating an iconic image of Zarqawi that would be used to rally his supporters.

Reactions to Death

Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al-Maliki commented on the death of Zarqawi by saying: “Today, Zarqawi has been terminated. Every time a Zarqawi appears we will kill him. We will continue confronting whoever follows his path. It is an open war between us.”

United States President George W. Bush stated that through his every action al-Zarqawi sought to defeat America and its coalition partners by turning Iraq into a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Bush also stated, “Now Zarqawi has met his end and this violent man will never murder again.”

Zarqawi’s brother-in-law has since claimed that he was a martyr even though the family renounced Zarqawi and his actions in the aftermath of the Amman triple suicide bombing that killed at least 60 people. The opinion of Iraqis on his death is mixed; some believe that it will promote peace between the warring factions, while others are convinced that his death will provoke his followers to a massive retaliation and cause more bombings and deaths in Iraq. Abu Abdulrahman al-Iraqi, the deputy of al-Zarqawi (which may be the individual called “Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman” mentioned above, meaning he was not present as the bombing happened), released a statement to Islamist websites indicating that al-Qaeda in Iraq also confirmed Zarqawi’s death: “We herald the martyrdom of our mujahed Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq … and we stress that this is an honor to our nation.” In the statement, al-Iraqi vowed to continue the jihad in Iraq.

On June 16, 2006, Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council, which groups five Iraqi insurgent organizations including al-Qaeda in Iraq, released an audio tape statement in which he described the death of al-Zarqawi as a “great loss.” He continued by stating that al-Zarqawi “will remain a symbol for all the mujahideen, who will take strength from his steadfastness.” Al-Baghdadi is believed to be a former officer in Saddam’s army, or its elite Republican Guard, who has worked closely with al-Zarqawi since the overthrow of Saddam’s regime in April 2003.

Counterterrorism officials have said that al-Zarqawi had become a key part of al-Qaeda’s marketing campaign and that al-Zarqawi served as a “worldwide jihadist rallying point and a fundraising icon.” Rep. Mike J. Rogers, R-Mich., who serves on the House Intelligence Committee, called al-Zarqawi “The terrorist celeb, if you will,... It is like selling for any organization. They are selling the success of Zarqawi in eluding capture in Iraq.”

On June 23, 2006, Al-Jazeera aired a video in which Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s No. 2 leader, states that Zarqawi was “a soldier, a hero, an imam and the prince of martyrs, [and his death] has defined the struggle between the crusaders and Islam in Iraq.”

On June 30, 2006, Osama bin Laden released an audio recording in which he stated, “Our Islamic nation was surprised to find its knight, the lion of jihad, the man of determination and will, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in a shameful American raid. We pray to God to bless him and accept him among the martyrs as he had hoped for.” Bin Laden also defended al-Zarqawi, saying he had “clear instructions” to focus on U.S.-led forces in Iraq but also “for those who... stood to fight on the side of the crusaders against the Muslims, then he should kill them whoever they are, regardless of their sect or tribe.” Shortly after, he released another audio tape in which he stated, “Our brothers, the mujahedeen in the al-Qaeda organization, have chosen the dear brother Abu Hamza al-Muhajer as their leader to succeed the Amir Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. I advise him to focus his fighting on the Americans and everyone who supports them and allies himself with them in their war on the people of Islam and Iraq.”

Alleged Betrayal by al-Qaeda

A day before Zarqawi was killed, a U.S. strategic analysis site suggested that Zarqawi could have lost the trust of al-Qaeda due to his emphatic anti-Shia stance and the massacres of civilians allegedly committed in his name. Reports in The New York Times on June 9 treated the betrayal by at least one fellow al-Qaeda member as fact, stating that an individual close to Zarqawi disclosed the identity and location of Sheik Abd al-Rahman to Jordanian and American intelligence. Non-stop surveillance of Abd al-Rahman quickly led to Zarqawi.

The Associated Press quotes an unnamed Jordanian official as saying that the effort to find Zarqawi was successful partly due to information that Jordan obtained one month beforehand from a captured Zarqawi al-Qaeda operative named Ziad Khalaf Raja al-Karbouly.

Reward

In apparent contradiction to statements made earlier in the day by U.S. ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, an Iraqi spokesman said the US$25 million reward “will be honored” (although this need not mean that any money will actually be paid, as the terms of the reward would indeed be “honored” by having no payee if no one qualifies). Khalilzad, in an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, had stated the bounty would not be paid because the decisive information leading to Zarqawi’s whereabouts had been supplied by an al-Qaeda in Iraq operative whose own complicity in violent acts would disqualify him from receiving payment.

Rep. Mark Kirk, a Republican of Illinois who wrote the legislation specifying the Zarqawi reward, has been quoted as saying that the Bush Administration does plan to pay “some rewards” for Zarqawi. “I don’t have the specifics,” he said, “The administration is now working out who will get it and how much. As their appropriator who funds them, I asked them to let me know if they need more money to run the rewards program now that they are paying this out.”

Post-Zarqawi Iraq Environment

Zarqawi’s death was seen a major coup for the US government in terms of the political and propaganda stakes. However, unconfirmed rumors in early April 2006 suggested that Zarqawi had been demoted from a strategic or coordinating function to overseer of paramilitary/terrorist activities of his group and that Abdullah bin Rashed al-Baghdadi of the Mujahideen Shura Council succeeded Zarqawi in the former function. On June 15, 2006, the United States military officially identified Abu Ayyub al-Masri as the successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

After Zarqawi’s demise in early June 2006 there has been little or no immediately identifiable change in terms of the level of violence and attacks against U.S. and allied troops. In the immediate aftermath insurgency attacks averaged 90 a day, apparently some of the highest on record. Four months after Zarqawi’s death, it is estimated that 374 coalition soldiers and 10355 Iraqis have been killed. Several insurgency groups and heads of Sunni Muslim tribes also formed a coalition called the Mujahideen Shura Council.

By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed by AQI against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image and caused the loss of support among the population, isolating the group. In a major blow to AQI, thousands of former Sunni militants that previously fought along with the group started to actively fight AQI and also work with the American and Iraqi forces starting with the creation of the Anbar Awakening Council because of its Anbar origins. The group spread to all Sunni cities and communities and some Shite areas and adopted the broader name Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq was instrumental in giving tips to coalition forces about weapons caches and militants resulting in the the destruction of over 2,500 weapons caches and over 800 militants being killed or captured. In addition, the 30,000 strong U.S. troop surge supplied military planners with more manpower for operations targeting Al-Qaeda in Iraq, The Mujahadeen Shura Council, Ansar Al-Sunnah and other terrorist groups. The resulting events leading to dozens of high-level AQI leaders being captured or killed. Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared to be severely crippled due to its lack of vast weapons caches, leaders, safe havens, and Iraqis willing to support them. Accordingly, the bounty issued for Abu Ayyub-al-Masri AKA Abu Hamza al-Muhajer was eventually cut from $5 million down to a mere $100,000 in April 2008.

On January 8, 2008, & January 28, 2008, Iraqi and U.S. forces launched operations Phantom Phoenix and the Ninawa campaign AKA the Mosul Campaign killing and capturing over 4,600 militants and locating and destroying over 3,000 weapons caches in those 2 campaigns. Also effectively leaving AQI with 1 last major insurgent stronghold Diyala. On July 29, 2008 Iraqi, U.S. and Sons Of Iraq forces launched Operation Augurs of Prosperity in the Diyala province and surrounding areas to clear AQI out of its last stronghold. 2 operations were already launched before in Diyala with mixed results and this campaign was expected to face fierce resistance. The rustling operation left over 500 weapons caches destroyed and 5 militants killed, 483 militants were captured due to the lack of resistance from the insurgent forces. 24 high level AQI terrorist were killed or captured in the campaign. As of August 1st 2008 there has been 83.2% decline in violence in Iraq.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri

Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir are two pseudonyms of the same person according to an FBI wanted poster and the U.S. State Department. In a Reuters article it was alleged that a posting on an unnamed Islamist website that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir was announced to be the new leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq on June 12, 2006.

Al-Masri was also a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. He was a senior aide to former leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike on June 7, 2006. On that day, U.S. Pentagon sources identified him as among the prime candidates to assume direction of the Iraqi insurgency.

He was described by the United States military as a native Egyptian who was about 39 years of age. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and in 1982 he joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which later became part of al-Qaeda. He went to Afghanistan in 1999, where he became an explosives expert. In 2004 he was put in charge of al-Qaeda’s overseas networks, and in 2006 he succeeded al-Zarqawi as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Under the name Abu Ayyub al-Masri, he has been wanted by Coalition and Iraqi authorities since 2005 or possibly earlier. Washington Post wrote, “Officials in Washington said Masri is also known — and equally unknown — by the name Yusif al-Dardiri”. Montasser el-Zayat reportedly agrees that Abu Ayyub’s real name is Yusif al-Dardiri.

Al-Masri was thought to have been born around 1967. Since 2003, he served as an aide to his predecessor, al-Zarqawi. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and in 1982 he joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which later became part of al-Qaeda.

The Mujahideen Shura Council, which claims to speak for Tenzheem Qa’adah al-Jihad and other groups in Iraq, named Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) as its new emir in June 2006. However, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said, “It’s not clear at this point who is in (control). We’ve seen a number of different reports… In our view it’s not yet settled.”

United States Army Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for the coalition military forces in Iraq, said another possible candidate for al-Qaeda leadership in Iraq is Iraqi Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, another Mujahedin Shura Council leader. Yasser al-Sirri, an Egyptian in charge of the Islamic Observation Center in London, thinks Baghdadi is more likely to be the new leader, and that he is “95 percent sure that this al-Masri doesn’t exist.” He speculated that al-Qaeda may want the public to believe that their new leader in Iraq is an Egyptian and not Iraqi “because they work under the Islamic banner…and they seek international jihad.”

On October 3, 2006, “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir” was erroneously believed to have been killed during a US raid in Haditha. As of May 3, it appears that the person killed was actually Muharib Abdul-Latif al-Jabouri, a senior member of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the “public relations minister” of al-Baghdadi’s shadow cabinet.

Biography

According to General Caldwell, Masri joined Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1982, where he was Zawahiri’s protégé. He remained a member after that organization was merged into Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. He went to bin Laden’s Farouk (or al-Farouq) camp in Afghanistan in 1999, where he worked with explosives, especially truck bombs and roadside bombs like those currently used in Iraq. After the American invasion of Afghanistan, he went to Iraq, where he took charge of al-Qaeda’s operations in the southern part of the country. The United States military said that Masri “helped draw other insurgent groups into al-Qaeda’s fold.” DefenseLINK News reported that Masri “helped establish the Baghdad cell of al-Qaeda in early 2003”. Soon after, he “worked the ‘rat line’ down the Euphrates River Valley supplying suicide bombers via Syria.” Masri organized fund-raising and recruitment efforts in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East to aid in al-Qaeda’s activities in Iraq. One envoy he sent for those purposes was Yasser al-Misri, arrested in Algeria in July 2005. Masri participated in the major 2004 battle of Fallujah, Zarqawi, a Sunni Muslim, often attacked the Shiite Muslim population of Iraq, possibly against his leaders’ wishes. Masri has become a primary target of the American military in Iraq. General Caldwell said, “Al-Masri’s intimate knowledge of al-Qaeda in Iraq and his close relationship with [Zarqawi’s] operations will undoubtedly help facilitate and enable them to regain some momentum if in fact he is the one that assumes the leadership role.” And on another occasion he said, “There is no question that if we can take him down that will just disrupt the organization to the point to where it would be ineffective for a long period of time.” One anti-Masri tactic Caldwell mentioned was portraying Masri as foreigner who has no significant ties to the Iraqi people.

On 20 September 2006 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir claimed responsibility for personally killing Turkish hostage Murat Yuce in a video that was first released in August 2004. Murat Yuce was killed with three gunshot wounds to the head in a video released on the internet. He was kidnapped in late July 2004 along with a co-worker named Aytullah Gezmen. Aytullah Gezmen was released in September 2004 after “repenting” working for the Americans. According to the Associated Press, the Bush administration posted a $200,000 bounty on Masri even before Zarqawi’s death. The reward was later raised to up to $5 million before being reduced to $100,000 in 2008.

Not much is known about him. ‘Muhajir’ is thought to be a pseudonym. After the death of al-Zarqawi, an American military spokesperson identified him as the most likely to succeed al-Zarqawi. Some analysts identify Muhajir as an Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who trained in Afghanistan, formed al Qaeda’s first cell in Baghdad, and is sought by the U.S. military as a Zarqawi aide.. As of 15 June 2006, the U.S. military has confirmed this identification. There has been some debate as to the accuracy of the U.S. military’s claim. On July 6, 2006 an Egyptian newspaper indicated that Mamduh Ismail, an Egyptian lawyer, reported that Sharif Hazaa, or Abu Ayyub al-Masri, has been in a Cairo prison for the past seven years. The lawyer was later arrested due to his connections to Al Qaeda.[2] According to the Washington Post some unidentified American and Jordanian officials claim that al-Masri has another alias of Yusuf al-Dardiri.

A claim posted on an Islamic website said that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir personally killed two U.S. Army soldiers who disappeared after an ambush in Iraq on June 16, 2006, as a means of “making his presence felt.” Their bodies were later found mutilated and booby-trapped in Yusufiya, Iraq on June 19, 2006. However Rita Katz, the head of SITE institute, said she believed that message was a fake.

Muhajir means “immigrant”, “emigrant” or “exile” in Arabic, and is often used to refer to the group of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers who fled to Medina (the Hijra). This may indicate that he is not from Iraq, but rather imply a person who was an “exile” in his own land, as per the original meaning of muhajir. In recent weeks Zarqawi’s group has tried to establish a more “local” profile in an attempt to appeal to potential Iraqi recruits, and the name “Muhajir” may alternatively indicate an Iraqi Sunni Muslim who opposed Saddam Hussein. It is known that several radical Sunnis native to Iraq-among them several individuals who were close to Zarqawi and initially believed likely candidated for successorship-were influenced by the former leader’s 1990s campaign of reislamization which was initially hailed by Islamist circles (the prime motivation for the secular regime was to make itself more appealing to religiously motivated Iraqis and other Arabs) but dismissed as a sham later.

Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi

Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (also known as Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) is a person purported to be the leader (or emir) of the former Mujahideen Shura Council (also known as the “Council of Freedom Fighters,” the “Consultative Council of Mujahedeen,” and the “Council of Holy Warriors”), an umbrella organization composed of eight groups that oppose the United States’ military presence in Iraq, and purported to be the head of Islamic State of Iraq.

The Interior Ministry of Iraq claimed that al-Baghdadi was captured in Baghdad on March 9, 2007, but it was later said that the person in question was not al-Baghdadi. On May 3, 2007, the Iraqi Interior Ministry said that al-Baghdadi was killed by American and Iraqi forces north of Baghdad. However, in July 2007, the U.S. military reported that al-Baghdadi never actually existed. The detainee identified as Khaled al-Mashhadani, a self-proclaimed intermediary to Osama bin Laden, claimed that al-Baghdadi was a fictional character created to give an Iraqi face to a foreign-run terror group, and that statements attributed to al-Baghdadi were actually read by an Iraqi actor.

In March 2008 the spokesman for an insurgent organization that is hostile to the Coalition, Hamas-Iraq, claimed that al-Baghdadi is a fabrication made by Al Qaeda to put a false Iraqi face to their organization.

On May 7, 2008 the Arabic-language satellite channel Al-Arabiya, citing information obtained from an Iraqi police official, identified al-Baghdadi as Hamid Dawoud al-Zawi.

Alleged Biography

Baghdadi met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Yasser al-Sirri, head of the Islamic Observatory in London, said that to be named emir, al-Baghdadi “should have proven combat skills and be versed in Sharia.” Sirri also said Baghdadi was previously head of the Al-Haya al-Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence committee) of the Shura Council. The New York Times reported that many terrorism experts believe the Shura Council is “a fiction” or “a front organization that appeared to give local control to Iraqis.” The paper also suggests that Baghdadi may have been a puppet of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, chosen to give an illusion of Iraqi control over “resistance” to the Americans and the democratically elected government in Iraq.

Alleged Role in Insurgency

Baghdadi reportedly oversaw fatwas and hostages and is the ultimate authority over an Islamic militant court. He has written articles such as Why do we fight and whom do we fight? and The constitution of the infidels. Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for the American military in Iraq, has suggested that Baghdadi might be in competition for power against Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the alleged new leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Muhajir, Zarqawi’s successor, stated that al-Baghdadi was “the ruler of believers” with al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters under his command.

Claim of Capture

Al-Baghdadi was reported captured by United States and Iraqi forces in a raid in Abu Ghraib, on the western outskirts of Baghdad, on March 9, 2007. Officials denied that the person captured was Al-Baghdadi on March 10, but said that the person was “a senior al-Qaeda leader”.

Claim of Death

Iraq’s Ministry of Interior has said that the leader of the insurgent group, the Mujahideen Shura Council, Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, has been killed by the United States military and Iraqi Forces and that his remains have been identified. The Iraqi Interior Ministry claimed he was killed during the night of May 2, 2007.

Caldwell denied these reports, saying the US does not have the bodies of al-Baghdadi or Abu Ayyub al-Masri who was also reported killed on that occasion by the IIM, nor did he know of anybody who did. It appears that the person killed was actually Muharib Abdul-Latif al-Jabouri, a senior member of Tenzheem Qa’adah al-Jihad and the “public relations minister” of al-Baghdadi’s shadow cabinet.

Claim of Non-existence

In July 2007, U.S. Major General Kevin Bergner reported that al-Baghdadi never existed. According to Reuters, “Bergner said the information came from an operative called Khaled al-Mashhadani who was caught on July 4 and who he said was an intermediary to Osama bin Laden.” Reuters further quoted Bergner as saying, “‘In [al-Mashadani’s] words, the Islamic State of Iraq is a front organization that masks the foreign influence and leadership within al Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to put an Iraqi face on the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq.’”

In March 26, 2008 the spokesman for the Iraqi Sunni jihad organization Hamas-Iraq, Ahmad Salah Al-Din claimed that al-Baghdadi was an Al Qaeda fabrication. He stated that Al-Qaeda’s real commander [in Iraq] was Abu Ayyub Al-Masri, and that [Abu ‘Omar] Al-Baghdadi was an Iraqi figure to whom many [words and deeds] are attributed solely to create the impression that [Al-Qaeda is a genuinely] Iraqi organization. This confirmation comes from a source hostile to American interests.

Mohamed Moumou

Mohamed Moumou also known as Abu Qaswarah or Abu Sara born 30 July 1965 was a Moroccan-born Swedish national who was the No. 2 leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the senior leader in Northern Iraq. He died in a building in Mosul during a shootout with American troops. Born in Fez, Morocco, he was one of the founders of the militant Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, or GICM). Moumou immigrated to Sweden in the mid-1980s and gained Swedish citizenship in the mid-1990s.

In March 2004, Moumou was arrested in Copenhagen, Denmark, at the Morrocan authorities request for his alleged role in the 2003 Casablanca bombings. He was released by the Danish authorities after a month and sent back to Sweden. While in Sweden, he was the “uncontested leader of an extremist group centered around the Brandbergen Mosque” in the Stockholm suburb of Haninge, according to the U.S. Treasury Department.

Säpo, the Swedish intelligence agency, had been keeping an eye on him since the mid-1990s, suspecting him of leading an Islamist network that supported terrorism abroad. He was believed to be recruiting Jihadists to fight in Iraq from his base in Sweden. The Swedes also suspected that he had taken part in terrorist attacks and fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s. In May 2006, he left for Iraq and never returned. In December of 2006, he was placed on the UN and EU terrorist lists.

According to the U.S. military, Abu Qaswarah was a charismatic figure who became the senior commander in northern Iraq in June 2007 and was second in command of Al-Qaeda in Iraq behind Abu Ayyub al-Masri. Allegedly, he was in charge of smuggling foreign fighters into northern Iraq and killed the fighters who did not want to attack Iraqis or carry out suicide missions. Prior to his death, a large number of Iraqi Christians were killed, and their murders were widely blamed on al-Qaeda. He is also accused of orchestrating the failed attack on the Mosul Civic Center, which if successful would have killed hundreds on Iraqi civilians.

According to the United States Department of the Treasury, Moumou traveled to Afghanistan in the mid 1990s to participate in the al-Qaeda-run Khalden training camp. According to TelQuel, Moumou was recruited in 1996 by Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi to serve as a “sleeping agent” in Stockholm. Moumou reportedly served, at some time in the past, as “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s representative in Europe for issues related to chemical and biological weapons”. He still reportedly maintains ties to “al-Zarqawi’s inner circle” in Iraq. He is also the editor of the Al Ansar newsletter connected to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA).

The U.S. military said that it tracked Abu Qaswarah to a building in Mosul, which served as a “key command and control location” for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. On 5 October 2008, they entered the building, were fired upon, and during the shootout they killed five people, one of which was Abu Qaswarah. His death was announced ten days later, when positive identification was made on his body. His death will make it more difficult for Al-Qaeda to network and operate in the region, according to the U.S. military. However, Al-Qaeda has been more successful than other groups in its ability to replace captured and killed leaders.

Abu Yaqub al-Masri

Abu Yaqub al-Masri also known as Zakkariya (The Doctor) and labeled “The Emir of Taji” (died 31 August 2007) was one of the top leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the organizer of the 23 November 2006 Sadr City bombings.

The Egyptian-born Masri was killed by Coalition forces near the city of Tarmiya, north of Baghdad.

Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi

Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi (also known as Hamed Jumma al-Saedi, Abu Humam, Abu Hammam and Abu Rana) is an Iraqi member of al-Qaeda accused by Iraq’s government of being “the number two al-Qaeda leader [in Iraq] after Abu Ayyub al-Masri.” He was captured during a joint raid by Iraqi and United States forces on June 19, 2006 either north or southwest of Baquba, Iraq.

Activities as an Insurgent

An anonymous “senior coalition official” claimed that Saeedi was responsible for many attacks and has been part of the insurgency against American forces in Iraq since about 2003. Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser, accused Saeedi of ordering Haitham al-Badri to carry out the February 22, 2006 Al Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra, Iraq.

Rubaie also said Saeedi “carried out al-Qaeda’s policies in Iraq,” specifically in the northern Salahuddin province and later Baquba province and tried to start a civil war between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in Iraq. He also said Saedi attempted to evade capture on the day of his arrest by hiding in a residential building, and that since his arrest he has told interrogators that al-Qaeda in Iraq exchanges logistical support and information with supporters of Saddam Hussein.

Post-capture

An anonymous “senior coalition official” said Saedi was captured along with “three other individuals.” He was interrogated for over two months. Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser, said that information from Saedi after his capture resulted in the death or capture of 11 “top Al Qaeda in Iraq figures” and nine “lower-level members. The Mujahideen Shura Council released an internet statement on Saedi’s capture which said the arrest was propaganda designed to mask coalition defeats in the region. “We reassure our brothers that out leaders... are on the front lines, fighting and inciting the faithful,” it read in part.

Khaled al-Mashhadani

Khaled al-Mashhadani (full name Khaled Abdul-Fattah Dawoud Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, also known as Abu Shahed) was a senior operative of al-Qaeda in Iraq. He served as a liaison between al-Qaeda leadership in hiding in Pakistan and Abu Ayyub al-Masri until his capture on July 4, 2007, in Mosul.

Mahir al-Zubaydi

Mahir al-Zubaydi (d. October 3, 2008 in Adhamiya, Baghdad, Iraq), also known as Abu Assad or Abu Rami, was a key al-Qaeda military commander. Zubaydi is believed to have headed the group behind bombings which killed at least 16 people in Baghdad in October 2008. The U.S. military says Zubaydi was suspected in several other attacks against Iraqis and U.S. forces in past years. Zubaydi also took part in a videotaped killing of four Russian diplomats in June 2006.

Death

US troops targeted Zubaydi on October 3, 2008, after receiving intelligence following bombings in Baghdad against Shia Muslim mosques. Troops tracked him down to a house in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad, a strongly Sunni Muslim area, surrounded the building and used loud speakers to order him to surrender. The Americans say he responded by shooting at them, so they shot him. A woman reported to be his wife was also killed.

Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman

Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman (?-June 7, 2006) (also Shaykh Abd Al-Rahman or Sheik Abd Al-Rahman) was the spiritual advisor to al-Qaeda in Iraq until his death in June 2006.

Death

Abd-Al-Rahman was killed on June 7, 2006 while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse approximately 8 km (5 mi) north of Baqubah, along with al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. At 14:15 GMT two United States Air Force F-16C jets identified the house and the lead jet dropped two 500-pound (230kg) guided bombs, a laser-guided GBU-12 and GPS-guided GBU-38 on the building located at 33°482 02.833 N 44°302 48.583.

The United States had tracked al-Zarqawi’s movements leading up to his meeting at the safehouse.

Islamic Terrorism

Islamic terrorism (also known as Islamist terrorism or Jihadist terrorism) is religious terrorism by those whose motivations are rooted in their interpretations of Islam.

Statistics gathered for 2006 by the National Counterterrorism Center of the United States indicated that “Islamic extremism” was responsible for approximately a quarter of all terrorism fatalities worldwide, and a majority of the fatalities for which responsibility could be conclusively determined. Terrorist acts have included airline hijacking, beheading, kidnapping, assassination, roadside bombing, suicide bombing, and occasionally rape.

Perhaps the most resonant, well known, and well documented incident of terrorism was the hijacking of four passenger jets and the destruction of the World Trade Center on the day of September 11 2001, in the United States of America. Other prominent attacks have occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Israel, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Britain, Spain, France, Russia and China. These terrorist groups often describe their actions as Islamic jihad (struggle). Self-proclaimed sentences of punishment or death, issued publicly as threats, often come in the form of fatwas (Islamic legal judgments).

Both Muslims and non-Muslims have been among the targets and victims, but threats against Muslims are often issued as takfir (a declaration that a person, group or institution that describes itself as Muslim has in fact left Islam and thus is a traitor). This is an implicit death threat as the punishment for apostasy in Islam is death under Sharia law.

The controversies surrounding the subject include whether the terrorist act is self-defense or aggression, national self-determination or Islamic supremacy; ; whether Islam can ever condone the targeting of noncombatants; whether some attacks described as Islamic terrorism are merely terrorist acts committed by Muslims or motivated by nationalism; whether the Arab-Israeli Conflict is the root of Islamic terrorism, or simply one cause; how much support there is in the Muslim world for Islamic terrorism and whether support for terror is a temporary phenomenum, a “bubble”, now fading away.

Debate over terminology

“Islamic terrorism” is itself a controversial phrase, although its usage is widespread throughout the English-speaking world. Bernard Lewis believes that the phrase “Islamic terrorism” is apt, because although “Islam as a religion” is not “particularly conducive to terrorism or even tolerant of terrorism”, Islam has had an essentially political character... from its very foundation... to the present day. An intimate association between religion and politics, between power and cult, marks a principal distinction between Islam and other religions.... In traditional Islam and therefore also in resurgent fundamentalist Islam, God is the sole source of sovereignty. God is the head of the state. The state is God’s state. The army is God’s army. The treasury is God’s treasury, and the enemy, of course, is God’s enemy.

This argument is countered by Jamal Nassar and Karim H. Karim, who contend that, because there are over a billion adherents of the religion, the phenomenon is more precisely regarded as “Islamist terrorism” or “militant Islamism”, because Islamism describes political ideologies rooted in interpretations of Islam. In this vein, describing terrorism as “Islamic” may confirm “a prejudicial perspective of all things Islamic”.

Karen Armstrong contends that “fundamentalism is often a form of nationalism in religious disguise”, and that using the phrase “Muslim terrorism” is dangerously counterproductive, as it suggests those in the west believe that such atrocities are caused by Islam, and hence reinforces the viewpoint of some in the Muslim world that the west is an implacable enemy. Armstrong believes that the terrorists in no way represent mainstream Islam, and suggests the use of other terms such as “Wahhabi terrorism” and “Qutbian terrorism”.

History

According to one source, although Islamic terrorism, at least in the form of suicide attacks-dates back to the Hashshashin sect of the 11th century, “its modern history begins with statements made by Sheik Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah”, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, who said in an interview published in 1983: “We believe that the future has surprises in store. The jihad is bitter and harsh, it will spring from inside, through effort, patience and sacrifice, and the spirit of readiness for martyrdom.”

Organizations and acts

Some prominent Islamic terror groups and incidents include the following:

Transnational

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a worldwide pan-Islamic terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden and is most famous for orchestrating the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.

It now operates in more than 60 countries. Its stated aim is the use of jihad to defend Islam against Zionism, Christianity, the secular West, and Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, which it sees as insufficiently Islamic and too closely tied to America.

Formed by bin Laden and Muhammad Atef in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1980s, Al Qaeda called for the use of violence against civilians and military of the United States and any countries that are allied with it. Since its formation Al Qaeda has committed a number of terrorist acts in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Although once supported by the Taliban organization in Afghanistan, the U.S. and British governments never considered the Taliban to have been a terrorist organization.

Europe

Major lethal attacks on civilians in Europe credited to Islamic terrorism include the March 11 2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, where 191 people were killed and 2,050 wounded, and the 7 July 2005 London bombings, also of public transport, which killed 52 commuters and injured 700.

Russia

Politically-motivated attacks on civilians in Russia have been traced to separatist sentiment among Muslims in its Caucasus region, particularly Chechnya. Russia’s two biggest terrorist attacks both came from Muslim groups. In the Nord-Ost incident at a theater in Moscow in October 2002, the Chechnyan separatist “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment” took an estimated 850 people hostage. An estimated 300 Russians died in an attempted rescue. Whether this attack would more properly be called a nationalist rather than an Islamist attack is in question.

In the September 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis 1,200 schoolchildren and adults were taken hostage after “School Number One” secondary school in Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania was overrun by the “Caucasus Caliphate Jihad” led by Shamil Basayev. As many as 500 died, including 186 children. According to the only surviving attacker, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, the choice of a school and the targeting of mothers and young children by the attackers was done in hopes of generating a maximum of outrage and igniting a wider war in the Caucasus with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic Emirate across the whole of the North Caucasus.

Turkey

Hezbollah (Turkish)

Unrelated to the more famous Shia Hezbollah of Lebanon, this Sunni terrorist group has been credited with the assassination of Diyarbakir police chief Gaffar Okkan, and the November 2003 bombings of two synagogues, the British consulate in Istanbul and HSBC bank headquarters, killing 58 and wounding several hundred.

Iraq

The area that has seen some of the worst terror attacks in modern history has been Iraq as part of the Iraq War. In 2005, there were 400 incidents of one type of attack (suicide bombing), killing more than 2000 people-many if not most of them civilians. In 2006, almost half of all reported terrorist attacks in the world (6600), and more than half of all terrorist fatalities (13,000), occurred in Iraq, according to the National Counterterrorism Center of the United States. The insurgency in Iraq against the US and Iraqi government combines attacks on “Coalition troops” and the Iraqi security forces, with attacks on civilian contractors, aid workers, and infrastructure. Along with nationalist Ba’athist groups and criminal, non-political attacks, the insurgency includes Islamist insurgent groups, who favor suicide attacks far more than non-Islamist groups.

They include the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda affiliate; Al-Faruq Brigades, a militant wing of the Islamic Movement in Iraq (Al-Harakah al-Islamiyyah fi al-arak); Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna; the Mujahideen of the Victorious Sect (Mujahideen al ta’ifa al-Mansoura); the Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq (Kata’ib al mujahideen fi al-jama’ah al-salafiyah fi al-‘arak); the Jihad Brigades/Cell; “White Flags, Muslim Youth and Army of Mohammed” ; Ansar al-Islam, a Taliban-like, jihadist group with ties to Al Qaeda. At least some of the terrorism has a transnational character in that some foreign Islamic jihadists have joined the insurgency.

Lebanon

Fatah al-Islam

Fatah al-Islam is an Islamist group operating out of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. It was formed in November 2006 by fighters who broke off from the pro-Syrian Fatah al-Intifada, itself a splinter group of Fatah, and is led by a Palestinian fugitive militant named Shaker al-Abssi. The group’s members have been described as militant jihadists, and the group itself has been described as a terrorist movement that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. Its stated goal is to reform the Palestinian refugee camps under Islamic sharia law, and its primary targets are Israel and the United States. Lebanese authorities have accused the organization of being involved in the February 13, 2007 bombing of two minibuses that killed three people, and injured more than 20 others, in Ain Alaq, Lebanon, and identified four of its members as having confessed to the bombing.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is a Shi’a militia, political party, and social services provider based in Lebanon. Six governments consider it, or a part of it, to be a terrorist group responsible for blowing up the American embassy and later its annex, as well as the barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops and a dozens of kidnappings of foreigners in Beirut. It is also accused of being the recipient of massive aid from Iran, and of serving “Iranian foreign policy calculations and interests,” or serving as a “subcontractor of Iranian initiatives” Hezbollah denies any involvement or dependence on Iran.

In the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the other hand, Hezbollah is regarded as a legitimate and successful resistance movement that drove both Western powers and Israel out of Lebanon. In 2005, the Lebanese Prime Minister said of Hezbollah, it “is not a militia. It’s a resistance.”

Hezbollah’s simultaneous suicide attacks on US and French barracks in Beirut and the withdrawal of American peacekeeping troops shortly thereafter the bombings prompted is thought to have “made a profound impression on bin Laden.”

Israel and the Palestinian territories

Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades

Hamas

Hamas, (“zeal” in Arabic and an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), began support for attacks on military and civilian targets in Israel at the beginning of the Intifada in 1987. As the Muslim Brotherhood organization for Palestine its leadership was made up of “intellectuals from the devout middle class,... respectable religious clerics, doctors, chemists, engineers, and teachers.

The 1988 charter of Hamas calls for the destruction of Israel, and it still states its goal to be the elimination of Israel. Its “military wing” has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Israel. Hamas has also been accused of sabotaging the Israeli-Palestine peace process by launching attacks on civilians during Israeli elections to anger Israeli voters and facilitate the election of harder-line Israeli candidates. For example, “a series of spectacular suicide attacks by Palestinians that killed 63 Israelis and led directly to the election victory of Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party on May 29, 1996.”

Hamas justifies these attacks as necessary in fighting the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, and as responses to Israeli attacks on Palestinian targets. The wider movement also serves as a charity organization and provides services to Palestinians.

Hamas has been designated as a terrorist group by the European Union, Canada, the United States, Israel, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights Watch. Opponents of this view claim that Israel is not a legitimate state because of the conditions of its establishment after World War II.

Islamic Jihad

Islamic Jihad is a militant Palestinian group Islamist group based in the Syrian capital, Damascus, and dedicated to waging jihad to eliminate the state of Israel. It was formed by Egyptian Fathi Shaqaqi in the Gaza Strip following the Iranian Revolution which inspired its members. From 1983 onward, it engaged in “a succession of violent, high-profile attacks” on Israeli targets. The intifada which “it eventually sparked” was quickly taken over by much larger the PLO and Hamas. Beginning in September 2000, it started a campaign of suicide bombing attacks against Israelis. It is currently led by Sheikh Abdullah Sheikh Abdullah Ramadan.

The PIJ’s armed wing, the Al-Quds brigades, has claimed responsibility for numerous militant attacks in Israel, including suicide bombings and the group has been designated as a terrorist group by the several countries in the West.

North Africa

Armed Islamic Group

The Armed Islamic Group, active in Algeria between 1992 and 1998, was one of the most violent Islamic terrorist groups, and is thought to have takfired the Muslim population of Algeria. Its campaign to overthrow the Algerian government included civilian massacres, which sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation (see List of Algerian massacres of the 1990s; notably the Bentalha massacre and Rais massacre, among others.) It also targeted foreigners living in Algeria killing more than 100 expatriate men and women in the country. The group’s favored technique was the kidnapping of victims and slitting their throats although it also used assassination by gun and bombings, including car bombs. Outside of Algeria, the GIA established a presence in France, Belgium, Britain, Italy and the United States. In recent years it has been eclipsed by a splinter group, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now called Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.

South Asia

Lashkar-e-Toiba

Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba is a militant group that seeks the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. It has committed mass militant actions against Indian troops and civilian Hindus. The Lashkar leadership describes Indian and Israeli regimes as the main enemies of Islam, claiming India and Israel to be the main enemies of Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Toiba, along with Jaish-e-Mohammed, another militant group active in Kashmir are on the United States’ foreign terrorist organizations list. They are also designated as terrorist groups by the United Kingdom, India, Australia and Pakistan.

Jaish-e-Mohammed

Jaish-e-Mohammed (often abbreviated as JEM) is a major Islamic militant organization in South Asia. Jaish-e-Mohammed was formed in 1994 and is based in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The group’s primary objective is to separate Kashmir from India, and it has carried out a series of attacks all over India.

The group was formed after the supporters of Maulana Masood Azhar split from another Islamic militant organization, Harkut-ul-Mujahideen. It is believed that the group gets considerable funding from Pakistani expatriates in the United Kingdom. The group is regarded as a terrorist organization by several countries including India, United States and United Kingdom. Jaish-e-Mohammed is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and “the principal terrorist organization in Jammu and Kashmir”. The group was also implicated in the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl.

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen

In Bangladesh the group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh was formed sometime in 1998 and gained prominence on 20 May 2001 when 25 petrol bombs and documents detailing the activities of the organization were discovered and eight of its members were arrested in Parbatipur in Dinajpur district. The organization was officially banned in February 2005 after attacks on NGOs, but struck back in August when 300 bombs were detonated almost simultaneously throughout Bangladesh. Dhaka international airport, government buildings and major hotels were targeted.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin forces, are reported to have “sharply escalated bombing and other attacks in 2006 and early 2007” against civilians. During 2006 “at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally launched at civilians or civilian objects. An additional 52 civilians were killed in insurgent attacks in the first two months of 2007.”

Southeast Asia

Abu Sayyaf Group

The Abu Sayyaf Group also known as al-Harakat al-Islamiyya is one of several militant Islamist separatist groups based in and around the southern islands of the Philippines, in Bangsamoro (Jolo, Basilan, and Mindanao) where for almost 30 years various Muslim groups have been engaged in an insurgency for a state, independent of the predominantly Christian Philippines. The name of the group is derived from the Arabic ÇÈæ, abu (“father of”) and sayyaf (“Swordsmith”).

Since its inception in the early 1990s, the group has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, rapes, and extortion in their fight for an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago with the stated goal of creating a pan-Islamic superstate across southeast Asia, spanning from east to west; the island of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, the island of Borneo (Malaysia, Indonesia), the South China Sea, and the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar).

The U.S. Department of State has branded the group a terrorist entity by adding it to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Tactics

Some of these groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have limited their acts to localized regions of the Middle East, while others, notably Al-Qaeda, have an international scope for their terrorist activities.

Bombings

An increasingly popular tactic used by terrorists is suicide bombing. This tactic is used against civilians, soldiers, and government officials of the regimes the terrorists oppose.

The use of suicide bombers is seen by many Muslims as contradictory to Islam’s teachings; however, groups who support its use often refer to such attacks as “martyrdom operations” and the suicide-bombers who commit them as “martyrs” (Arabic: shuhada, plural of “shahid”). The bombers, and their sympathizers often believe that suicide bombers, as martyrs to the cause of jihad against the enemy, will receive the rewards of paradise for their actions.

One source has found interest in new and so far unutilized bombing technique on internet forums used by the Islamic terror group al-Qaeda-the use of “remote-piloted aircraft” and “robot designs,” and “training dogs to recognize American troops’ uniforms,” as a replacement for techniques such as suicide bombing or a detonating planted bombs with a radio-control.

Hijackings

The hijacking of passenger vehicles such as cars, buses, and planes has also become a hallmark of Islamist terrorism, particularly as a result of the simultaneous hijacking of the four passenger jets utilized in the September 11th terrorist attacks as well as the hijacking of a Belgian airlines jet during the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre.

Kidnappings and Executions

Along with bombings and hijackings, Islamist terrorists have made extensive use of highly-publicised kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. Notable foreign victims include Nick Berg, Daniel Pearl, Paul Marshall Johnson, Jr., Eugene Armstrong, Jack Hensley, Kim Sun-il, Kenneth Bigley, Shosei Koda, Fabrizio Quattrocchi, Margaret Hassan. One Iraqi victim was Seif Adnan Kanaan. The most frequent form of execution by these groups has been decapitations, often committed while shouting the Islamic chant, “Allahu Akbar” (Arabic for God is greatest). While some targets are military, or seen as supporting the anti-Islamist forces, victims are also as varied as the Red Cross, the Iraqi education ministry, and diplomats.

Motivation, Ideology and Theology

Robert Pape, has argued that at least terrorists utilizing suicide-homicide attacks — a particularly effective form of terrorist attack — are driven not by Islamism but by “a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.” However a critic of Pape’s theory, Martin Kramer, argues that it does not account for the lack of suicide bombings in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in Israel for nearly 30 years after the occupation began, for the targeting of native, non-combatant Shia by jihadi bombers in Iraq, the prominence of British-born Pakistanis in bombings in London, or of North Africans, and especially Moroccans, in the second wave of al-Qaeda attackers.

In particular, scholar Scott Atran, points out that the massive increase in suicide bombing has meant most suicide bombings have occurred after Pape’s study ended in 2003. “Roughly 600,” suicide attacks occurred in just two years, 2004 and 2005, more “than in Pape’s entire sample,”-and the overwhelming majority of these bombers have been motivated by the ideology of Islamist martyrdom.

Some supporters of Palestinian political violence have claimed that citizens of Israel are legitimate military targets because Jewish adolescents are required by law to serve in the country’s military.

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer’s view is that Islamic terror attacks against America are motivated by the perception that U.S. foreign policy is a threat to Islam. He has further condensed his argument down to the phrase “They hate us for what we do, not who we are.” By this, Scheuer acknowledges that American culture and religion are offensive to many Muslims, but claims these factors have very little role as motivators of Islamic terrorism. Rather, he cites the following U.S. foreign policy actions as fueling Islamic terror:

The presence of U.S. troops on Muslim holy ground in Saudi Arabia
U.S. support for “apostate” police states in Muslim nations such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait
The U.S. invasions and subsequent occupations of the Muslim nations of Afghanistan and Iraq
U.S. support for the creation of the Christian state of East Timor from territory previously held by Muslim Indonesia.
U.S. approval or support of:

India against Muslim forces in the disputed region of Kashmir
The Philippines against separatist Muslims in Mindanao
Russia against Muslim Chechens in the Second Chechen War
China against Muslim Uyghur separatists in western China
Israel against Muslim Arabs in the Palestinian territories

Bergesen and Lizardo wrote “Crenshaw (2001:425) argues that ‘terrorism should be seen as a strategic reaction to American power,’ an idea associated with Johnson’s (2000) ‘blowback’ thesis. In this view, the presence of empires-both at the end of the last century and today-and the analogous unipolar military position of the United States today (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002) provoke resistance in the form of terrorism. Johnson (2000) notes that the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires-which controlled multiple ethnic, religious, and national peoples-led to a backlash, or blowback, by Serb, Macedonian, and Bosnian terrorist organisations (the Black Hand, Young Bosnia, Narodnaya Volya). By analogy the powerful global position of the United States, particularly in its role of propping up repressive undemocratic regimes, constitutes something of a similar condition with Arab-Islamic terrorism as a result. The causal mechanism here is that the projection of military power plants seeds of later terrorist reactions, as ‘retaliation for previous American imperial actions’ (Johnson 2000:9)”

Profile

Lawrence Wright and Olivier Roy have mentioned the characteristic of “displacement” of members of the most famous Islamic terrorist group, Al-Qaeda.

What the recruits tended to have in common-besides their urbanity, their cosmopolitan backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills-was displacement. Most who joined the jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They were Algerians living in expatriate enclaves in France, Moroccans in Spain, or Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. Despite their accomplishments, they had little standing in the host societies where they lived.....”

Another author, forensic psychiatrist and former foreign service officer Marc Sageman, made an “intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad,” in his book “Understanding Terror Networks”. He concluded “social networks”, the “tight bonds of family and friendship” rather than behavioral disorders “poverty, trauma, madness, [or] ignorance” inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad” and kill.

What may be an indication that this profile is changing comes from a 2007 study of 110 suicide bombers in Afghanistan, by an Afghan pathologist Dr. Yusef Yadgari. Yadgari found that “80%” of the attackers studied had some kind of physical or mental disability. The bombers were also “not celebrated like their counterparts in other Arab nations. Afghan bombers are not featured on posters or in videos as martyrs.”

Ideology

Tenets of Qutbism have been summarized by Dale C. Eikmeier as being:

A belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to “pure Islam” as originally practiced during the time of the Prophet.
The path to “pure Islam” is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith, along with implementation of the Prophet’s commands.
Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars.
That any interpretation of the Quran from a historical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the classical jurisprudential tradition is mere sophistry.

Transnational Islamist ideology, specifically of the militant Islamists, assert a Western polities and society are actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a “war on Islam”. Islamists often identify what they see as a historical struggle between Christianity and Islam, dating back as far as the Crusades, among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions. Osama bin Laden, for example, almost invariably describes his enemy as aggressive and his call for action against them as defensive. Defensive jihad differs from offensive jihad in being “fard al-ayn,” or a personal obligation of all Muslim, rather than “fard al-kifaya”, a communal obligation, which if some Muslims perform it is not required from others. Hence, framing a fight as defensive has the advantage both of appearing to be a victim rather than aggressor, and of giving your struggle the very highest religious priority for all good Muslims. Many of the violent terrorist groups use the name of Jihad to fight against Christians and Jews. An example is Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, which is also known as ‘International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders’. Most militant Islamists oppose Israel’s policies, and often its existence.

The historic rivalry between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent has also often been the primary motive behind some of the most deadly terrorist attacks in India. According to a US State Department report, India topped the list of countries worst affected by Islamic terrorism.

In addition, Islamist Jihadis, scholars, and leaders opposed Western society for what they see as immoral secularism. Islamists have claimed that such unrestricted free speech has led to the proliferation of pornography, immorality, secularism, homosexuality, feminism, and many other ideas that Islamists often oppose. Although bin Laden almost always emphasized the alleged oppression of Muslims by America and Jews when talking about them in his messages, in his “Letter to America” he answered the question, “What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?,” with

We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling’s, and trading with interest... You separate religion from your policies,... You are the nation that permits Usury, which has been forbidden by all the religions... You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants... You are a nation that permits acts of immorality... You are a nation that permits gambling in its all forms.... You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women....

Accusations of Apostasy

Justification for terrorism against other Muslims by militant Islamists, in particular against Muslim regimes they consider non-Islamic, is often based on the contention that the targets are apostates. Osama Bin Laden, for example, maintains that any Muslim who helps “infidels over Muslims” is no longer a Muslim, ... the believer... should boycott the goods of America and her allies, and he should be very wary that he does not support falsehood, for helping the infidels over Muslims — even with a single word is clear unbelief, as the religious scholars have decreed and that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (deposed in 2001) “is the only Islamic country” in the world. Islamic law traditionally designates death as the penalty for apostasy (converting) from Islam.

Opinions within the Muslim community vary as to the grounds on which an individual may be declared to have apostatized. The most common view among Muslim scholars is that a declaration of takfir (designation of a Muslim as an apostate) can only be made by an established religious authority. Mainstream Muslim scholars usually oppose recourse to takfir, except in rare instances. Takfir was used as justification for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Interpretations of the Qur’an

The role played by the Qur’an, Islam’s sacred text, in opposing or in encouraging attacks on civilians is hotly disputed.

Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, an Iranian-born American citizen awaiting trial for nine counts of attempted murder, cited a number of verses from the Qur’an in justifying his attempt to kill civilians, including:

Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not.

The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter;

But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur’an 9:5]

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. The Jews call ‘Uzair a son of Allah, and the Christians call Christ the son of Allah. That is a saying from their mouth; (in this) they but imitate what the unbelievers of old used to say. Allah’s curse be on them: how they are deluded away from the Truth! [Qur’an 9:29-30]

Marmaduke Pickthall, a Western convert to Islam and Islamic scholar commented on verse 2:216, references verse 2:251, and interpreted these particular verses to mean that fighting is not optional when done in defense of the oppressed and the weak.

Pickthall goes on to say that “Nowhere does the Qur’an approve a spirit of revenge” and situates verse 2:194 in the context of a defensive war. Ibn Kathir stated that the Quran clearly commands believers to prefer forgiveness over retaliation wherever possible.

Michael Sells and Jane I. Smith (a Professor of Islamic Studies) write that barring some extremists like Al-Qaeda, most Muslims do not interpret Qura’nic verses as promoting warfare; and that the phenomenon of radical interpretation of scripture by extremist groups is not unique to Islam.”. According to Sells, “[Most Muslims] no more expect to apply [the verses at issue] to their contemporary non-Muslim friends and neighbors than most Christians and Jews consider themselves commanded by God, like the Biblical Joshua, to exterminate the infidels.”

Criticism of Islamic Terrorist Ideology

Although “Islamic” Terrorism is commonly associated with the Salafis or “Wahhabis”, the scholars of the group have constantly attributed this association to ignorance, misunderstanding and sometimes insincere research and deliberate misleading by rival groups.. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Arlington, Shaikh Abdul-Azeez Aal ash-Shaikh (the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia President of the Committee of Major Scholars and centre for Knowledge based research and verdicts) made an official statement that “the Islamic Sharee’ah (legislation) does not sanction” such actions. A Salafi or “Wahhabi” “Committee of Major Scholars” in Saudi Arabia has declared that “Islamic” terrorism, such as the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, are in violation of Sharia law and aiding the enemies of Islam..

Criticism of Islamic terrorism on Islamic grounds has also been made by anti-terrorist Muslims such as Abdal-Hakim Murad:

Certainly, neither bin Laden nor his principal associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are graduates of Islamic universities. And so their proclamations ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship, and instead take the form of lists of anti-American grievances and of Koranic quotations referring to early Muslim wars against Arab idolaters. These are followed by the conclusion that all Americans, civilian and military, are to be wiped off the face of the Earth. All this amounts to an odd and extreme violation of the normal methods of Islamic scholarship. Had the authors of such fatwas followed the norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of mainstream Islam allows the targeting of civilians. An insurrectionist who kills non-combatants is guilty of baghy, “armed aggression,” a capital offense in Islamic law.

One counter-terrorism scholar, Dale C. Eikmeier, points out the “questionable religious credentials” of many Islamist theorists, or “Qutbists,” which can be a “means to discredit them and their message”:

With the exception of Abul Ala Maududi and Abdullah Azzam, none of Qutbism’s main theoreticians trained at Islam’s recognized centers of learning. Although a devout Muslim, Hassan al Banna was a teacher and community activist. Sayyid Qutb was a literary critic. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman.

Yemeni Judge Hamoud Al-Hitar has also attacked the Islamic intellectual basis of terrorism using hujjat or proof “in theological dialogues that challenge and then correct the wayward beliefs” of terrorists or would-be terrorists. Iranian Ayatollah Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei issued a fatwa (ruling) that suicide attacks against civilians are legitimate only in the context of war. The ruling did not say whether other types of attacks against civilians are justified outside of the context of war, nor whether Jihad is included in Sanei’s definition of war.

On the other hand, Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Turkish Islamic scholar, has claimed that “a real Muslim,” who understood Islam in every aspect, could not be a terrorist. There are many other people with similar points of view such as Karen Armstrong, Prof. Ahmet Akgunduz, and Harun Yahya

Muslim attitudes toward terrorism

Muslim popular opinion on the subject of attacks on civilians by Islamist groups varies. While most Muslims living in the West denounce the September 11th attacks on the US, Hezbollah’s rocket attacks against Israeli civilian targets are widely supported in the Muslim world and regarded as defensive Jihad by a legitimate resistance movement rather than terrorism.

A Sunday Times survey taken in UK shortly after the 9/11 attack “revealed that 40% of British Muslims believe Usama bin Laden was right to attack the United States. About the same proportion think that British Muslims have a right to fight alongside the Taliban. A radio station serving London’s Pakistani community conducted a poll which 98% of London Muslims under 45 said they would not fight for Britain, while 48% said they would fight for bin Laden.”

A 2005 Pew Research study that involved 17,000 people in 17 countries showed support for terrorism was declining in the Muslim world along with a growing belief that Islamic extremism represents a threat to those countries. A Daily Telegraph survey showed that 6% of British Muslims fully supported the July 2005 bombings in the London Underground.

A 2004 Pew survey revealed that Osama bin Laden is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%) and Morocco (45%). In Turkey as many as 31% say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.

The Free Muslims Coalition rallied against terror, stating that they wanted to send “a message to radical Muslims and supporters of terrorism that we reject them and that we will defeat them.”

Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, a Muslim and the general manager of Arab news channel, Al-Arabiya has said: “It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims.” Statistics compiled by the United States government’s Counterterrorism Center present a more complicated picture: of known and specified terrorist incidents from the beginning of 2004 through the first quarter of 2005, slightly more than half of the fatalities were attributed to Islamic extremists but a majority of over-all incidents were considered of either “unknown/unspecified” or a secular political nature.

The vast majority of the “unknown/unspecified” terrorism fatalities did however happen in Islamic regions such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or in regions where Islam is otherwise involved in conflicts such as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, southern Thailand and Kashmir.The methodology employed by the Center is sometimes disputed and the center has been accused of responding to political pressure from the Bush administration to show a decline in terrorism.

In 2006, Palestine voters gave the group Hamas-which is designated as a terrorist organization in Israel, United States, Canada, and the European Union-a majority of the seats in its parliament. though there is question as to whether whether the election results represent support for the organization’s militia tactics, support for the organization’s social programs, or dissatisfaction with the previous government which was widely seen as corrupt and incompetent.

Fred Halliday, a British academic specialist on the Middle East, argues that most Muslims consider these acts to be egregious violations of Islam’s laws.

Daniel Chirot said “Not many people in the world, either in Islamic countries, or Christian ones, or Hindu, or Buddhist, or anything else, really want to live a life of extreme puritanism, endless hate, and suicidal wars. Extremist leaders can take power, and for a time, be backed by much of their population hoping to redress past grievances and trying to find a new utopia. But as with the most extreme Christian warriors during the European wars of religion, or with the Nazis, or the most committed communist revolutionaries, it eventually turned out that few of their people were willing to go all the way in their struggles if that meant permanent violence, suffering, and death. So it will be with Islamic extremism.”

Examples of Attacks

4 September 1972-Munich Olympic Massacre.
18 April 1983-April 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon. 63 killed.
26 February 1993-World Trade Center bombing, New York City. 6 killed.
13 March 1993-1993 Bombay bombings. Mumbai, India. The single-day attacks resulted in over 250 civilian fatalities and 700 injuries.
24 December 1994-Air France Flight 8969 hijacking in Algiers by 3 members of Armed Islamic Group and another terrorist. 7 killed including 4 hijackers.
25 June 1996-Khobar Towers bombing, 20 killed, 372 wounded.
14 February 1998. The 1998 Coimbatore bombings occurred in the city of Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, India. 46 people were killed and over 200 were injured in 13 bomb attacks within a 12 km radius.
7 August 1998-1998 United States embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. 224 dead. 4000+ injured.
12 October 2000-USS Cole bombing, 56 killed
11 September 2001-September 11, 2001 attacks 4 planes hijacked and crashed into World Trade Center and The Pentagon by 19 hijackers. Nearly 3000 dead.
13 December 2001-Suicide attack on India’s parliament in New Delhi. Aimed at eliminating the top leadership of India and causing anarchy in the country. Allegedly done by Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist organizations, Jaish-E-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba.
3 March 2002-Suicide bomb attack on a Passover Seder in a Hotel in Netanya, Israel. 29 dead, 133 injured
9 March 2002-Café suicide bombing in Jerusalem; 11 killed, 54 injured.
7 May 2002-Bombing in al-Arbaa, Algeria. 49 dead, 117 injured.
24 September 2002-Machine Gun attack on Hindu temple in Ahmedabad, India. 31 dead, 86 injured.
12 October 2002-Bombing in Bali nightclub. 202 killed, 300 injured.
16 May 2004-Casablanca Attacks-4 simultaneous attacks in Casablanca killing 33 civilians (mostly Moroccans) carried by Salafaia Jihadia.
11 March 2004-Multiple bombings on trains near Madrid, Spain. 191 killed, 1460 injured. (alleged link to Al-Qaeda)
3 September 2004 Approximately 344 civilians including 186 children, are killed during the Beslan school hostage crisis.
2 November 2004-Ritual murder of Theo van Gogh (film director) by Amsterdam-born jihadist Mohammed Bouyeri.
4 February 2005-Muslim militants attacked the Christian community in Demsa, Nigeria, killing 36 people, destroying property and displacing an additional 3000 people.
7 July 2005-Multiple bombings in London Underground. 53 killed by four suicide bombers. Nearly 700 injured.
23 July 2005-Bomb attacks at Sharm el-Sheikh, an Egyptian resort city, at least 64 people killed.
29 October 2005-29 October 2005 Delhi bombings. Over 60 killed and over 180 injured in a series of three attacks in crowded markets and a bus, just 2 days before the Diwali festival.
9 November 2005-2005 Amman bombings. Over 60 killed and 115 injured, in a series of coordinated suicide attacks on hotels in Amman, Jordan. Four attackers including a husband and wife team were involved.
7 March 2006-2006 Varanasi bombings. An attack attributed to Lashkar-e-Toiba by Uttar Pradesh government officials, over 28 killed and over 100 injured, in a series of attacks in the Sankath Mochan Hanuman temple and Cantonment Railway Station in the Hindu holy city of Varanasi. Uttar Pradesh government officials.
11 July 2006. Mumbai, India. 11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings were a series of seven bomb blasts that took place over a period of 11 minutes on the Suburban Railway in Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay). 209 people lost their lives and over 700 were injured in the attacks.
26 July 2008. Ahmedabad, India. Islamic militants detonate at least 16 explosive devices in the heart of this industrial capital, leaving at least 49 dead and 160 injured. A Muslim group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen claims responsibility. Indian authorities believe that extremists with ties to Pakistan and/or Bangladesh are likely responsible and are intent on inciting communal violence.. Investigation by Indian police led to the eventual arrest of a number of militants suspected of carrying out the blasts, most of whom belong to a well-known terrorist group, The Students Islamic Movement of India.

Terrorist attacks of the Iraq War

2004

• 2004 Irbil bombings

• 2004 Iraq Ashura bombings

• 21 April 2004 Basra bombings

• 24 June 2004 Mosul bombings

• 14 September 2004 Baghdad bombing

• 30 September 2004 Baghdad bombing

• December 2004 Karbala and Najaf bombings

• 2004 Baqubah bombing

• 2004 Kufa shelling

• 2004 Forward Operating Base Marez bombing

2005

• 2005 Al Hillah bombing

• 2005 Musayyib bombing

• 17 August 2005 Baghdad bombings

• 14 September 2005 Baghdad bombing

• 2005 Khanaqin bombings

2006

• 5 January 2006 Iraq bombings

• 22 February 2006 Al-Askari Mosque bombing

• Buratha Mosque bombing

• 1 July 2006 Sadr City bombing

• 23 November 2006 Sadr City bombings

2007

• 2007 Baghdad Mustansiriya University bombing

• 22 January 2007 Baghdad bombings

• 3 February 2007 Baghdad market bombing

• 12 February 2007 Baghdad bombings

• 18 February 2007 Baghdad bombings

• 2007 Al Hillah bombings

• 2007 Tal Afar bombings

• 29 March 2007 Baghdad bombings

• 2007 Iraqi Parliament bombing

• Imam Hussein Mosque bombing

• 18 April 2007 Baghdad bombings

• Imam Abbas mosque bombing

• 13 May 2007 Makhmoor bombing

• Second bombing of Al-Askari Mosque

• Al-Khilani Mosque bombing

• 2007 Amirli bombing

• 2007 Kirkuk bombings

• 26 July 2007 Baghdad market bombing

• 1 August 2007 Baghdad bombings

• 2007 Kahtaniya bombings

• 2007 Al Amarah bombings

2008

• 1 February 2008 Baghdad bombings

• 2008 Balad bombing

• 6 March 2008 Baghdad bombing

• 2008 Karbala bombing

• 17 June 2008 Baghdad bombing

• 15 July 2008 Baquba bombings

Al-Qaeda and Armed Massacres

Beginning in April 2004, members of the Iraqi insurgency began taking hostage foreign civilians in Iraq. Since then, they have kidnapped more than 200 foreigners and thousands of Iraqis; among them, 30 foreign hostages have been killed. The motives behind these kidnappings include influencing foreign governments with troops in Iraq and foreign companies with workers there, as well as ransom money and discouraging travel to Iraq. In 2004, executions of captives were often filmed, and several were beheaded. However, the number of videotaped killings has decreased significantly, and now the deaths of hostages are often announced only in a statement. Many hostages remain missing with no clue as to their whereabouts. The US Department of State Hostage Working Group was organized by the US Embassy in Baghdad in the summer of 2004 to monitor hostages in Iraq.

Assassinations

Since the beginning of the insurgency, several high-profile people have been assassinated. These included:

Sergio Vieira de Mello (2003)
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim (2003)
Akila al-Hashimi (2003)
Izzedine Salim (2004)
Dhari Ali al-Fayadh (2004)
Mohammed Awad (2007)
Sheikh Sittar (2007)

Chemical Warfare Attacks

During 2007 insurgents exploded several chlorine containers attacking Iraqi civilians. Hundreds were killed and many more injured.

Awareness of US Opinion on the War

One study has compared the number of insurgent attacks in Iraq to the number of “anti-resolve” statements in the US media, the release of public opinion polls, and geographic variations in access to international media by Iraqis. The purpose was to determine if insurgents responded to information on “casualty sensitivity.” The researchers found that insurgent attacks spiked by 5 to 10% after increases in the number of negative reports of the war in the media. The authors identified this as an “emboldenment effect” and concluded “insurgent groups respond rationally to expected probability of US withdrawal.”

In a response, Camillo Mac Bica has expressed surprise that an “unpublished... working paper” had excited as much interest as it did among media outlets and bloggers. He argued that the research methodology utilized in this study was flawed and that the researchers, despite recognizing and acknowledging the inadequacies of their argument, continued to draw conclusions not indicated by their findings.

Psychological operations

Psychological Operations (PSYOP, PSYOPS) are techniques used by military and police forces to influence a target audience’s value systems, belief systems, emotions, motives, reasoning, and behavior. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, and are used in order to induce confessions, or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives. These are sometimes combined with black operations or false flag tactics.

This concept has been used by military institutions throughout history, but it is only since the twentieth century that it has been accorded the organizational and professional status it enjoys now.

The word is commonly used by governments, such as the government of the United States, who do not wish to use the term propaganda or brainwashing to refer to their own work. The word propaganda has very negative connotations, and by calling it psychological operations instead, more sophisticated methods of psychological manipulation are accurately incorporated by the terminology. This euphemism for mind control is ironically an example of psychological operations — i.e. using psychological techniques to persuade [manipulate] a large number of people to support something that they wouldn’t normally support.

Germany

In the German Bundeswehr, the Zentrum Operative Information and its subordinate Bataillon für Operative Information 950 are responsible for the PSYOP efforts (called Operative Information in German). Both the center and the battalion are subordinate to the new Streitkräftebasis (Joint Services Support Command, SKB) and together consist of about 1,200 soldiers specialising in modern communication and media technologies. One project of the German PSYOP forces is the radio station Stimme der Freiheit (Voice of Freedom), heard by thousands of Afghans. Another is the publication of various newspapers and magazines in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where German soldiers serve with NATO.

United Kingdom

In the British Armed Forces, PSYOPS are handled by the tri-service 15 Psychological Operations Group. (See also MI5 and Secret Intelligence Service.)

United States

The purpose of United States psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to US objectives. Dedicated psychological operations units exist in the United States Army. The United States Navy also plans and executes limited PSYOP missions.

United States PSYOP units and soldiers of all branches of the military are prohibited by law from conducting PSYOP missions in the US.(Executive Order S-1233, DOD Directive S-3321.1, and National Security Decision Directive 130.) While United States Army PSYOP units may offer non-PSYOP support to domestic military missions, they can only target foreign audiences. However, domestic Federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI are exempt from the above-mentioned law.

During the Waco Siege, the FBI and BATF conducted psychological operations on the men, women and children inside the Mount Carmel complex. This included using loudspeakers to play sounds of animals being slaughtered, drilling noises and clips from talk shows about how much their leader David Koresh was hated. In addition, very bright, flashing lights were used at night.

Terminology

Within the U.S. Psychological Operations community, the correct acronym is PSYOP without the “s” at the end, as noted in FM 33-1-1. NATO references will alternately list the capability as PSYOP or PSYOPS, depending on the source’s country of origin, with European countries frequently using PSYOPS as compared to the US PSYOP.

Nuclear 9/11

Nuclear weapons materials on the black market is a growing global concern, and a nuclear 9/11 could involve the detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a terrorist group, in a major U.S. city, with significant loss of life and property.

9/11 Revisited

On September 11, 2001, nineteen al Qaeda hijackers killed some 3,000 people and caused billions of dollars damage to New York City and the Pentagon. This toll would be small compared with a nuclear 9/11 — a nuclear attack launched by a terrorist group. Detonation of a crude strategic nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city could kill more than 500,000 people and cause more than a trillion dollars in damage:

Half a million people would be killed immediately. Hundreds of thousands would die from fallout, the resulting fires and collapsing buildings. Uncontrolled fires would rage for days and emergency services and hospitals would be completely overwhelmed.

Current Risk

Large quantities of nuclear materials are inadequately secured in several countries, including Russia and Pakistan. Since 1993, there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium, both of which can be used as the basis for an atomic bomb. When enough stolen material had been collected, only a few specialists would be needed to construct a nuclear weapon, which could then be delivered by truck to the detonation point. Paul Williams, in his book The Al Qaeda Connection, reports that Osama Bin Laden has already obtained nuclear weapons and smuggled them into the US through Mexico with the help of the MS-13 criminal group.

In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not”. Also in 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information stated: “I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon”. In 2006, Robert Gallucci, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, estimated that “it is more likely than not that al Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years”.

Response

If a terrorist group detonated a nuclear weapon in the United States, the FBI, CIA, Department of Homeland Security and the nation’s national laboratories would try to quickly track down those responsible and prevent any further detonations by that group.

List of Terrorist incidents

The following is a timeline of acts and failed attempts which can be considered non-state terrorism. Assassinations are listed by location at List of assassinated people.

There is no single accepted definition of non-state terrorism in common use, so incidents listed here are restricted to those which:

are not believed to have been state-sponsored.
are either commonly called terrorism, or meet at least some of the commonly used criteria.

19th century

1800: Plot of the Rue Saint-Nicaise, assassination attempt on Napoleon Bonaparte, in Paris on 24 December 1800.
1838: The Haun’s Mill massacre-30 October 1838. Massacre of 18 Mormon men, women and children by the Missouri Militia.
1856, 1858, 1859: raids by John Brown in his fight against slavery
1858 Felice Orsini tried to kill the Emperor Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, and failed, killing 8 people and wounding 142 others.
1863: Morgan’s Raid led by John Hunt Morgan
1867 5 March: Attempt to blow up Clerkenwell Prison by Fenian agents. Dynamite charges demolished nearby tenements, killing six people and causing 120 casualties “including 15 permanently injured with loss of eyes, legs, arms etc”.
1865-1877: Over 3000 Freedmen and their Republican Party allies were killed by a combination of the Ku Klux Klan and well-organized campaigns of violence by local whites in a campaign of terrorist violence which overthrew the reconstructionist governments in the American South and re-established segregation.
1868: Attempted assassination of Prince Alfred in Sydney.
1870: General Juan Prim, President of the Council, was shot by political enemies in his carriage after leaving the Spanish Parliament, and died due to wound complications two days later.
The Fenian Brotherhood attacked Canadian targets in order to pressure Britain into withdrawing from Ireland.
1881 14 January: Fenian attempt to blow up Salford Infantry Barracks killed one
1882, 22 October A bomb exploded in Théâtre Bellecour restaurant, in Lyon, killing one employee.
1884 30 May: Fenian dynamite explosions demolished part of Scotland Yard and part of the Carlton Club; an unexploded device was found at the foot of Nelson’s Column.
1885 25 January: Fenian bombs exploded at the Tower of London, London Bridge and two more at the House of Commons.
1887 21 June: The Jubilee Plot: A British-paid Fenian agent provocateur came close to blowing up Westminster Abbey and killing Queen Victoria.
1881 July 2: American President James Garfield was assassinated by religious fanatic Charles J. Guiteau.
1881: Tzar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated by a People’s Will (Narodnaya volya) terrorist. “.
1886: Bomb at Haymarket Square, Chicago during a labor rally caused the Haymarket Riot which killed twelve people.
1891 May 11: Assassination attempt on Nicholas II of Russia by a Japanese police officer named Tsuda Sanzo.
1893, 3 February Auguste Vaillant threw the home-made device from the public gallery of the French Chamber of Deputies in order to avenge the Ravachol execution. The weakness of the device meant that the explosion only wounded one deputy.
1893, 25 April The day before Ravachol judgment, a bomb exploded in Very restaurant, the place where Ravachol was arrested. The owner and one other man were killed. Théodule Meunier was later arrested in London in 1894 for the bombing.
1893: Anarchist Santiago Salvador threw two bombs into the stalls of the Liceu Opera House in Barcelona, the only exploding bomb killing about twenty and causing many injured.
1894: Explosion at the Royal Greenwich Observatory in London. The bomb went off prematurely, killing only the bomber.
1894, 12 February One week after the execution of Auguste Vaillant, Emile Henry threw a bomb in the “Terminus” café, in Saint Lazare train station. 1 killed, 20 wounded. Ravachol, Vaillant and Henry were all anarchist militants.
1894, 20 February. 2 bombs exploded in two hotels, in 69 rue Saint-Jacques]], wounded a woman, and 47 rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin, without casualties.
1894, 4 April A bomb exploded in Foyot restaurant. The writer Laurent Tailhade lost an eye in the explosion.
1894, 24 June An Italian anarchist, Sante Geronimo Caserio stabbed to death the French president Sadi Carnot, in order to avenge Auguste Vaillant and Emile Henry.
897: President of the Council Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, was shot dead by anarchist Michele Angiolillo in a thermal bath resort.
1898 September 10: Empress Elisabeth of Bavaria of Austria-Hungary (commonly called “Sissi”) was stabbed to death by a young Italian anarchist named Luigi Lucheni, in Geneva.

1900s-1940s

1901 September 6: American President William McKinley was assassinated by anarchist Leon Czolgosz.
1904 May 18: Ion Perdicaris and Cromwell Varley kidnapped and ransomed by bandit Mulai Ahmed er Raisuli in Morocco.
1904 June 16: Governor-General Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov was assassinated in Senate House in Helsinki by Finnish nationalist Eugen Schauman.
1906: Anarchist Mateu Morral, threw a bomb concealed in a bouquet to the passing carriage of King Alfonso XIII of Spain and his wife Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg on the day they were married. The royal couple were unharmed, but 24 people died in the incident.
1908 February 1: The Portuguese King Carlos was murdered with his son Prince Luís Filipe, Duke of Braganza, by two men connected with Carbonária, a terrorist organisation linked with the Portuguese Republican Party.
1908 July 13: The Amalthea Bombing. 1 killed and 23 injured in attack on strikebreakers by the young socialist activist Anton Nilsson.
1909 October 26: Assassination of Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi by Korean independence activist An Jung-geun.
1910 October 1: A bomb at the Los Angeles Times newspaper building in Los Angeles, California, United States, killed 21 workers.
1914 June 28: Assassination in Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and his wife, precipitating World War I.
1915 January 1: Battle of Broken Hill-Turkish nationalists shot at civilians in the Australian town, killing six.
1915 July 2 Frank Holt, (a.k.a. Erich Muenter) a German professor, exploded a bomb in the reception room of the U.S. Senate. The next morning, he tried to assassinate J.P. Morgan, Jr. (son of the financier whose company served as Great Britain’s principal U.S. purchasing agent for munitions and other war supplies), in a bid to stop the United States entering World War I against Germany.
1920 September 16: Wall Street Bombing killed 38 people and wounded 300 others.
1925 April 16: St Nedelya Church assault killed 150 people, mostly high-ranked individuals, and wounded 500 in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.
1927: The Ku Klux Klan launched a wave of political terror in Alabama.
1933 October 10: A Boeing 247 was destroyed in midflight by a nitroglycerin bomb. All seven people aboard were killed. This incident was the first proven case of air sabotage in the history of aviation.
1934 October 9: Assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in Marseille by Ustashas and IMRO.
1940-1956: George Metesky, the “Mad Bomber”, placed over 30 bombs in New York City in public places such as Grand Central Station and The Paramount Theater, injuring ten during this period in protest against the local electric utility. He also sent many threatening letters.
1946 July 22: Bombing of King David Hotel, the British Military HQ in Jerusalem, by the Zionist group Irgun, with 91 deaths-a mix of military and civilian.

1950s

During this and the next decade, the Ku Klux Klan re-emerged. Some of the tactics used were lynching, cross burning and assassination.
1950 November 1: Puerto Rican nationalists failed to assassinate U.S. President Harry S. Truman.
1951 October 16: Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, was assassinated by two gunshots to the chest in a public meeting of the Muslim City League at Municipal Park, Rawalpindi by Saad Akbar Babrak, an Afghan from the Zadran tribe Pacha Khan Zadran.
1952 August 22: Hurvamorden in Hurva, Sweden. Tore Hedin killed 7 people.
1954 March 1: U.S. Capitol shooting incident by Puerto Rican nationalists wounded five Congressmen.
1955 April 11: Air India “Kashmir Princess” (Lockheed Constellation) went down on the sea near Natuna Islands, Indonesia after a bomb explosion, killing 16 people. The plane was chartered by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government for carrying an official delegation to Bandung Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Possible suspects included a Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) secret agent who put the bomb in the aircraft during transit in Hong Kong, intending to kill PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.
1955 August 28: Lynching of Emmett Louis Till in Mississippi.
1955, August: Members of the Algerian FLN massacred civilians in the town of Philippeville.
1956 September 30: The FLN set off bombs at the office of Air France and elsewhere in Algiers.
1958 October 12: Bombing of the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation Temple in Atlanta, Georgia, suspected to have been done by white separatists.

1960s

1960 March 4: Possible bombing of the Belgian ammunition carrier La Coubre in the port of Habana, killing over 30 people.
1961 April 8: Omani terrorists blew up the passenger liner MV Dara, killing 238 people.
1963: 16th Street Baptist Church bombing. A member of the Ku Klux Klan bombed a Church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four girls aged 11-14.
1965: The Ku Klux Klan murdered Viola Liuzzo, a Southern-raised white mother of five who was visiting the South from her home in Detroit to attend a civil rights march. At the time of her murder, Liuzzo was transporting Civil Rights Marchers.
1965: The Monumental Plot-New York Police thwarted an attempt to dynamite the Statue of Liberty, Liberty Bell, and the Washington Monument by three members of the pro-Castro Black Liberation Front and a Quebec Separatist.
1966 March 8: A group of former IRA men planted a bomb which destroyed Nelson’s Pillar in Dublin.
1966: Ulster Volunteer Force declared war on the IRA; on June 26, they committed three sectarian murders.
1966: NAACP leader Vernon Dahme was assassinated by a firebomb, exploded by the Ku Klux Klan.
1966 September 22: A bazooka attack on the Cuban embassy in Ottawa was made.
1966 October 5: Anti-Castro forces bombed the offices of the Cuban trade delegation in Ottawa.
1967: May-December: The Hong Kong 1967 riots evolved from civil disobedience into terrorism. Leftists killed at least 51 people including eleven policemen, a bomb expert of the British forces and a fireman, through murders or bombs.
1968: During a student rebellion at Columbia University, members of the Students for a Democratic Society and Student Afro-American Society held a Dean hostage, demanding an end to both military research on campus and construction of a gymnasium in nearby Harlem.
1968 December 26: Two Palestinian gunmen travelled from Beirut to Athens and attacked an El Al jet there, killing one person.
1969 February 13: the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) set off a powerful bomb which ripped through the Montreal Stock Exchange, causing massive destruction and seriously injuring 27 people.
1969 December 12: The Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan killed 16 people.

Al-Qaeda and Religious Terrorism

Religious terrorism is terrorism by those whose motivations and aims have a predominant religious character or influence.

According to Mark Juergensmeyer, religious terrorism consists of acts that terrify, the definition of which is provided by the witnesses-the ones terrified-and not by the party committing the act; accompanied by either a religious motivation, justification, organization, or world view. Religion is sometimes used in combination with other factors, and sometimes as the primary motivation. Religious terrorism is intimately connected to current forces of geopolitics.

According to Bruce Hoffman, to be considered religious terrorism the perpetrators must use religious scriptures to justify or explain their violent acts or to gain recruits and there must be some sort of clerical figures involved in some leadership roles.

In the modern age, after the decline of ideas such as the divine right of kings and with the rise of nationalism, terrorism more often involved anarchism, nihilism and revolutionary politics, but since 1980 there has been an increase in activity motivated by religion.

Former United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that terrorist acts in the name of religion and ethnic identity have become “one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of the Cold War.” Stephen Weinberg has argued that religion is the most important factor, famously saying “for good people to do evil things, that takes religion”. However, Robert Pape, Rogers et al, Nardin, and Juergensmeyer have all argued that religion should be considered only one incidental factor, and that so-called “religious” terrorism is primarily geopolitical.

Criticism of the Concept of “Religious Terrorism”

Robert Pape, political science professor of the University of Chicago, compiled the first complete database of every documented suicide bombing from 1980-2003. He argues that the news reports about suicide attacks are profoundly misleading-“There is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions”. After studying 315 suicide attacks carried out over the last two decades, he concludes that suicide bombers’ actions stem from political conflict, not religion.

Michael A. Sheehan stated in 2000, “A number of terrorist groups have portrayed their causes in religious and cultural terms. This is often a transparent tactic designed to conceal political goals, generate popular support and silence opposition.”

Terry Nardin wrote, “A basic problem is whether religious terrorism really differs, in its character and causes, from political terrorism... defenders of religious terrorism typically reason by applying commonly acknowledged moral principles... But the use (or misuse) of moral arguments does not in fact distinguish religious from nonreligious terrorists, for the latter also rely upon such arguments to justify their acts... political terrorism can also be symbolic... alienation and dispossession... are important in other kinds of violence as well. In short, one wonders whether the expression ‘religious terrorism’ is more than a journalistic convenience”.

Professor Mark Juergensmeyer wrote, “..religion is not innocent. But it does not ordinarily lead to violence. That happens only with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances-political, social, and ideological-when religion becomes fused with violent expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and movements for political change.” and “Whether or not one uses ‘terrorist’ to describe violent acts depends on whether one thinks that the acts are warranted. To a large extent the use of the term depends on one’s world view: if the world is perceived as peaceful, violent acts appear to be terrorism. If the world is thought to be at war, violent acts may be regarded as legitimate. They may be seen as preemptive strikes, as defensive tactics in an ongoing battles, or as symbols indicating to the world that it is indeed in a state of grave and ultimate conflict”.

Financing

Terrorism activities worldwide are supported through not only the organized systems that teach holy war as the highest calling, but also through the legal, illegal, and often indirect methods financing these systems which sometimes utilize organizations as fronts to mobilize or channel sources and funds, including charities. Charities can involve the provision of aid to those in need and oblations or charitable offerings occur in nearly all religious systems with sacrifice as a furtherance of the custom.

Martyrdom and Suicide Terrorism

Important symbolic acts such as the blood sacrifice link acts of violence to religion and terrorism. Suicide terrorism, self-sacrifice, or martyrdom has throughout history been organized and perpetrated by groups with both political and religious motivations. Suicide terrorism or martyrdom is efficient, inexpensive, easily organized, and extremely difficult to counter, delivering maximum damage for little cost. The shocking nature of a suicide attack also attracts public attention. Glorifying the culture of martyrdom benefits the terrorist organization and inspires more people to join the group. Retaliation against suicide attacks, often in the form of collective punishment, further increases the group’s sense of victimization and commitment to adhere to doctrine and policy. This process serves to encourage martyrdom. Suicide terrorism, self-sacrifice, or martyrdom therefore represent “value for money”.

Destructive cult

“Destructive cult” is a term used to refer to religions and other groups which have caused harm to their own members or to others. Some researchers define “harm” in this case with a narrow focus, specifically groups which have deliberately physically injured or killed other individuals, while others define the term more broadly and include emotional abuse among the types of harm inflicted. Use of the term has been criticized by some researchers, who assert that it is used to discredit the groups it is applied to, and unfairly compare them with historically more harmful groups and movements. Authors have also compared destructive cults with terrorism, and have used the term to characterize Osama bin Laden as a destructive cult leader.

Physical Harm

“Destructive cult” as applied to physical abuse has generally referred to groups which have, through deliberate action, physically injured or killed members of their own group or other individuals. The Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance limit use of the term to specifically refer to religious groups that “have caused or are liable to cause loss of life among their membership or the general public.”

Emotional Harm

Some researchers describe the term “destructive cult” more broadly, and include emotional abuse along with physical abuse as a defining characteristic. Steven Hassan, author of the book Combatting Cult Mind Control, defines the term as such: “A destructive cult is a pyramid-shaped authoritarian regime with a person or group of people that have dictatorial control. It uses deception in recruiting new members (e.g. people are NOT told up front what the group is, what the group actually believes and what will be expected of them if they become members).” Psychologist Michael Langone, executive director of the International Cultic Studies Association, defines a destructive cult as “a highly manipulative group which exploits and sometimes physically and/or psychologically damages members and recruits.” In the book Into the Rabbit Hole contributor Randall Waters cites psychiatrist Robert Lifton’s Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, specifically Lifton’s “Eight Criteria for Thought Reform”, as criteria to identify a destructive cult. In Perfected Mind Control-The Unauthorized Black Book of Hypnotic Mind Control author J. K. Ellis also cites Lifton’s criteria, writing: “If most of Robert Lifton’s eight point model of thought reform is being used in a cult organization, it is most likely a dangerous and destructive cult.” In a statement which Congressman Leo J. Ryan later read into the Congressional Record, Dr. John Gordon Clark cited totalitarian systems of governance and an emphasis on money making as characteristics of a destructive cult. Dr. Clark later authored the work Destructive Cult Conversion: Theory, Research and Practice.

In their book Cult and Ritual Abuse, authors Noblitt and Perskin also include the characteristics of “trauma-induced dissociation and programming” in their definition of a destructive cult. In Cults and the Family the authors cite Shapiro, who defines a “destructive cultism” as a sociopathic syndrome, whose distinctive qualities include: “behavioral and personality changes, loss of personal identity, cessation of scholastic activities, estrangement from family, disinterest in society and pronounced mental control and enslavement by cult leaders.” In The Ethics of Touch: The Hands-on Practitioner’s Guide To Creating a Professional, Safe and Enduring Practice, the authors describe their version of destructive cult characteristics in a section on “Cult Mind Control Abuse.” In the book, a destructive cult is seen as being either “religious, political, ‘therapeutic’ or business” and they state that it can cause trauma-related symptoms such as dissociative disorder. In Dr. Susan Gregg’s The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Spiritual Healing, she cites three main signs of a destructive cult, including giving up one’s individuality, having their relationships with friends and family threatened, and being asked to donate large sums of money to the group. In his work Lethal Violence, the criteria of a destructive cult environment is compared to that of battered woman defence.

Criticism of the Term

Some researchers have criticized the usage of the term “destructive cult”, writing that it is used to describe groups which are not necessarily harmful in nature to themselves or others. In his book Understanding New Religious Movements, John A. Saliba writes that the term is overgeneralized and equated with the deaths of members of Peoples Temple at Jonestown. Saliba sees this as the “paradigm of a destructive cult,” where those that use the term are implying that other new religious movements will have similar outcomes to those of the Peoples Temple at Jonestown. Writing in the book Misunderstanding Cults: Searching for Objectivity in a Controversial Field, contributor Julius H. Rubin complains that the term has been used to discredit certain groups in the court of public opinion. In his work Cults in Context author Lorne L. Dawson writes that though the Unification Church “has not been shown to be violent or volatile,” it has been described as a destructive cult by “anticult crusaders.” In 2002, the German government was held by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court to have defamed the Osho movement by referring to it, among other things, as a “destructive cult”. The court decided that “destructive cult” and other expressions employed by the government to describe the group had no factual basis to justify their use.

Terrorism

In 1984, a group of followers of Osho (then known as Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) carried out what has come to be known as the first bioterrorism attack in the United States. Over seven hundred and fifty individuals became ill from salmonella poisoning, after the group had deliberately contaminated the salad bars of ten restaurants. After epidemiological research, law enforcement isolated the source of the contamination as a clinical laboratory operated by members of the Rajneesh movement. They had intended to influence voter turnout in an upcoming election. The March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo movement, as well as their prior experiments with anthrax, were also seen as bioterrorism events.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks and the prevalence of the War on Terrorism in society, researchers have begun to use the term “destructive cult” to compare and contrast certain characteristics of terrorist organizations with those of other religious groups previously characterized as such. In the book Jihad and Sacred Vengeance: Psychological Undercurrents of History, psychiatrist Peter A. Olsson compares Osama bin Laden to other religious leaders including Jim Jones, David Koresh, Shoko Asahara, Marshall Applewhite, Luc Jouret and Joseph Di Mambro, in a section of the book called: “The Psychology of Destructive Cult Leaders”. Olsson asserts that each of these individuals fit at least eight of the nine criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Olsson goes into some of these issues in more depth in his work Malignant Pied Pipers of Our Time: A Psychological Study of Destructive Cult Leaders from Rev. Jim Jones to Osama bin Laden. In the book Seeking the Compassionate Life: The Moral Crisis for Psychotherapy and Society authors Goldberg and Crespo also refer to Osama bin Laden as a “destructive cult leader.”

At a 2002 meeting of the American Psychological Association (APA), Steven Hassan asserted that Al Qaeda fulfills the characteristics of a destructive cult. Panelists at the convention asked the APA to investigate mind control among destructive cults. Hassan spoke of the commonalities between researching destructive cults, and the war on terrorism: “We need to apply what we know about destructive mind-control cults, and this should be a priority with the war on terrorism. We need to understand the psychological aspects of how people are recruited and indoctrinated so we can slow down recruitment. We need to help counsel former cult members and possibly use some of them in the war against terrorism.”

In an article on Al Qaeda published in The Times, Mary Ann Sieghart wrote that al-Qaeda resembles a “classic cult”, commenting: “Al-Qaeda fits all the official definitions of a cult. It indoctrinates its members; it forms a closed, totalitarian society; it has a self-appointed, messianic and charismatic leader; and it believes that the ends justify the means.” A similar comparison was made by former UK Home Secretary Charles Clarke, as well as UK Home Secretary John Reid, who stated that “..fanatics are looking to groom and brainwash children, including your children, for suicide bombings, grooming them to kill themselves in order to murder others.”

Although not specifically mentioning al Qaeda, former Mujaheddin member and now author and academic Dr. Masoud Banisadr stated in a May 2005 speech in Spain :

If you ask me: are all cults a terrorist organisation? My answer is no as there are many peaceful cults at present around the world and in the history of mankind. But if you ask me are all terrorist organisations, some sort of cult? my answer is yes. Even if they start as ordinary modern political party or organisation, to prepare and force their members to act without asking any moral question and act selflessly for the cause of the group and ignore all the ethical, cultural, moral or religious code of the society and humanity, those organisations have to change into a cult. Therefore to understand an extremist or a terrorist organisation one has to learn about a Cult.

Dr. Banisadr mentions al Qaeda several times in a talk entitled “The Use of the Philosophy of Martyrdom within Religious Cults for Acts of Terrorism” delivered at an INFORM seminar at the London School of Economics in May 2007.

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia is unleashed by radical Islamic fighters, believed to be associated with al-Qaeda. Their targets include foreign civilians—mainly Westerners affiliated with its oil-based economy—as well as Saudi civilians and security forces. Anti-Western attacks have occurred in Saudi Arabia dating back to 1995.

Background

The US military sent forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990 after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

After the US-led coalition won the 1991 Gulf War, it moved most of its forces from Saudi Arabia to bases in Iraq but several thousand, mostly associated with Operation Southern Watch, remained.

Since Saudi Arabia houses the holiest sites in Islam — Mecca (where the prophet Muhammed was born) and Medina (where he is buried) — many Muslims were upset at the U.S. presence. It is believed this is one of, if not the main reason Osama bin Laden called for jihad against the United States. Attacks against American forces and Westerners in the country were few until 1995.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, there was continued world pressure for the Saudi government to crack down on the radical imams preaching anti-American rhetoric in Saudi mosques. These calls grew as it turned out that 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials pledged to make efforts to crack down on these imams, yet preaching continued.

Timeline

1995

November 13, 1995-The U.S. Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program was attacked by a car bomb in a parking lot in Riyadh. Six killed, including five Americans, and 60 injured. The “Tigers of the Gulf,” “Islamist Movement for Change,” and “Fighting Advocates of God” claimed responsibility. Saudi authorities arrested and executed the perpetrators.

1996

June 25, 1996-A truck containing about 5000 pounds of explosives targeted against US military dormitory in Khobar, resulting in 19 dead and about 500 wounded.

2000

On November 17, in central Riyadh at the junction of Oruba/Olaya road, a car bomb killed British national Christopher Rodway and injured his wife Jane. The bomb was placed underneath his vehicle and detonated as it approached a traffic signal.

The following week on November 22, in Riyadh close to the RSAF HQ, a car bomb detonated on a vehicle driven by British national Mark Payne. Although the driver and his three passengers were injured, all survived the attack.

Less than one month later on December 15 in Al Khobar, a small IED in a juice carton left on the vehicle of British national David Brown exploded as he attempted to remove it. Brown survived but lost his sight and part of his right hand.

2001

On January 10, a small bomb exploded outside the Euromarche supermarket in Riyadh. There were no casualties.

A bomb placed in a waste bin outside the Jarir bookstore on Oleya Road in central Riyadh on March 15 injured British national Ron Jones, American Charles Bayer and a Canadian national. Jones was taken from hospital and arrested by Saudi authorities. During detention, Jones was subjected to torture to extract a ‘confession’ before being released without charge after 67 days.

On May 3, an American doctor Gary Hatch received injuries to his face and hands after opening a parcel bomb in his office in Al Khobar.

On the eve of the U.S. strike on Afghanistan on October 6, a pedestrian suicide bomber killed an American, Michael Gerard, outside a shopping center in Al Khobar. One Briton and two Filipinos were injured in the attack.

U.K. Citizen Involvement

Publicly, the Saudi authorities blamed the car bombing campaign on a small group of western expatriates, mainly British, who they claimed were fighting a turf war over the illegal distribution of alcohol. All of those involved in the ‘alcohol trade’ were arrested and detained. Despite the arrests, the attacks on western nationals continued.

Early in 2001, video taped ‘confessions’ by William Sampson and Sandy Mitchell were aired on Saudi state TV channels. Apart from the confessions, which both men later retracted, there was no evidence to link any of the western detainees to the bombing campaign. Sampson and Mitchell were later sentenced to death but were eventually released (but not pardoned) along with several other British detainees in August 2003 in a prisoner exchange deal brokered by the UK and US for Saudi detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Both men maintain their innocence, citing torture was used to extract ‘confessions.’ Court action taken in the UK by the men since their release failed after the UK High Court supported Saudi Arabia’s defense under the State Immunity Act 1978.

In their interrogation of suspects and in charges brought against detainees, the Saudi Maba’ith were wholly disinterested in alcohol trading and did not charge the men with alcohol offenses. Those charged with the murders were accused of carrying out the attacks on behalf of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. Diplomats from the British Embassy in Riyadh were investigated by Scotland Yard and cleared of any involvement. One of those investigated was Deputy Head of Mission in Riyadh, Simon McDonald, who was later appointed British Ambassador to Israel. Although British Embassy officials in Riyadh were aware of the continuing abuse of detainees, they failed to secure the support of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London in pushing hard for their release.

2002

In May, a Sudanese national attempted to shoot down a U.S. fighter jet taking off from the Prince Sultan Air Base with an SA-7 missile. The attempt failed, and in June the Saudis arrested several suspects. [2]

A month later on June 20, in the Riyadh suburb of Al Nakheel, a British national, Simon Veness, a 35 year old bank employee, was killed after a bomb placed underneath his vehicle exploded a few seconds after he set off for work.

On June 29, a car bomb placed on the vehicle of an American couple in Riyadh was disarmed by Saudi authorities.

On September 29, a car bomb killed German national Max Graf in central Riyadh.

2003

On February 20, Robert Dent, an employee for BAE Systems was shot to death in his car while waiting at a traffic signal in the Granada district of Riyadh.

A Saudi was killed on March 18 in an explosion at a villa in the Al Jazira district of Riyadh where police uncovered a cache of arms and explosives. It is believed that he was manufacturing a bomb at the time.

At a house in the same district of Riyadh on May 6, police were involved in a shootout with suspected militants. All nineteen suspects escaped and police unearthed another large cache of arms and explosives.

The insurgency took a giant leap forward with the Riyadh Compound Bombings; on May 12, attackers drove three car bombs into residential compounds housing Westerners and others, killing 26 people. Nine bombers also died. The compound bombings led to a harsh crackdown against militants by the Saudi government who until this point had been in denial about the terrorist threat within the Kingdom. Police and National Guard troops were involved in hundreds of raids, seizing weapons and equipment used by the militants. Throughout most of 2003, these helped in keeping the anti-foreigner attacks down.

On November 8, hours after the U.S. embassy issued a warning about attacks in Saudi Arabia, a truck bomb struck the al-Mohaya residential compound in Riyadh, killing 17 workers and injured more than 100. Most of the victims were Muslims, prompting outcry among Saudi citizens and other people in the world who had normally avoided condemning al-Qaeda attacks.

2004

After the Muhaya bombing, militants either halted or were prevented from committing their attacks. Security forces continued their raids and arrests. On April 21, a car bomb struck a building originally used by the Saudi police, killing five and injuring 148. This marked the start of a new campaign by the militants.

In May, the 2004 Yanbu attack left six Westerners and a Saudi dead.

On May 22, German chef Hermann Dengl was shot to death in Riyadh.

On May 29, the militants staged one of their most complex attacks, known as the 29 May 2004 Al-Khobar massacres. Gunmen scaled a fence of the Oasis compound, which houses the employees of foreign oil companies, and took dozens hostage. They are said to have separated Christians and Muslims and shot the Christians. Of those killed, 19 were foreign civilians; the rest were Saudis. The gunmen escaped.

On June 6, gunmen shot and killed an Irish cameraman of the BBC, Simon Cumbers, and also wounded reporter Frank Gardner. On June 8, an American member of Vinnell Corp. was shot in his Riyadh villa.

Another American expatriate, Kenneth Scroggs, was shot to death by two gunmen outside his home in Riyadh on June 13, and an American working for Lockheed Martin, Paul Marshall Johnson, was kidnapped at a fake police checkpoint in Riyadh.

On June 18, Johnson was reported beheaded in a video released to the news media. On the same day, Saudi security forces killed Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin, at that time the country’s most wanted man. Officials said that his killing was a major blow to al-Qaeda’s forces in the kingdom; however, foreigners were still killed in the country.

On August 3, Anthony Higgins, an Irish expatriate, was shot and killed at his desk at the Saudi-owned Rocky for Trade and Construction company, in the Al Rawda district of Riyadh. The attackers’ use of silencers on the pistols led investigators to believe it was an act of premeditated murder and not simply an act terrorism aimed indiscriminately at the expatriate community. Tony, who had worked in the Kingdom for almost 25 years, had been an active member of Saudi Arabia’s underground church and although unconfirmed, most who knew him, believe he was gunned down for his impassioned but indiscreet efforts to spread the Christian faith within Saudi Arabia.

On September 15, Edward Muirhead-Smith, a British man working for Marconi, was shot to death in his car outside a supermarket in Riyadh.

On September 26, Frenchman Laurent Barbot, an employee of a defense electronics firm, was shot to death in his car in Jeddah.

On December 6, militants staged perhaps their most brazen attack, the storming of the American consulate in Jeddah. They breached the compound’s outer wall and began shooting, though they did not enter the consulate itself. A Yemeni, a Sudanese, a Filipino, a Pakistani and a Sri Lankan—all employees of the consulate—were killed, and about ten others were wounded. All of the gunmen were killed.

On December 29, suicide car bombs exploded outside of the Saudi Interior Ministry and the Special Emergency Force training center, killing a passerby and wounding several others. Though damage to each building was incurred, the attacks did not result in large-scale casualties, and was the last significant attack of the insurgency.

2005

Saudi security forces made a great deal of successes against insurgents. Many militants were captured and several killed, many by American forces in Iraq. One of these, Saleh al-Oufi, who was killed on August 18, was described as the al-Qaeda chief in the kingdom.

On December 28, Saudi security services killed Abdul Rahman Al-Suwailemi and Abdul Rahman ibn Salen Al-Miteb in separate incidents. In the morning, Al-Miteb was stopped by two policemen and opened fire, killing both. This set off a running firefight, during which three other policemen were killed. Automatic weapons, grenades, forged documents, and almost half a million riyals in cash were also seized.

Despite these successes, foreign governments still have travel warnings in effect for Saudi Arabia.

2006

While attacks by militants have decreased dramatically since late 2004, violent incidents still occasionally occur. On February 24, two explosive-laden cars tried to enter the Abqaiq oil plant, the largest such facility in the world and producer of 60% of Saudi Arabian oil. Both cars exploded when fired upon by guards, killing the two bombers and two guards. A successful attack could have seriously crippled oil production.

In June, six militants and a policeman were killed in a gun battle in Riyadh.

2007

On February 4, Saudi security forces arrested ten people suspected of fundraising for “suspicious groups” outside of Saudi Arabia that engage in terrorism. Interior Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki said seven Saudi citizens and one foreign resident were arrested in Jeddah while two Saudi citizens were arrested in Medinah. A-Turki went on to say, “We know of the group’s activity as a whole but we also need to define the role of each of the arrested members.” The Interior Ministry issued a statement saying, “Security forces, in the framework of their efforts to fight terrorism and its funding have arrested a group of suspects believed to be responsible for collecting donations illegally and smuggling the money to suspicious groups that use it in deceiving the sons of this nation and dragging them to disturbed areas.” In March, lawyers for some of the accused defended their clients by stating they were simply peaceful reformists. A petition was delivered to King Abdullah asking that he consider a constitutional monarchy, and was signed by 100 prominent business leaders and academics.

On February 26, suspected militants attacked a group of nine French citizens who were returning from the historical site of Madain Saleh in the northwest of Saudi Arabia. The group, traveling in three vehicles had been looking for remnants of the Hejaz railway track and had apparently stopped for a rest approx 90km north of Madinah when three assailants traveling in a 4x4 vehicle stopped then singled out and shot all four males in the group. Two died at the scene, a third en route to hospital and the fourth, a sixteen year old boy, died the following day after undergoing surgery to remove a bullet from his lung. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. On March 7, authorities announced the arrest of several suspects and stated that they were hunting two named individuals in connection with the attack.

On April 6, security forces were involved in a gunbattle with militants at a property 20km outside Madinah. One of the militants, a Saudi national named as Waleed Ibn Mutlaq Al Radadi, was killed in the shootout. One police officer was also killed and several were injured. Al Radadi had appeared on a list of 36 most-wanted terrorists in 2005. An Interior Ministry spokesman said that the shootout was linked to an investigation into the killings of the French expatriates in February.

On April 19, Saudi authorities announced the arrest of eight people who had allegedly aided and abetted in the killings of the French expatriates in February. They also stated that Al Radadi had been the mastermind behind the killings.

On April 27, the Saudi Interior Ministry announced the arrest of 172 terrorist suspects in a series of raids on seven cells in the Kingdom in an operation lasting several months. The largest of the cells numbered 61 members. Unprecedented amounts of explosives and weapons of various types where uncovered after being buried in the desert. Also recovered was over $US5 million in cash. Some of the cells had trained as pilots and planned attacks on military and oil installations as well as the assassinations of high profile individuals. Most of the suspects were said to be Saudi nationals.

On November 28, security forces arrested 208 terrorist suspects across the country.

2008

On June 25, the Saudi Interior Ministry announced the arrest of 701 militants since the start of the year, however 181 were later released because there was no proof linking them to the terror network.

Operation Cannonball

Operation Cannonball is an American Central Intelligence Agency operation that was disclosed in 2008. Beginning in 2006, it was intended as part of an effort to capture Osama Bin Laden and eliminate Al Qaeda forces in Pakistan. There was reportedly “mounting frustration” among Pentagon officials due to the ongoing delay and deployment of special forces units, as originally planned in the Cannonball program. The operation was reportedly hampered by conflicts between CIA offices, leading to large delays in the deployment of the program. Partially to blame for the presently failed deployment of the program was conflict among United States intelligence agencies, among with resources having been diverted to the War In Iraq.

The existence of the covert program, and its various internal conflicts, was revealed to the public by the New York Times on June 30, 2008. The New York Times article was said to be “exposing highly classified Pentagon orders”.

Islamofascism

Islamofascism is a controversial neologism suggesting an association of the ideological or operational characteristics of certain Islamist movements from the late 20th century on, with European fascist movements of the early 20th century, neofascist movements, or totalitarianism. Critics of the term argue it is overly simplistic and offensive.

Origins and Usage

The term is included in the New Oxford American Dictionary, defining it as “a controversial term equating some modern Islamic movements with the European fascist movements of the early twentieth century”.

The origins of the term are uncertain. Earlier comparisons between fascism and Islam exist, such as Edgar Alexander’s comparison of Nazism with ‘Mohammedanism’ in 1937, and Manfred Halpern’s 1963 comparison of “neo-Islamic totalitarian movements” with fascist movements.

In a 1979 debate with Michel Foucault in the pages of Le Monde over the character of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the French Marxist historian Maxime Rodinson wrote that the Khomeini regime and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood represented a type of “archaic fascism” (“un type de fascisme archaïque”). Albert Scardino claims that “Islamo-fascism” was coined by Muslim scholar Khalid Duran in a Washington Times piece, where “the word was meant as a criticism of hyper-traditionalist clerics”. In 1990 the term was also used by Scottish historian Malise Ruthven who wrote in The Independent that, “authoritarian government, not to say Islamo-fascism, is the rule rather than the exception from Morocco to Pakistan.”

The related term, Islamic fascism, was adopted by journalists including Stephen Schwartz and Christopher Hitchens, who intended it to refer to Islamist extremists, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, although he more often tends to use the phrases “theocratic fascism” or “fascism with an Islamic face” (a play on Susan Sontag’s phrase “fascism with a human face”, referring to the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981). The terms Islamic fascism and Muslim fascism are used by the French philosopher Michel Onfray, an outspoken atheist and antireligionist, who notes in his Atheist Manifesto that Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution “gave birth to an authentic Muslim fascism”.

Paul Berman and Christopher Hitchens argue that there are similarities between historical fascism and Islamofascism:

Rage against historical humiliation;
Inspiration from what is believed to be an earlier golden age (one or more of the first few Caliphates in the case of Islamism);
A desire to restore the perceived glory of this age — or “a fanatical determination to get on top of history after being underfoot for so many generations” — with an all-encompassing (totalitarian) social, political, economic system;
Belief that malicious, predatory alien forces (Jews in the case of Nazi Fascists or Islamofascists) are conspiring against and within the nation/community, and that violence is necessary to defeat and expel these forces;
Exaltation of death and destruction along with a contempt for “art and literature as symptoms of degeneracy and decadence”, and strong commitment to sexual repression and subordination of women.
Offensive military, (or at least armed) campaign to reestablish the power and allegedly rightful international domination of the nation/community.

Examples of use in Public Discourse

The following are examples of use of the term:
“It is right for us to be on the offense against Islamofascism, and not wait until they attack us on our soil. Unlike any war we have ever fought in this nation, this is not a war for soil. It is a war for our soul. We will either win it or we will lose it. This nation must rally to the point where we recognize there is no compromise. There is no alternative. We must win; they must lose. Islamofascism must disappear from the face of the earth, or we will.” —Mike Huckabee
“What we have to understand is... this is not really a war against terrorism, this is not really a war against al Qaeda, this is a war against movements and ideologies that are jihadist, that are Islamofascists, that aim to destroy the Western world.” —Clifford May
“[Islamic terrorist] attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil, but not insane. Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism. Whatever it’s called, this ideology is very different from the religion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom.” —George W. Bush

Support

American author and Nixon speechwriter William Safire writes, “Islamofascism may have legs: the compound defines those terrorists who profess a religious mission while embracing totalitarian methods and helps separate them from devout Muslims who want no part of terrorist means.” Christopher Hitchens has also publicly defended the term in Slate, noting along with the fact that he finds the comparison apt, that the names for other forms of religious fascism, like clerical fascism have a less contested existence.

Author Malise Ruthven, a Scottish writer and historian who focuses his work on religion and Islamic affairs, opposes redefining Islamism as ‘Islamofascism‘, but also finds the resemblances between the two ideologies “compelling”.

Criticism and controversy

The term, “Islamofascism” has been criticized by Western scholars and journalists alike. One of the world’s leading authorities on Fascism, Walter Laqueur, after reviewing this and related terms, concluded that “Islamic fascism, Islamophobia and antisemitism, each in its way, are imprecise terms we could well do without but it is doubtful whether they can be removed from our political lexicon.”

Cultural historian Richard Webster has argued that grouping many different political ideologies, terrorist and insurgent groups, governments, and religious sects into one single idea of “Islamofascism” may lead to an oversimplification of the phenomenon of terrorism. In a similar vein the left-wing National Security Network argues that the term dangerously obscures important distinctions and differences between groups of Islamic extremists while alienating moderate voices in the Muslim World because it “creates the perception that the United States is fighting a religious war against Islam.” Other critics, such as former National Review columnist Joseph Sobran, and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman argue that it is predominantly a propaganda term used by proponents of the War on Terror. Yet others, such as security expert Daniel Benjamin, political scientist Norman Finkelstein and The American Conservative columnist Daniel Larison, highlight the claim that despite its use as a piece of propaganda the term is inherently meaningless, since as Benjamin notes, “there is no sense in which jihadists embrace fascist ideology as it was developed by Mussolini or anyone else who was associated with the term.” Conservative British historian Niall Ferguson points out that this political use of what he calls a “completely misleading concept,” is “just a way of making us feel that we’re the ‘greatest generation’ fighting another World War.” Harping on the claimed incongruity between the “Muslim World” and “industrial state fascism,” American journalist Eric Margolis claims that ironically the most totalitarian Islamic regimes, “in fact, are America’s allies.”

The public use of the term has also elicited a critical response from various Muslim groups. In the aftermath of the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, George Bush described the fight against terrorists as a battle against “Islamic fascists... [who] will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom”. The Council on American-Islamic Relations wrote to him to complain, saying that the use of the term “feeds the perception that the war on terror is actually a war on Islam”. Ingrid Mattson of the Islamic Society of North America also complained about this speech, claiming that it added to a misunderstanding of Islam. Mattson did acknowledge, however, that some terrorist groups also misuse “Islamic concepts and terms to justify their violence.”

The controversy surrounding this neologism is not only confined to the critical commentary of media figures, academics and Muslim groups. In 2007, the conservative writer and activist David Horowitz launched a series of lectures and protests on college campuses under the title of “Islamofascism Awareness Week.” At least 40 Universities moved officially to distance themselves from the event Several Muslims and non-Muslims on different college campuses aware of the event came out in opposition to it. The Muslim Student Group at Penn State University, for instance, said it feared “that this Islamophobic program will have hazardous consequences on the Penn State community.” At least one campus “Republican” group has also gone on record to distance themselves from the event.

In April 2008, Associated Press reported that US federal agencies, including the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security, were advised to stop using the term ‘Islamo-fascism’ in a 14-point memo issued by the Extremist Messaging Branch, a department of another federal body known as the National Counterterrorism Center. Aimed at improving the presentation of the War on Terrorism before Muslim audiences and the media, the memo states: “We are communicating with, not confronting, our audiences. Don’t insult or confuse them with pejorative terms such as ‘Islamo-fascism,’ which are considered offensive by many Muslims.”

Understanding Al-Qaeda’s Pakistan PSYOP and Insurgency

The Troubling Effectiveness of al-Qaeda’s PSYOP on the Pakistani Army

Going forward in the global conflict before us, it is important to acknowledge and understand that al-Qaeda is currently engaged in an Information Operation (IO) campaign inside Pakistan. This is in addition to its efforts to gain influence outside of Pakistan, particularly with Muslims in Europe, the Middle East and in the US. The primary target of the Pakistan campaign is the Pakistani military and it is driven by al-Qaeda’s accelerating insurgency inside Pakistan. Understanding how and why al-Qaeda has undertaken this effort allows decision makers greater understanding of al-Qaeda’s aims and equips them with a ‘lay of the land’ required to counter al-Qaeda’s message and objectives.

Usama bin Laden’s latest recorded message is the third in just two weeks following three years of virtual silence from the al-Qaeda leader. In it, bin Laden calls on Pakistani Muslims to acknowledge that Musharraf’s actions are examples of his loyalty to the United States and representative of his unbelief. For bin Laden and his compatriots, such unbelief marks Musharraf as ‘kufr’ and places the requirement on believers to make “armed rebellion against him.” The misguided understanding that bin Laden and al-Qaeda have of Islam makes it obligatory to fight against those who rule outside of their interpretation of Islam, and its overly broad application of tawhid. Yet bin Laden crafts a different message for the Pakistani Army, whom he advises to “resign” from their jobs, “disassociate yourself from Pervez and his Shirk (polytheism)” and “enter anew into Islam.” There is a reason for this, which will be discussed below.

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s latest video message and bin Laden’s audio message, released on the same day, mark as-Sahab’s 77th and 78th propaganda productions this year alone. There is a clear shifting of gears in the al-Qaeda Information Operations, most notably within Pakistan as well as their international efforts surrounding the 6th anniversary of the September 11th attacks.

Before looking further into the al-Qaeda Pakistani IO campaign, we must address the al-Qaeda-Taliban insurgency actively ongoing in Pakistan.

al-Qaeda in Pakistan-From Terrorism to Insurgency

There is, of course, no single agreed upon definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the US Code of Federal Regulations as “…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85) For instance, terrorism is – among other things-a tactic employed to increase support for a group through inspiration while also decreasing effective resistance to the group through intimidation. An example of this type of terrorism would be the beheading of those deemed to be ‘spies’ for the Americans in South Waziristan, the multiple car bomb and rocket attacks, or the anti-aircraft assassination attempts on Musharraf. Additionally, the bombings that took place after the Pakistani government raid on Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) are an example of the use of terror to gain influence. No matter the definition of terrorism being applied, al-Qaeda has clearly been a terrorist organization in Pakistan.

Beyond Pakistan, Al-Qaeda seeks to – in part-influence American foreign policy through terrorist means. But within Pakistan, al-Qaeda has clearly and by specific design transformed from being simply a dangerous international terrorist group within Pakistan to a full-fledged internal insurgency against it. This transformation is represented through the efforts of al-Qaeda to acquire the armored assets of a state Army and its nuclear weapons, as well as the pursuit of land holdings to be integrated into the larger objective of creating an Islamic state to be ruled by a successor to the Prophet, a Khalifa or Caliph, nearly 1350 years after the last of the ‘rightly guided’ rulers.

An insurgency is a movement with specific governmental designs on the host country. In Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks, Col. Thomas X. Hammes (USMC, Ret.) quotes Bard O’Neill to define an insurgency. O’Neill wrote, “Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.”

In more accessible terms, Terrorism-Research.com offers that the ultimate goal of an insurgency “is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power.”

Both aptly describe al-Qaeda’s actions, operations and aims within Pakistan, a ready-made nuclear power which the terrorist group seeks to wrest complete control.

Perhaps the best way to describe al-Qaeda’s Pakistan insurgency is to call it a “Death by a Thousand Cuts.” They have openly sought not only the assassination of Pervez Musharraf, but also the demise – or reconfiguration – of the Pakistani national government. In a strategy that has been executed with remarkable patience, al-Qaeda has gained acknowledged control of several sizable territories in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

After defeating Pakistani forces on the battlefield, the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance have secured various ‘peace accords’ replete with concessions from the Musharraf government. Effective control of North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bajour and Swat have been ceded to them and Pakistani forces were – upon agreement – effectively withdrawn from the areas handed the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance through the accords. The accords, no matter how presented by the Musharraf government, represented abject defeat.

Al-Qaeda Insurgency: Destination-Islamabad

Domination in these territories has allowed al-Qaeda the haven necessary to rebuild its training and planning infrastructure as well as replenish its human resources. After a few short weeks of basic military training, Taliban conscripts are sent in waves across the border to battle US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

However, al-Qaeda has no designs on investing in regaining that territory. There are no resources for them there – and a more formidable, if reduced, military force to be reckoned with. One whose defeat of the terrorist group drove them into Pakistan’s border regions to begin with. Al-Qaeda’s designs are not back towards the west, but rather onward deeper into the heart of Pakistan.

While al-Qaeda’s Pakistan insurgency has been largely waged in the FATA region, it’s territorial aims are by no means limited to it. Rather, al-Qaeda seeks control of all of Pakistan, including its military, weapons and economic capabilities. Al-Qaeda has been executing this strategy one territory, one victory at a time. And it now closes in on Islamabad.

Indeed, an analysis by the Pakistani Interior Ministry warned Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf of precisely this. The New York Times reported that the 15-page internal Pakistani document warned Musharraf that “the influence of the extremists is swiftly bleeding east and deeper into his own country, threatening areas like Peshawar, Nowshera and Kohat, which were considered to be safeguarded by Pakistani government forces.” The Interior Ministry document said that Peshewar endures the “highest number of terrorist incidents, including attacks on local police,” and that in Bannu and Tank regions, police are “patronizing the local Taliban and have abdicated the role of law and order.” It is important to note that Peshewar is the capital of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Much of the Pakistani government, non-Islamist educators, officials and police forces live inside heavily armed and walled communities in the NWFP, where they are more safe from al-Qaeda attack. The NWFP borders the Federally Administered Tribal Areas under direct Taliban-al-Qaeda control on one side and the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on the other. The rising violence is a clear indicator of the expansion of al-Qaeda’s insurgency as it marches patiently but steadily toward Islamabad. As evidenced by bin Laden’s latest message, that patience may be nearing an end.

Usama bin Laden’s latest message implored the Pakistani public to take up arms against Musharraf and warned the army’s soldiers to break ranks and fight Musharraf with al-Qaeda rather than serve him. This is a sign that al-Qaeda’s patient approach to its Pakistan insurgency has run its course. There could be a maelstrom of events to follow in Pakistan.

AQ Targets Police for Violence and Army Soldiers for Influence

The al-Qaeda Information Operation (IO) is designed to support the insurgency’s incremental march on Islamabad. The key to understanding the al-Qaeda IO and its insurgency goals is to understand how al-Qaeda primarily targets Pakistani Interior Ministry forces (police, constabularies and the Frontier Corps) for physical attack while targeting Pakistani regular army forces for influence and subversion.

The persistent mention of Pakistani police forces – rather than Pakistani Army forces – is expected in any Pakistani Interior Ministry report, as the Police forces fall under the Interior. But Pakistani police forces also decidedly bear the brunt of al-Qaeda’s lethal attacks and not the Pakistani Army. It’s not that al-Qaeda and their indigenous Taliban allies cannot attack the Pakistani Army with expectations of success. They most certainly can and have. With bin Laden’s latest audio message delivering a combination invitation and ultimatum to Pakistani Army soldiers, al-Qaeda’s designs for the Pakistani Army are more clearly visible. The reason for attacking Pakistani police forces is two-fold and – in this writer’s view-also the most elusive and yet perhaps most important indicator of the ongoing al-Qaeda insurgency.

First, the Interior Ministry is widely regarded as the one segment of the Pakistani government with unwavering loyalty to Musharraf, whom al-Qaeda has sought to assassinate several times. Unlike the military and the military’s intelligence arm (ISI), the Pakistani police forces, constabularies and Frontier Corps of the Interior Ministry do not have historical ties to Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Interior Ministry loyalty to Musharraf makes their ranks logical targets for the Islamists who seek to kill and replace Musharraf atop an Islamist-run Pakistani government.

Secondly, and most importantly, al-Qaeda at the same time seeks to avoid open bloody conflict with the Army. Not because it fears the deadly consequences of such a confrontation, but rather because al-Qaeda senior leadership wants the Pakistani military intact – for themselves. Ideally, they do not want to ultimately find Musharraf killed or oustered only to have the military splintered internally between pro-government and pro-al-Qaeda commanders. Al-Qaeda is executing an insurgency to gain control, not to touch off a civil war.

In the end, al-Qaeda’s design is also to co-opt an intact military in order to gain command of a military force with the assets of a state (aircraft, armor, etc.) and direct control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Recent reports of defections of Pakistani military elements since bin Laden’s latest message to them indicates a level of success in the al-Qaeda IO campaign targeting them.

Measuring al-Qaeda’s PSYOP Success

Three weeks ago, well over 200 Pakistani Army soldiers surrendered to a much smaller number of fighters from the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance without a shot fired. But the al-Qaeda IO campaign primarily targeting the Pakistani regular army forces has a spillover effect on other forces-and the general populace-as well. It is reported in Pakistan that many soldiers in the Pakistani Army, Frontier Corps paramilitary and police forces are refusing to fight or putting up little fight against their own countrymen inside the Federally Administered Tribal Area. It is difficult to dispute the success of al-Qaeda’s Psychological Warfare efforts inside Pakistan. The message has been consistent for several years and al-Qaeda’s patience and restraint in seeing it through are significant qualities of the terrorist organization turned insurgent group. With every message and in all their forms, al-Qaeda has sought to convince the Army soldiers that they are not al-Qaeda’s enemy, rather that they are simply being misled by Musharraf. In bin Laden’s latest message, he said of the Pakistani Army, “we see the armies becoming tools and weapons in the hands of the Kuffaar [unbeliever, referencing Musharraf and the US] against the Muslims.”

This message resonates, as many Pakistanis are reluctant to take up arms against other Pakistanis, whether those they would confront are Taliban or al-Qaeda or not. It must also be considered that upwards of 30% of the Pakistani Army are, like the Taliban, ethnic Pashtuns. The vast majority of them are enlisted foot soldiers, as very few ethnic Pashtuns hold leadership positions, largely due to internal social and educational dynamics.

Even among the Pakistani police forces in the North West Frontier Province, many are said to have requested leave or simply deserted when faced with the outlook of deadly confrontations with fellow Pakistanis among the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance. In other instances, including the Interior Ministry’s report that specifically cited the Bannu and Tank regions, police are “patronizing the local Taliban and have abdicated the role of law and order.”

Where True Power Lies…And Grows

This is an indication that fear is also a prime motivator among Pakistanis. In the North West Frontier Province capital of Peshawar, al-Qaeda’s black banner of jihad can be seen displayed in the widows of many shops and flying in various places. This does not necessarily mean that there is explicit support in the hearts and minds of all Pakistanis there – even among those flying the al-Qaeda banner.

Though Peshewar and the rest of the NWFP are technically under Pakistani state control, this indicates a reflection among the populace of where the true power lies – outside the walled communities where many government employees and ‘moderate’ citizens take refuge. In many cases, the al-Qaeda banner may well be flown simply out of self-protection to avoid attack on their particular shops.

The police cannot protect everyone all the time, but al-Qaeda and the Taliban can attack at their choosing. And from a local’s perspective, this is where the true power lies. And as more and more Pakistanis in the police forces, the Frontier Corps and the regular army begin to show a reluctance to do battle, the al-Qaeda power in these region grows, both in measurable means on the ground and within the minds of the Pakistani populace.

Such are the tangible gains of effective, persistent and robust al-Qaeda information operations, a classic PSYOP directed at both the Pakistani population writ large and also expressly directed at the Pakistani Army. As a result, Pakistani forces are engaging al-Qaeda and the Taliban less and less. In fact, President Musharraf announced that in 2008, there will be no Pakistani Army activity at all in al-Qaeda-held territory, deferring engagement to the less capable and less effective Frontier Corps and Pakistani police and constabularies.

Conclusions

The growing success of this long running al-Qaeda PSYOP makes it clear that the defeat of al-Qaeda and the elimination of their global headquarters in Pakistan will not come from Pakistani sources or initiative. As with so many other theaters in this global conflict, the initiative must again come directly from the United States. The American public and American political leaders must prepare themselves for the reality that, at this stage, defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan most likely requires American boots on Pakistani soil.

The continued disengagement from the fight by Pakistani military forces unwilling to combat terrorists and insurgents within their own country is indeed troubling. President Musharraf’s recent decision to fully disengage and withdraw his most capable combat forces from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas by January 2008 certainly does not bode well for continued distanced engagement or non-engagement by American forces. In the end, defeating al-Qaeda in Pakistan will require direct American military action on the ground. The alternative is to accept the consequences of a strengthening al-Qaeda insurgency that is gaining momentum.

There can therefore be little debate that al-Qaeda and its global headquarters in Pakistan must be defeated before they consume Pakistan and the assets of a nuclear-armed state with professional military forces. The first step is an effective IO strategy of our own to counter this very powerful aspect of the insurgency. At current, only Pervez Musharraf openly engages the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in the war of words and ideas within Pakistan. Unfortunately, these efforts amount to little given his poor domestic credibility. More Pakistani voices are required, and they must address the Pakistani people, bottom up, in a credible manner.

Al-Qaeda’s Future

An audiotape believed to be the voice of bin Laden was broadcast in November 2002, praising the spasm of anti-Western attacks that occurred in the fall of 2002 and threatening further attacks. Bin Laden specifically threatened Australia, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and Spain—all countries that had arrested or cracked down on alleged al-Qaeda militants—for their cooperation in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

In April 2004 another audiotape by bin Laden indicated a new strategy by al-Qaeda to sow divisions between the United States and its European allies. It offered a truce to European countries that “do not attack Muslim countries” or “interfere in their affairs,” saying the truce would begin “when the last soldier leaves our countries.” Several European countries had sent troops to the mainly Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States led coalitions that toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in April 2003.

The delivery of the tape followed commuter train bombings in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, that killed more than 190 people and injured more than 1,400 others. Spanish authorities arrested several suspects linked to al-Qaeda, and a Spanish judge concluded that al-Qaeda was behind the bombings. Spain had joined the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, sending 1,300 troops. In the aftermath of the bombings, a new government began withdrawing Spain’s troops, following through on a campaign pledge that preceded the terrorist attack. Some observers believed that al-Qaeda hoped to force other European countries to withdraw from the U.S.-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, European governments unanimously rejected the offer of a truce, and many issued statements saying that they would not negotiate with terrorists.

Al-Qaeda, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election

More findings about al-Qaeda’s role in the September 11 attacks and its alleged links to the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein were released in July 2004. Two bipartisan reports, one by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee and another by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, found no evidence of a collaborative relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The reports dismissed claims of a meeting between one of the hijackers and an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, in April 2001, saying such a meeting never took place. The bipartisan National Commission also found that while the administration of President George W. Bush had been warned about al-Qaeda’s determination to launch an attack within the United States, there was probably no way to have prevented the attacks.

Al-Qaeda attempted to insert itself in the 2004 U.S. presidential election with the release of a videotape featuring bin Laden just days before the election. In the videotape, bin Laden addressed the American people, saying “Your security is not in the hands of [Democratic presidential candidate John] Kerry, Bush, or al-Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands.…Any state that does not mess with our security has naturally guaranteed its own security.” Intelligence analysts pointed out that the taped message was lacking in bin Laden’s usual radical religious jargon and seemed aimed at a broader base—secular Arabs opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Bin Laden’s videotaped message was followed weeks later by another videotape, this one from al-Zawahiri and apparently made before the election but broadcast afterwards. “The results of the election do not matter to us,” al-Zawahiri said in that message. “Vote whoever you want, Bush, Kerry, or the devil himself. This does not concern us. What concerns us is to purge our land from the aggressors.”

Counterterrorism experts continued to be concerned about al-Qaeda’s attempts to acquire unconventional weapons, especially nuclear weapons. In November 2004 the CIA issued a report citing concerns that a Pakistani nuclear engineer may have aided al-Qaeda’s efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.

In January 2007 Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte testified before the U.S. Congress that al-Qaeda was no longer an organization “on the run.” In July 2007 the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate, a summary of possible threats to U.S. national security, characterized al-Qaeda as a global threat that was seeking to strike the United States again.

As the sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks approached, bin Laden issued another videotape message, his first since 2004. Intelligence experts verified the voice on the tape as that of bin Laden, and the taped message contained references to recent events. In it bin Laden railed against capitalism and global corporations as the chief cause of war and military conflict while maintaining that democracy was a failed system.

Although bin Laden continued to be the main symbol of al-Qaeda, some intelligence experts believed that his deputy al-Zawahiri had emerged as its principal leader and strategist. They cited intelligence reports indicating that bin Laden had not chaired a meeting of the majlis al-shura (al-Qaeda’s consultative council, or top decision-making body) for at least two years. According to some accounts bin Laden’s increased visibility in the fall of 2007 was an attempt on his part to reassert his leadership.

Bin Laden followed his sixth-anniversary videotape with an audiotaped message calling for the ouster of Pakistan’s leader Pervez Musharraf. The message condemned Musharraf for a crackdown on Islamic militants associated with the Red Mosque in.

AL QAEDA’S CENTER OF GRAVITY

“When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing.”

—Sun Tzu

This statement by Sun Tzu many centuries ago epitomizes how we must think about strategy in our war today against Al Qaeda. It will take the patience and skill of a hawk to strike at the right time. Our most important prey in this war is Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. To support this assertion, in this paper I will analyze center of gravity candidates leading to the selection of Al Qaeda’s leadership coupled with the Islamist support it receives as the enemy center of gravity.

Al Qaeda was established in the early 1990s by Osama Bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian family. Al Qaeda, which translates from Arabic as “the Base,” is a “multi-national group which funds and orchestrates the activities of Islamic militants worldwide” by maintaining a “loose connection between Muslim extremists in diverse countries.” Al Qaeda traces its roots to the guerrilla war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s when Bin Laden organized and supported Muslim fighters in this struggle.

Later during the first Persian Gulf War, Bin Laden grew angry over increased American presence in Saudi Arabia, which he considered an unacceptable encroachment on holy Islamic sites. Because of his radical views, Bin Laden came under the scrutiny of Saudi Arabian officials and left his homeland where he removed to the Sudan and later back to Afghanistan. He continued, with the assistance of a competent team of lieutenants, to set up training facilities and recruit, train, and organize disenchanted Muslims into terrorist units to carry on a holy war of Jihad against the West. Linked to attacks and bombings throughout the world during the 1990s, it was not until the devastation of September 11, 2001, that the American people realized the full fury and potential of Al Qaeda’s extremist objectives.

Although degraded since 9/11 by U.S. and allied attacks in Afghanistan that sent its leaders into hiding, Al Qaeda continues to seek the strategic goal of establishing “the rule of the Caliphs with the entire world practicing fundamentalist Islam.” Al Qaeda supports a network of Islamist groups throughout the world to overthrow “infidel” regimes and to rid Muslim countries of Western influence. Bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998, stating that “it was the duty of all Muslims to kill citizens of the United States, both civilian and military, as well as their allies everywhere.”

Al Qaeda operates in a decentralized manner with terrorist cells or clusters of cells operating globally to strike targets in an attempt to disrupt and devastate society. Estimates vary as to Al Qaeda’s strength, with ranges up to “70,000 members in more than 60 countries around the world.” Rohan Gunaratna, an authority on terrorism, states:

Since the contemporary wave of terrorism began in the Middle East in 1968, no groups resembling Al Qaeda previously emerged. Al Qaeda has moved terrorism beyond the status of a technique of protest and resistance and turned it into a global instrument with which to compete with and challenge Western influence in the Muslim world. Al Qaeda is a worldwide movement capable of mobilising a new and hitherto unimagined global conflict.

AL QAEDA’S CENTER OF GRAVITY CANDIDATES

Clausewitz said this about determining the start point on how to defeat the enemy: One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.

A modern military author, Antulio Echevarria, indicates one must look at the “enemy’s system as a whole before deciding whether a center of gravity exists” and cautions that the application of a center of gravity “must be judicious.” He goes on to say that the “COG concept does not apply if enemy elements are not sufficiently connected.” Given that Al Qaeda is a decentralized terrorist organization, this makes finding a center of gravity very challenging. Nonetheless, looking at Al Qaeda as a “system,” we find these characteristics of Al Qaeda emerge as COG candidates: its fighting force, financial capacity, external support, leadership, and extremist Muslim ideology. What follows is an analysis of each of these candidates to include discussion of capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.

AL QAEDA’S FIGHTING FORCE

Clausewitz said “…no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be—the point on which your efforts must converge—the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign.” Al Qaeda’s fighting force can be divided into two major components: the 055 Brigade that operates in Afghanistan and “an extensive network of cells and agents outside of Afghanistan.”

The 055 Brigade, a guerrilla organization, is made up of veterans of the war against the Soviets, many of whom remained in Afghanistan following that conflict, and a second generation of younger, better educated recruits “shunned” by their native countries, yet very loyal and dedicated to Bin Laden, “viewing him as both savior and leader.” The 055 Brigade fought with the Taliban against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in 2002 and suffered significant losses. Bin Laden ordered what remained of this force to retreat to the mountainous region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to wage a “protracted campaign” and to “fight another day.” Although the remnants of this 055 Brigade continue to wage guerrilla and terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I will eliminate it as a COG candidate for this paper because it is an operational level entity. The 055 Brigade, as an organization, does not possess a capability to operate outside of the region. Individual members of the brigade may join terrorist cells if selected to do so.

The more threatening component of Al Qaeda’s fighting force is its network of terrorist cells and agents deployed around the world. They give Al Qaeda strategic reach and the critical capability of striking the United States. The most ominous critical capability is Al Qaeda’s desire to gain a capacity to employ a weapon of mass destruction and deliver a blow against a major U.S. metropolitan area potentially knocking out our government or centers of economic power and killing millions of people.

Terrorist cells engage “in missions independent of the other, and the members and activities of the other cells are kept secret.” Cell members are dedicated to the Islamist ideology and many are willing to engage in suicide missions to attain martyrdom. This limits the effectiveness of deterrence strategies on our part. Because terrorists typically are able to blend into society, sometimes for years living what would appear to be normal lives waiting to carry out attacks, they are especially difficult to identify. Critical requirements for terrorists cells include the ability to recruit dedicated individuals who are educated and able to function in western society and willing to conduct suicide missions. These cells must be able to receive funds to operate, to pay living expenses, and to procure the necessary weapons, equipment and material to carryout attacks. They must be able to gain entry into the country targeted for attack, and once in they must be able to avoid detection efforts. Critical vulnerabilities include overconfidence, defection of members, the requirement to travel, and the need for funds and resources enabling detection by intelligence and law enforcement officials.

The most significant characteristic of terrorist cells that eliminate it as a “fighting force” COG at the strategic level is the ability of these units to operate in a decentralized and disconnected manner requiring little or no consistent command and control from Al Qaeda’s leadership. These cells operate globally “in vast distributed networks without necessarily being linked to one central authority, or to one another. Clausewitz’s center of gravity concept depends on the condition that the enemy is connected enough to act as a single entity. By implication, when this is not the case, the concept did not apply.”

Therefore, Al Qaeda’s fighting force of terrorist cells is eliminated as a strategic center of gravity. Terrorist cells may serve as operational COGs in individual countries, but destroying cells in one country may not cause those in another country to collapse. Given the diffused nature of this force of cells that operate independently, the random elimination of single cells will not destroy the Al Qaeda organization as a whole, although, of course, should all the cells be eliminated nearly simultaneously, Al Qaeda would effectively cease to exist.

AL QAEDA’S FINANCIAL CAPACITY

Clausewitz is silent in discussing economic power as a potential center of gravity in his book On War. But, Michael Howard adds it as a characteristic to consider by emphasizing that we need to know the “enemy’s economic capacity to carry on the war at all.” So what are Al Qaeda’s economic capabilities? Al Qaeda supports its network of terrorist cells by maintaining a complex financial system. Its annual budget is estimated at a modest $36 million. The bulk of Al Qaeda’s funds originate from Islamic charities, Al Qaeda controlled companies, counterfeit currency activities, and credit card fraud. Bin Laden is at the head of this financial network. His shrewd management of funds has enabled the Al Qaeda organization to operate on a relatively low budget. To again quote author Rohan Gunaratna:

Al Qaeda is established in most countries with indigenous or migrant Muslim communities; its infiltration is evident wherever Muslims live and work. It can never operate in isolation, as mounting a terrorist operation requires financial and technical-logistical support that has to be in place often years in advance. In the Middle East, especially the Gulf, Al Qaeda has public, though hidden, support and also receives practical help from Islamic philanthropists and foundations, notably from the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Gunaratna notes that Western intelligence services have “never before encountered a global terrorist financial network as sophisticated as Al Qaeda” by stating:

The resilience of Al Qaeda’s financial infrastructure is primarily due to the compartmentalized structure it has adhered to since its inception. It assigns a high priority to financial training and management as well as the sustained generation and investment of funds. Al Qaeda’s finance and business committee – comprising of professional bankers, accountants, and financiers – manages the groups across four continents. To move funds clandestinely from source to recipient, Al Qaeda’s financial network disguises the true identities of both parties. For this purpose too, Al Qaeda has established several legitimate institutions including state and privately owned charities, banks, and companies.

The critical requirements for a terrorist financial system to function involve the use of a “variety of alternative financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store their assets…[emphasis added].” Terrorists earn money by engaging in profitable crimes such as selling counterfeit goods and elicit drugs. They move money through “charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash, and commodities” such as precious stones and metals. And, to store assets, terrorists may invest in such commodities because their value will hold over time.

It is difficult to provide a comprehensive list of critical vulnerabilities other than to state that financial transactions through formal systems (like credit cards, cash transfers, etc.) are subject to monitoring, audit, and internal control by U.S. government agencies as well as the financial institutions themselves. Additionally, assets known to belong to Al Qaeda or organizations that support or sympathize with Al Qaeda can be frozen if on deposit with U.S. or allied financial institutions. But, as GAO points out, “the U.S. government and others face challenges in understanding the nature and extent of terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms and in monitoring these and emerging mechanisms.”

Bottom line—there are too many sources of money to find and isolate. Money is very easy to generate. “Following the money” may provide valuable intelligence in locating and neutralizing terrorists cells operating in the field or allow the United States to exert pressure on entities supporting Al Qaeda. The financial capacity of Al Qaeda is not its source of power. It is a means (or critical requirement) to carry out operations. But this can be done at relatively low financial cost. What is disconcerting is that even if significant funding sources for Al Qaeda are severed, the cost of a terrorist operation is not that large. GAO notes that the “estimated cost of the September 11 attack was between $300,000 and $500,000.”

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Clausewitz said that another feature to consider as important for the defeat of the enemy is the “delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he.” Allies of Al Qaeda can be broadly categorized as countries that allow Al Qaeda to operate or provide safe haven such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and others to varying degrees. Another type of ally can be entities that provide assistance to Al Qaeda such as other terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the governments of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.

Al Qaeda does not appear have a “state sponsor” per se as in a Cold War model where a belligerent might actively support a terrorist group as a tool to further state objectives. Al Qaeda is its own “supranational” entity with its own strategic and political agendas. If Al Qaeda did have a clearly identifiable state sponsor or government closely associated with and in support of it, then that state or government could be considered a center of gravity and subject to attack by the United States. An example was the Taliban prior to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces defeating Al Qaeda and destroying its infrastructure in Afghanistan in 2002. Defeating Al Qaeda forces and facilities in Afghanistan was an operational center of gravity for that phase of the campaign. If Al Qaeda manages to set up new training camps in other third world countries, then those camps in all probably will be targeted by U.S. strikes in a continuing effort to degrade Al Qaeda capabilities.

Iran supports the terrorist group Hezbollah and Syria supports both Hezbollah and Hamas. Al Qaeda has formed a “strategic partnership” with Hezbollah and receives technical assistance, training, and intelligence from this group. Israeli intelligence believes that Al Qaeda has infiltrated into the Occupied Territories with the support of Hamas.33 But, do we really want to strike at Hezbollah and Hamas? Neither of these groups is targeting Americans.

Furthermore, if these groups marshaled their efforts against the United States, then a so-called alliance or alignment with Al Qaeda would further expand its terrorist network and capabilities. Hezbollah and Hamas are focused on fighting Israel with the goal of a Palestinian state. It is probably not in their interests to alienate the U.S. more than they already have. Furthermore, a U.S. strike against either of these terrorist groups would not materially weaken Al Qaeda. Iran is problematic with respect to its designs of chemical and biological weapons programs coupled with desires to develop nuclear weapons. Terrorists could attempt to gain access to WMD “on the black market or by recruiting reengage scientists or other regimes, such as Iran” or North Korea which has been known in the past to support terrorism and sell weapons technology to bad actors.

The critical requirement for any of these external actors that may support Al Qaeda is their own survival and desire to maintain or gain legitimacy. They take risk in aligning with or supporting Al Qaeda by making themselves vulnerable to attack by the United States (witness what happened to the Taliban) that can bring military power to bear as well as economic sanctions. None of these potential allies appear, as Clausewitz would say, “more powerful” than Al Qaeda with regard to global terrorist reach. While attacking or neutralizing Al Qaeda allies may diminish the group’s ability to operate, Al Qaeda’s response would be to disperse and set up its network elsewhere. Thus, external support from other organizations is eliminated as a strategic center of gravity. Blocking Al Qaeda’s access to WMD and material assistance is a “decisive point” in degrading Al Qaeda or a critical requirement for Bin Laden. Further, the United States should be using its diplomatic element of power to build a coalition against terrorism that could include “other organizations” like the states of Iran and Syria. The real sources of terrorists are from U.S. allies like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia that have repressive policies that fuel poverty, anger, and radical ideology as well as funding for the Islamist movement.

AL QAEDA’S LEADERSHIP AND EXTREMIST MUSLIM IDEOLOGY

In looking at the dominant characteristics of a belligerent, Clausewitz indicated that a center of gravity in a popular uprising is the “personalities of the leaders and public opinion.” Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, fits the Clausewitzian definition of a personality leading a popular uprising. Only today, this uprising is on a global scale with the objective of overthrowing the world order. Bin Laden rallies Muslim extremists. His charisma, vision, wealth, and leadership abilities are the reasons Al Qaeda is an effective terrorist organization striking fear across the globe while winning admiration among many in the Muslim world. Author Rohan Gunaratna in describing Bin Laden’s capabilities:

In the spectrum of contemporary terrorist leaders Osama bin Laden has no equal. As a leader who has employed violence in pursuit of his political aims and objectives, he stands out in many ways. First, he is the only leader to have built a truly multinational terrorist group that can strike anywhere in the world. For over a decade Osama has inspired, instigated and supported Islamist guerrillas and terrorists, bringing about many deaths and much human suffering. In the World Trade Centre attack alone, the victims were from nearly 100 different nationalities. Second, he has built a popular following throughout the Islamic world, being almost revered in Muslim circles in Asia, Africa and the Middle East and among the first-and second-generation migrants in North America, Europe and Australia. Nor has his popularity waned despite evidence that he masterminded the worst terrorist attack in history. He continues to be regarded as the supreme symbol of resistance to US imperialism. Third, Osama’s disposition towards his enemies has not mellowed in the face of the imminent threat to his own life and to his organisation. Even after the US cruise missile attacks in 1998 and intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, the tone of his statements has remained constant, if not more strident. To his admirers he sets an example of fearlessness; he is unrelenting; neither he nor Al Qaeda will compromise [emphasis added].

It is interesting to note that Clausewitz connected leaders of popular uprisings with public opinion. He did not expand on this idea in his book On War, but, his phrasing of “personalities of leaders and public opinion,” clearly links these two elements as a single center of gravity candidate. Although Clausewitz never could have imagined the world as it exists today, his observations and words still resonate by relating to the Gunaratna’s description above of Bin Laden and that segment of the Muslim population that supports his extremist Muslim ideology. Thus, with Bin Laden, coupled with extremist ideology, as the strategic center of gravity for Al Qaeda, the United States must “direct its energies” at both. Echevarria offers the counter to this by saying:

… the avowed “hatred of apostasy,” rooted in a radical brand of Islam – rather than Osama bin Laden or another individual leader—probably serves as the group’s COG. Admittedly, bin Laden laid much of the groundwork to establish Al Qaeda, but it does not appear that his removal will cause his organization to collapse. Most analysts and intelligences sources claim that if bin Laden were captured or killed, another leader would simply take his place. That leader can only turn out to be either more or less effective than bin Laden. Thus, Al Qaeda’s leadership really amounts to a center of critical capability—something we want to neutralize but not something, in itself, that will end the war [emphasis added].

In my opinion, Bin Laden is not replaceable—another leader cannot “simply take his place.” Bin Laden possesses characteristics of a successful commander who not only knows the rules of the game, but he is “the one who through his genius created them.” Neutralizing this “genius,” who is clearly a talented yet ruthless and evil leader, will achieve “significant” results that will commence the unraveling of Al Qaeda. The author Peter Bergen, CNN’s terrorism analyst, notes that if Bin Laden is captured or killed, Al Qaeda will be dealt a blow. Bergen goes on to say:

Others down the chain of command might hate the United States as much or more, but it was bin Laden’s charisma and organizational skills that created his transnational terrorist concern. In death bin Laden will certainly become a martyr for his immediate followers. But the most obvious statement you can make about martyrs is that they are dead, and that would immediately make bin Laden less potent. Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda occupies the space that exists somewhere in between a cult and a genuine mass movement. Cults usually disappear with the deaths of their leaders: think of Jim Jones or David Koresh. So too will “bin Ladenism” eventually join what President Bush has called “history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”

In identifying the “hatred of apostasy” as the possible center of gravity, Echevarria suggests that the strategy to defeat Al Qaeda “will mean employing the diplomatic and informational elements of national power as deliberately, if not more so, as the military one.” I agree that the United States will need to employ these two elements of power as well as the economic element of power to effect the Islamist attitude and defiance. But, identifying the “hatred of apostasy” as the sole center of gravity seems to be an intangible thing to attack. In my strategic judgment I suggest it be the other way around. Neutralizing the Al Qaeda leadership should be the first priority and the “hub of all power and movement at which our energies should be directed.” To effect defeat of Al Qaeda by concentrating on influencing the will of disaffected Islamists may take a generation or longer to accomplish. We have a more immediate need to conduct moral and physical harm on the Al Qaeda leadership now before they can orchestrate more hate and another major attack on us.

As Bin Laden provides the motivation of “hatred of apostasy,” fueling a world-wide uprising, his critical requirements include his personal safety and that of key Al Qaeda deputies within the command and control element, his ability to periodically communicate direction and targets for terrorists cells, and his ability to communicate his Islamist message to the world and gain support for his movement. Bin Laden also requires resources (financing, weapons, etc.) and a place to hide. Al Qaeda’s operations are also enhanced by the cooperation of other terrorist groups and entities sympathetic to Bin Laden’s cause through material assistance and shared information and intelligence. Bin Laden is vulnerable to U.S. or allied surveillance and attack if he can be located. He also could be rendered irrelevant if the Islamist movement that supports him could be thwarted. If Bin Laden is killed, his martyrdom would probably not last because martyrs do not feed or take care of people. On the other hand, martyrs can become powerful images; an information campaign would be necessary to counter this. If he is captured alive, he should be taken out of the limelight and tried in front of a tribunal without public access and media coverage.

The critical requirement for a “popular uprising” as in Al Qaeda’s Islamist movement, is a charismatic and visionary leader like Bin Laden. In addition, the movement requires something to hate (like Western culture) and is further fueled by repression and poverty and the lack of opportunity. The movement is further organized by the effort to educate and institutionalize the radical form of Islam through a “network of fundamentalist schools (madrassas), some of which radicalize and recruit youngsters for entrance into terrorists networks. Funded through Islamic charities and often espousing extreme views, madrassas will remain a key source of trouble in the years ahead.” The movement and its ideology are vulnerable to “fighting an idea with a better idea.” And, these ideas would include improved human rights, democratization of all nations in the Middle East, resolution of the Israeli/Palestian issue, and stabilization of the Middle East region and economic development. It will take a generation or longer, but the United States must lead this effort.

CONCLUSIONS

During a recent Meet the Press interview, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York was asked by the moderator Tim Russert about her recent trip to Afghanistan and if she believed Osama Bin Laden was still alive and in the region. Her response:

I believe he is alive and I believe he is in the region. I’m glad you turned to Afghanistan, because as, you know, one young soldier said to me, “Welcome to the front lines in the war against terrorism,” we have forgotten that that’s where those horrible attacks against us were planned and implemented from. Russert’s follow-up question: “Will we get bin Laden?” Clinton’s answer: We better. We better, because the failure to get him fuels the kind of myth of fundamentalism and extremism and serves as a recruiting tool for people who would wish us ill.

A counter to this line of thought comes from the magazine Newsweek: It’s difficult to know where or how Osama bin Laden fits in...The CIA seems to believe that bin Laden and Zawahiri are either on the Afghan-Pakistani border or in a teeming Pakistani city like Karachi, while some Pentagon officials are intrigued by hints that bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri may be hiding in Iran. Last week Marine General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that “bin Laden has taken himself out of the picture.”

I agree with Senator Clinton. Even if Bin Laden has taken himself out of the picture, we need to take a lesson from the ancient Romans who pursued the leaders of a Jewish revolt to Massada in Palestine with the thought “we are coming after you and will get you sooner or later.” This may serve as a deterrent for others who would wish us ill.

In this paper I have postulated the center of gravity for Al Qaeda as Osama Bin Laden and his brand of Islamist extremism. In our war against terrorism, an analysis of COG candidates with the respective capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities all point to Al Qaeda’s leadership and ideology as the center of gravity at the strategic level. Eliminating Bin Laden will lead to the unraveling of his movement because his followers will be demoralized from the loss of a leader of almost mythical proportions. It will take patience, timing, and skill – the characteristics of a hawk described by Sun Tzu so long ago to break the body of its prey – and today that hawk is the American Eagle and his prey is Osama Bin Laden.

The war on terrorism might be perpetual, but the war on al-Qaeda will end. Although the al-Qaeda network is in many ways distinct from its terrorist predecessors, especially in its protean ability to transform itself from a physical to a virtual organization, it is not completely without precedent. And the challenges of devising an effective response over the long term to a well-established international group are by no means unique. Al-Qaeda shares elements of continuity and discontinuity with other terrorist groups, and lessons to be learned from the successes and failures of past and present counterterrorist responses may be applicable to this case. Current research focuses on al-Qaeda and its associates, with few serious attempts to analyze them within a broader historical and political context. Yet this context sheds light on crucial assumptions and unanswered questions in the campaign against al-Qaeda. What do scholars know about how terrorist movements end? What has worked in previous campaigns? Which of those lessons are relevant to understanding how, and under what circumstances, al-Qaeda will end?

Radical Islamists will pose a threat to the United States and its interests for a long time to come. But there is a difference between sporadic and local acts of terrorism by religious extremists and the coordinated growth of al-Qaeda, with its signature of meticulous planning, mass casualties, and global reach. A central assumption of early U.S. planning was that the elimination of al-Qaeda would bring the war on terrorism (or the global struggle against violent extremism) to an end. Yet al-Qaeda itself is a moving target, with experts arguing that it has changed structure and form numerous times. As a result, the strategy to counter this group is composed of tactics such as targeting its leader, Osama bin Laden, and his top lieutenants and denying the organization the ability, finances, and territory to regroup. Similar approaches have been employed against other terrorist organizations, with sharply varied outcomes.

Careful analysis of comparable situations can shed light on what is required to close out an epoch dominated by al-Qaeda terrorism.

Terrorism studies are often event driven, spurred by attacks and the need to analyze and respond more effectively to a specific threat. As a result, the bulk of traditional research on terrorism has been descriptive analysis focused on one group, detailing its organization, structure, tactics, leadership, and so on. True to this pattern, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an outpouring of research (bad and good) on al-Qaeda, but little attention to analyzing it across functional lines within a wider body of knowledge and research on terrorist groups. To the extent that broader crosscutting research has been done, the weight of it rests on questions of the causes of this threat, as well as the arguably narrow matters of the weapons and methods being used or likely to be used.

This agenda reflects the strengths of the established international security and defense community, where there is far more expertise, for example, on nuclear weapons and proliferation than on the Arabicspeaking networks that might use them, on operational methods such as suicide attacks than on the operatives who employ them, and on the causes of wars than on how they end. Yet just as war termination may be more vital in its implications for the international system than how wars begin, the question of how the al-Qaeda movement ends may be vital to understanding the strategic implications for the United States, its allies, and the shape of the new era.

The question of how terrorist groups decline is insufficiently studied, and the available research is virtually untapped. Yet it has a raft of implications for the challenges posed by al-Qaeda and its associates, as well as for the counterterrorist policies of the United States and its allies, many of which reflect little awareness or scrutiny of the assumptions upon which they rest. For example, national leaders focus on the capture or death of bin Laden as a central objective in the campaign against al-Qaeda.

Past experience with the decapitation of terrorist groups, however, is not seriously examined for insights into this case. Some analysts concentrate on the root causes of terrorism and urge policies that will shift local public support away from al-Qaeda, suggesting a longterm approach toward the movement’s gradual decline. Experience from cases where populations have become unwilling to support other causes is little tapped, and resulting changes in the behavior of terrorist organizations separated from their constituencies are hardly known. In other cases, the use of force or other repressive measures against terrorist groups has been successful. Yet the conditions under which that approach has succeeded or failed have not been examined for parallels with al-Qaeda. Most observers assume that negotiations would never lead to the end of al-Qaeda because it has nonnegotiable, apocalyptic demands. But experience with other terrorist groups that had open-ended or evolving demands is little scrutinized. In short, the substantial history of how terrorism declines and ceases has not been analyzed for its potential relevance to al-Qaeda.

The argument here is that past experience with the decline of terrorist organizations is vital in dealing with the current threat, and that the United States and its allies must tap into that experience to avoid prior mistakes and to effect al-Qaeda’s demise. The article proceeds in four sections. The first provides a brief review of previous research on how terrorism declines or ends; the second is an examination of the endings of other relevant terrorist organizations, with an eye toward determining what has worked in previous campaigns and why; the third offers an analysis of al-Qaeda’s unique characteristics to determine where comparisons with other groups are appropriate and where they are not; and the fourth addresses how what came before has implications for U.S. and allied policy toward al-Qaeda today.

The study of terrorism is often narrowly conceived and full of gaps; it is not surprising, therefore, that the question of how the phenomenon ends is understudied. The vast majority of contemporary research on terrorism has been conducted by scholars who are relatively new to the subject and unaware of the body of work that has gone before: in the 1990s, for example, 83 percent of the articles published in the major journals of terrorism research were produced by individuals writing on the subject for the first time. Thus far they have made little effort to build on past conclusions, with only halting and disappointing progress in understanding the phenomenon outside its present political context. Not unrelated, a crippling aspect of much of the research on terrorism is its often applied nature; analysts willing to examine more than one group or broader, noncontemporary, conceptual questions are rare. This is somewhat understandable, given that different groups undertake terrorist acts for different reasons, and it is safer to specialize; efforts to accelerate the demise of al-Qaeda, however, require more lateral thinking. The thinness of terrorism studies may be giving way to more sustained substantive research in the post–September 11 world, though it is too early to say whether current attention will persist and mature.

Nonetheless, serious research conducted thus far has produced several overlapping themes and approaches in three areas: the relationship between how a terrorist group begins and ends; the search for predictable cycles or phases of terrorist activity; and the comparison of historical counterterrorism cases.

Links between Beginnings and Endings

Hypotheses about how terrorist groups end are frequently connected to the broader body of hypotheses about what causes terrorism. The assumption is that the origins of terrorism persist throughout the life of terrorist organizations and shed light on sources of their eventual demise. But this is often an oversimplification. Given the close ties between terrorism analysis and government support, when the perception of imminent attacks subsides, support for solid research declines. Work on a declining or defunct terrorist group is therefore typically sparser than is the tackling of its origins and evolution. With such a glaring imbalance in the available research, great care must be taken in generalizing about beginnings and endings of specific terrorist groups.

Recognition of the interplay of internal and external forces in the evolution of terrorism is also crucial. In any given case, the evolution from political awareness to the formation (usually) of a terrorist group to the carrying out of a terrorist attack is a complex process. Some steps in this process may be acci-dental or opportunistic. Likewise, the process by which a terrorist group declines may be as much determined by innate factors as by external policies or actors.

A group may make a bad decision, engage in a counterproductive strategy, or simply implode. It may also have an innate compulsion to act—for example, it may be driven to engage in terrorist attacks to maintain support, to shore up its organizational integrity, or even to foster its continued existence. Studies of the causes of terrorism frequently begin with analyses of the role of individual operatives or their leaders.

These include examinations of the psychologies of individual terrorists, “profiles” of terrorists (and future terrorists) and their organizations, assessments of the conditions that encourage or enable individuals to resort to terrorism, and studies of the distinctive characteristics of terrorist leaders and their followers. The relationship be-tween the motivations and characteristics of individual operatives, on the one hand, and the means to end their violent attacks, on the other, is implied but not always obvious.

Another approach especially favored among terrorism experts is analyzing the organizational dynamics of the group. Important late-twentieth-century research concluded that terrorism is essentially a group activity: by understanding the dynamics of the group, including its shared ideological commitment and group identity, analysts can isolate the means of ending its terrorist attacks.

The focus is thus on the dynamics of relationships between members as a way of gaining insight into the vulnerability of the group’s hierarchy, the weaknesses of its organizational structure, the group’s ideology and worldview, and so on, which in turn potentially sheds light on how a group might unravel. Such research analyzes the behavior of the terrorist group from the perspective of the needs of the organization itself, an approach that was particularly inºuential in studying the behavior of leftist and ethnonationalist/ separatist groups of the 1970s and 1980s.

Many analysts, however, question the relevance of this well-established approach in an era of decentralized, nonhierarchical cell structures that are able to exploit information technology and the tools of globalization. The internet is emerging as the critical new dimension of twenty-first-century global terrorism, with websites and electronic bulletin boards spreading ideological messages, perpetuating terrorist networks, providing links between operatives in cyberspace, and sharing violent images to demonstrate ruthlessness and incite followers to action. Likewise, a growing emphasis on individual initiative, the presence of mission-driven organizations operating with an understanding of the commander’s intent, and a lack of traditional logistical trails all have implications for analyzing how terrorist groups end. Cells that operate independently are much more difficult to eliminate and can even gain a kind of immortality. Mission-driven groups are designed to be self-perpetuating and may not fit traditional organizational models of how terrorism ends.

The nature of the grievance that drives a terrorist organization has some bearing on the speed and likelihood of its decline. On average, modern terrorist groups do not exist for long. According to David Rapoport, 90 percent of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade. Whether an organization supports a left-wing, right-wing, or ethnonationlist/separatist cause appears to matter in determining its life span. Of these three, terrorist groups motivated by ethnonationalist/separatist causes have had the longest average life span; their greater average longevity seems to result, at least in part, from support among the local populace of the same ethnicity for the group’s political or territorial objectives. It is too soon to compile reliable data on the average life span of contemporary terrorist groups motivated by religion (or at least groups that appeal to religious concepts as a mobilizing force); however, the remarkable staying power of early religious terrorist groups such as the Hindu Thugs, in existence for at least 600 years, would seem to indicate the inherent staying power of sacred or spiritually based motivations.

Finally, because of the degree to which terrorism research has been subsidized by governments and biased by later policy imperatives, the role of counterterrorism is often overemphasized. With easier access to government data, researchers tend naturally to stress state behavior. The degree to which terrorist groups evolve independent of government action can be underappreciated. The result is a strong bias toward tying the decline of such groups to specific government policies, especially after the fact, even though the relationship between cause and effect may be unclear.

Cycles, Stages, Waves, and Phases

Some researchers argue that terrorist attacks conform to a temporal pattern that provides insight into increases and decreases in numbers of attacks. Thus another approach to understanding the life span of a terrorist movement is to search for identifiable cycles.

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler assert that long-term analysis of terrorism trends during the late twentieth century indicates that transnational terrorist attacks run in cycles, with peaks approximately every two years. Enders and Sandler’s cycles are tracked across terrorist groups worldwide, shedding light on the likelihood of an attack coming from someone somewhere; indeed, before September 11 they correctly predicted enhanced danger of a high-casualty terrorist attack. But like strategic intelligence that provided general but not tactical warning of the September 11 attacks, Enders and Sandler’s findings were of limited use in predicting where the attack would occur, by which group, and by what means. The apparent existence of global statistical patterns is interesting, but it provides no insight into the decline of specific terrorist groups.

In his attempt to use mathematical analysis to determine risk assessment for al-Qaeda attacks, Jonathan Farley likewise concluded that while the connections between cells can be quantitatively modeled, assumptions about how individual cells operate may be wrong. The usefulness of statistical models based on a large number of assumptions to determine a specific group’s decline is limited.

Other experts have focused on the existence of developmental stages through which all terrorist groups evolve, especially psychological stages of growing alienation or moral disengagement for groups, individuals, or both. Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson have explored the applicability of a conflict theory framework—including stages of emergence, escalation, and de-escalation—to the life cycles of terrorist groups. They conclude that the framework is useful in examining terrorist groups originating or operating in Western Europe in the late twentieth century, but urge more research in this area to determine whether it is applicable to other places and periods. Still other analysts suggest that specific types of groups may possess their own developmental stages.

Ehud Sprinzak, for example, argued that rightwing groups exhibit a unique cyclical pattern. Driven by grievances specific to their particular group, members direct their hostility against “enemy” segments of the population defined by who they are—with regard to race, religion, sexual preference, ethnicity, and so on—not by what they do. To the extent that the government then defends the target population, the former also becomes a “legitimate” target. But the cycle of violence reflects underlying factors that may continue to exist, and that can experience periods of ºare-up and remission, depending on the degree to which the government is able to bring campaigns of violence under control.

Other researchers study the evolution of terrorist groups as types of social movements and are intellectual descendants of Ted Robert Gurr.

The more highly developed literature on social movements posits, for example, that terrorism may appear at the end of a cycle of the rise and fall of movements of mass protest. Social movements may just as easily be drawn toward more positive means, however. Understanding the pattern of mobilization may be important for dissecting the origins of an established group but may not be as revealing of its likely end. On the whole, research on social movements gives more insight into the origins of terrorist groups than it does into their decline. Finally, Rapoport posits another broad hypothesis on the life cycles of terrorist groups. He argues that over the course of modern history, waves of international terrorist activity last about a generation (approximately forty years).

These waves are characterized by expansion and contraction and have an international character, with similar activities in several countries driven by a common ideology. Two factors are critical to Rapoport’s waves: (1) a transformation in communication or transportation patterns, and (2) a new doctrine or culture. Yet although a wave is composed of terrorist organizations and their activities, the two need not exist concurrently. Rapoport argues that because most individual organizations have short life spans, they often disappear before the overarching wave loses force. The current wave of jihadist terrorism may be different, however, because unlike earlier waves of the modern era, this one is driven by a religious (not a secular) cause. Rapoport is therefore reluctant to predict its end.

Comparative Counterterrorism Cases

Cyclical hypotheses are notoriously difficult to formulate and difficult to prove; they can require so much generalization and qualification that their relevance to specific groups becomes remote. As with many international security questions, an alternative approach has been to assemble volumes of comparative case studies that draw parallel lessons about terrorist organizations, including how they declined and ended or were defeated. These, too, present a host of challenges. First, terrorism studies often look primarily at the attributes of a particular group or at the counterterrorist policies of a state. Rarely are both equally well considered. Because of the heavy state interest in combating terrorism, the emphasis is understandably on a comparison of counterterrorist techniques used by states over the life span of each group, with policy implications for current challenges. Second, with their focus on a relatively narrow functional question, comparative terrorism cases can fall victim to superficiality: regional experts can be reluctant to cede ground to strategic studies experts whom they consider interlopers in their geographic/ linguistic/cultural ambit.

For this reason, many comparative studies are published as edited collections of articles by regional experts, but these in turn can fail to control relevant variables and to coalesce on a central theme. Third, access to data is a big problem: conducting primary research on contemporary terrorist groups is difficult because making contact with operatives or their targets can be dangerous for both the researchers and their contacts. In addition, governments may restrict access to relevant written sources. Fourth, because of the political nature of terrorism, researchers operate at the intersections of sensitive ideas; maintaining objectivity in studying behavior that is deliberately designed to shock can prove challenging. Finally, studying this phenomenon over a range of terrorist groups in different cultural, historical, and political contexts requires generalization and risks the introduction of distortions when making comparisons. The best case studies are usually completed years after a group has ceased to exist; as a result, their applicability to current challenges is limited. For any given group, it is vital to identify characteristics that distinguish it from its predecessors and those that do not.

How Other Terrorist Groups Have Ended

There are at least seven broad explanations for, or critical elements in, the decline and ending of terrorist groups in the modern era:

(1) capture or killing of the leader,

(2) failure to transition to the next generation,

(3) achievement of the group’s aims,

(4) transition to a legitimate political process,

(5) undermining of popular support,

(6) repression, and

(7) transition from terrorism to other forms of violence.

The relevant factors can be both internal and external: terrorist groups implode for reasons that may or may not be related to measures taken against them. Nor are they necessarily separate and distinct. Indeed individual case studies of terrorist groups often reveal that more than one dynamic was responsible for their decline. The typical focus on government counterterrorist measures slights the capabilities and dynamics of the group itself and is frequently misguided; even among groups that decline in response to counterterrorist campaigns, the picture remains complex. Counterterrorist techniques are often best used in combination, and methods can overlap: frequently more than one technique has been employed to respond to a given group at different times. The goal here is to focus on the historical experience of previous groups and study the commonalities, in both the internal and external variables, so as to determine aspects of the processes of terrorist decline that are relevant to al-Qaeda. Although listing these seven key factors separately is admittedly artificial, they are analyzed consecutively for the sake of argument and convenience.

Capture or Killing of the Leader

The effects of capturing or killing a terrorist leader have varied greatly depending on variables such as the structure of the organization, whether the leader created a cult of personality, and the presence of a viable successor. Regardless of whether the removal of a leader results in the demise of the terrorist group, the event normally provides critical insight into the depth and nature of the group’s popular support and usually represents a turning point. Recent examples of groups that were either destroyed or deeply wounded by the capture of a charismatic leader include Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), and Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo. The U.S. government designates all four as “foreign terrorist organizations.”

Shining Path’s former leader, Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (aka Guzmán), was a highly charismatic philosophy professor who built a powerful Marxist movement through a brutal campaign of executing peasant leaders in Peru’s rural areas during the 1980s and early 1990s. Somewhat ironically, Shining Path, which was founded in the late 1960s, began to engage in violence just after the government undertook extensive land reform and restored democracy to the country; the earliest attacks involved the burning of rural ballot boxes in the 1980 presidential election. Increased popular access to a university education helped Guzmán radicalize a growing cadre of impressionable young followers. He consolidated his power in part by expelling or executing dissenters, resulting in unquestioned obedience but also a highly individualistic leadership. By the early 1990s, Shining Path had pushed Peru into a state of near anarchy. Guzmán’s capture on September 12, 1992, however, including images of the former leader behind bars recanting and asking his followers to lay down their arms, dealt the group a crushing blow.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an ethnonationalist/separatist group founded in 1974 and dedicated to the establishment of a Kurdish state, also suffered the capture of its charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Beginning in 1984, the group launched a violent campaign against the Turkish government that claimed as many as 35,000 lives. Ocalan was apprehended in early 1999 in Kenya (apparently as a result of a tip from U.S. intelligence) and returned to Turkey, where a court sentenced him to death. On the day of sentencing, riots and demonstrations broke out among Kurdish populations throughout Europe. Ocalan, whose sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, advised his followers to refrain from violence. Renamed the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and then Kongra-Gel, the group remains on the U.S. terrorist list; however, it has subsequently engaged mainly in political activities on behalf of the Kurds.

The Real Irish Republican Army is a splinter group of the Provisional Irish Republican Army that split off in 1997 after refusing to participate in the peace process. It conducted a series of attacks in 1998, including the notorious Omagh bombing, which killed 29 people (including 9 children) and injured more than 200. The Northern Irish community reacted with such outrage that the group declared a cease-fire and claimed that its killing of civilians was inadvertent. In 2000 the RIRA resumed attacks in London and Northern Ireland, focusing exclusively on government and military targets. In March 2001 authorities arrested the group’s leader, Michael McKevitt. From an Irish prison, he and forty other imprisoned members declared that further armed resistance was futile and that the RIRA was “at an end.” The group currently has between 100 and 200 active members and continues to carry out attacks; nevertheless, its activities have significantly declined since McKevitt’s arrest.

Aum Shinrikyo (now known as “Aleph”) is essentially a religious cult founded in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, a half-blind Japanese mystic. Asahara claimed that the world was approaching the apocalypse and used an eclectic blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist, and Christian thought to attract an international following, primarily in Japan but also in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and the United States. Asahara declared that the United States would soon initiate Armageddon by starting World War III against Japan and called on the group’s members to take extraordinary measures in preparation for the attack. The notable aspects of this group are its international reach and its use of so-called weapons of mass destruction, particularly anthrax and sarin gas. In March 1995, members of Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, resulting in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to another 5,000. Asahara was arrested in May 1995 and sentenced to death in February 2004. The group has shrunk from approximately 45,000 members worldwide in 1995 to fewer than 1,000, many of whom live in Russia.

These are just a few of the contemporary cases where the capture or killing of the leader of a terrorist organization proved to be an important element in the organization’s decline. Other examples include the arrest of leaders in groups as diverse as France’s Direct Action (Action Directe); El Salvador’s People’s Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación); and the U.S. group known as the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord. From a counterterrorism perspective, the killing of a terrorist leader may backfire by creating increased publicity for the group’s cause and perhaps making the leader a martyr who will attract new members to the organization (or even subsequent organizations). Che Guevera is the most famous example of this phenomenon.

There is some reason to believe that arresting a leader is more effective in damaging a group than is killing or assassinating him. But even a humiliating arrest can backfire if the incarcerated leader continues to communicate with his group. Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman (the so-called Blind Sheikh), convicted of conspiracy in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, is a notable example. In other cases, imprisoned leaders may prompt further violence by group members trying to free them (e.g., the Baader-Meinhof group and, again, al-Rahman). Thus, if a leader is captured and jailed, undermining his credibility and cutting off inºammatory communications are critical to demoralizing his following.

Inability to Pass the cause on to the Next Generation

The concept of the failure to transition to the next generation is closely related to theories that posit that terrorist violence is associated with the rise and fall of generations, but here it is applied to individual case studies. As mentioned above, the nature of the group’s ideology seems to have relevance to the crossgenerational staying power of that group. The left-wing/anarchistic groups of the 1970s, for example, were notorious for their inability to articulate a clear vision of their goals that could be handed down to successors after the first generation of radical leaders departed or were eliminated. The Red Brigades, the Second of June Movement, the Japanese Red Army, the Weather Underground Organization/Weathermen, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and the Baader-Meinhof group are all examples of extremely dangerous, violent groups in which a leftist/anarchist ideology became bankrupt, leaving no possibility to transition to a second generation.

Right-wing groups, which draw their inspiration from fascist or racist concepts, can also have difficulty persisting over generations, though, as Martha Crenshaw observes, this may reflect the challenges of tracking them over time rather than their actual disintegration. Examples include the numerous neo-Nazi groups in the United States and elsewhere. Still, the racist causes of many of these groups can persist long after the disappearance of the group itself; their movement underground, or their reemergence under a different name or structure, is common. Extensive examinations by academic experts and the Federal Bureau of Investigation of right-wing groups in the United States during the 1990s, especially after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, revealed their tendency to operate according to a common modus operandi, ideology, or intent; this includes the so-called leaderless resistance, which involves individual operatives or small cells functioning independently in pursuit of an understood purpose. Such organizational decentralization complicates conclusions about beginnings and endings of right-wing groups, but it may also militate against truly effective generational transition. Furthermore, to support their activities, some right-wing groups engage in criminal behavior such as the robbing of banks and armored cars, racketeering, and counterfeiting, which, in the United States, has provided evidence trails for federal authorities and undermined group longevity.

The internal process that occurs during the transition from first-to secondgeneration terrorist leaders is very sensitive. Failure to pass the legacy to a new generation is a common historical explanation for a terrorist group’s decline or end.

Achievement of the cause

Some terrorist organizations cease to exist once they have fulfilled their original objective. Two examples are the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization, also known either by its Hebrew acronym ETZEL or simply as Irgun), founded in 1931 to protect Jews with force and to advance the cause of an independent Jewish state, and the African National Congress (ANC). As head of the Irgun, Menachem Begin, who would later become prime minister of Israel, ordered the 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel, headquarters of British rule in Palestine. The attack killed 92 people and hastened Britain’s withdrawal. Irgun disbanded with the creation of the state of Israel, when its members transitioned to participation in the new government. The ANC was created in 1912 and turned to terrorist tactics in the 1960s. Its attacks were met with an extremely violent campaign of right-wing counterstrikes as the apartheid regime began to wane. ANC leader Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for terrorist acts from 1964 to 1990, was elected South Africa’s first president following the end of apartheid. The last ANC attack occurred in 1989, and the organization became a legal political actor in 1990, having achieved its objective of ending the apartheid regime.

Walter Laqueur divides terrorist groups that attained their objectives into three categories: (1) those with narrow, clearly defined aims that were realistically attainable; (2) those with powerful outside protectors; and (3) those facing imperial powers that were no longer willing or able to hold on to their colonies or protectorates. In the context of twenty-first-century terrorism, additional categories are possible. Although it happens in a minority of cases, using terrorism to achieve an aim does sometimes succeed; to recognize this reality is not to condone the tactic and may even be a prerequisite to effectively countering it.

Negotiations Toward a Legitimate Political Process

The opening of negotiations can be a catalyst for the decline or end of terrorist groups, potentially engendering a range of effects. Groups have transitioned to political legitimacy and away from terrorist behavior after the formal opening of a political process. Examples include the Provisional Irish Republican Army, whose participation in the multiparty talks with the British and Irish governments was crucial to the 1998 Good Friday agreement; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which entered a peace process with Israel during the 1990s; and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), which began talks with the Sri Lankan government, brokered by the Norwegian government, in 2002. But the typical scenario for a terrorist group’s decline is usually much more complicated than simply the pursuit or achievement of a negotiated agreement.

Despite the successful negotiated outcomes that can result between the major parties, a common effect of political processes is the splintering of groups into factions that support the negotiations (or their outcome) and those that do not. For example, the IRA splintered into the Real Irish Republican Army; and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and PFLP–General Command (GC) split with the PLO over the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. From a counterterrorist perspective, dividing groups can be a purpose of the negotiations process, as it isolates and potentially strangles the most radical factions. But such splintering can also occur on the “status quo” (or, usually, pro-government) side, as happened in South Africa (with the Afrikaner white power group Farmers’ Force, or Boermag) and in Northern Ireland (with the Ulster Volunteer Force).

Governments confront huge difficulties when negotiating with organizations against which they are still fighting in either a counterterrorism campaign or a traditional war. The most extreme case of counterproductive splintering of status quo factions is Colombia, where the signing of the peace accords between the Colombian government and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, or EPL) in 1984 resulted in the formation of right-wing paramilitary groups that disagreed with the granting of political status to the EPL. Before long, leftist groups, paramilitary units, and the Colombian army stepped up their attacks, unraveling the peace, increasing the violence, and further fractionating the political actors. Worse, splinter groups are often more violent than the “mother” organization, responding to the imperative to demonstrate their existence and signal their dissent. Splinter groups can be seen as engaging in a new “layer” of terrorism with respect to the original group or their own government. This can also be the case, for example, when groups enter elections and take on a governing role. In such situations, the long-term goal (a viable political outcome) and the short-term goal (the reduction in violence) may be at odds.

A wide range of variables can determine the broader outcome of negotiations to end terrorism, including the nature of the organization of the group (with hierarchical groups having an advantage over groups that cannot control their members’ actions), the nature of the leadership of the group (where groups with strong leaders have an advantage over those that are decentralized), and the nature of public support for the cause (where groups with ambivalent constituencies may be more likely to compromise). There must also be negotiable aims, which are more likely to exist with territorially based groups than with those that follow left-wing, right-wing, or religious/spiritualist ideologies. Determining the degree to which opening a political dialogue with a terrorist group is a likely avenue for the decline of the group and a reduction in violence is a highly differentiated calculation.

Negotiations, however, need not be a formalized process and need not occur only with the leadership of a group. Arguably, a form of negotiation with a terrorist organization, or more precisely with its members, is the offer of amnesty to those willing to stop engaging in violence and come forth with information about their fellow operatives. The classic case of a successful amnesty is the Italian government’s 1979 and 1982 repentance legislation and the Red Brigades. In another case, the government of Alberto Fujimori in Peru offered amnesty to members of Shining Path, both after Guzmán’s capture and during the waning days of the group. As Robert Art and Louise Richardson point out in their comparative study of state counterterrorism policies, an amnesty may be most successful when an organization is facing defeat and its members have an incentive to seek a way out of what they see as a losing cause.

Diminishment of popular support

Terrorist groups are strategic actors that usually deliberate about their targets and calculate the effects of attacks on their constituent populations. Miscalculations, however, can undermine a group’s cause, resulting in plummeting popular support and even its demise. Terrorist groups generally cannot survive without either active or passive support from a surrounding population. Examples of active support include hiding members, raising money, and, especially, joining the organization. Passive support, as the term implies, is more diffuse and includes actions such as ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity, declining to cooperate with police investigations, sending money to organizations that act as fronts for the group, and expressing support for the group’s objectives.

Popular support for a terrorist group can dissipate for a number of reasons. First, people who are not especially interested in its political aims may fear government counteraction. Apathy is a powerful force; all else being equal, most people naturally prefer to carry on their daily lives without the threat of being targeted by counterterrorism laws, regulations, sanctions, and raids. Sometimes even highly radicalized populations can pull back active or passive support for a group, especially if the government engages in strong repressive measures and people simply become exhausted. The apparent loss of local popular support for Chechen terrorist groups is a good example.

Second, the government may offer supporters of a terrorist group a better alternative. Reform movements, increased spending, and creation of jobs in underserved areas are all tactics that can undermine the sources of terrorist violence. They can also result, however, in increased instability and a heightened sense of opportunity—situations that in the past have led to more terrorist acts. Evidence suggests that the extent to which societal conditions lead to a sense of “indignation” or frustrated ambition among certain segments of society during a period of transition might be a crucial factor for the decision to turn to terrorist violence. Sometimes terrorist attacks are seen as an effort to nudge the ºow of history further in one’s direction.

Third, populations can become uninterested in the ideology or objectives of a terrorist group; events can evolve independently such that the group’s aims become outdated or irrelevant. A sense of historical ripeness or opportunity may have been lost. Examples include many of the Marxist groups inspired by communist ideology and supported by the Soviet Union. This is arguably a major reason why the nature of international terrorism has evolved beyond primary reliance on state sponsorship toward a broader range of criminal or entrepreneurial behavior.

Fourth, a terrorist group’s attacks can cause revulsion among its actual or potential public constituency. This is a historically common strategic error and can cause the group to implode. Independent of the counterterrorist activity of a government, a terrorist group may choose a target that a wide range of its constituents consider illegitimate. This occurred, for example, with the Omagh bombing. Despite hasty subsequent statements by RIRA leaders that they did not intend to kill innocent civilians, the group never recovered in the eyes of the community. Other examples of strategic miscalculation abound. In February 1970 the PFLP-GC sabotaged a Swissair plane en route to Tel Aviv, resulting in the deaths of all 47 passengers, 15 of whom were Israelis. The PFLP-GC at first took responsibility but then tried unsuccessfully to retract its claim when popular revulsion began to surface. Similarly, there has been revulsion among the Basque population in Spain to attacks by the separatist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA), which some observers credit with the declining popularity of the group. Public revulsion was a factor in the undermining of support for Sikh separatism in India, a movement directed at establishing an independent state of Khalistan that killed tens of thousands between 1981 and 1995 and was responsible for the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984.

Popular revulsion against terrorist attacks can have immediate effects. Arguably the most well developed and broadly based conduit for resource collection in the world is the connection between the Tamil Tigers and the dispersed Tamil diaspora. The LTTE’s desire to avoid the “terrorist organization” label in the post–September 11 world and shore up its base of popular support was an element in the group’s December 2001 decision to pursue a negotiated solution.

Likewise, a state-sponsored terrorist group can lose support when the state decides that it is no longer interested in using terrorism, responds to pressure from other states, has more important competing goals, or loses the ability to continue its support. Libya’s expulsion of the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal and cutting off of support to Palestinian groups such as the Palestine Islamic Jihad and the PFLP-GC are notable examples.

Military force and the repression of terrorist groups

The use of military force has hastened the decline or ended a number of terrorist groups, including the late-nineteenth-century Russian group Narodnaya Volya, Shining Path, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. From the state’s perspective, military force offers a readily available means that is under its control. Although terrorism is indeed arguably a form of war, terrorists use asymmetrical violence, by definition, because they are unable or unwilling to meet a status quo government on the battlefield. Shifting the violence to a form that is familiar and probably advantageous for the state is an understandable response. In some circumstances, it is also successful. Historically, military force has taken two forms: intervention, when the threat is located mainly beyond the borders of the target state (as with Israel’s 1982 involvement in Lebanon); or repression, when the threat is considered mainly a domestic one (as with the PKK). More typically, the state will use some combination of the two (as in Colombia). The effects of the use of repressive military force in some cases may prove to be temporary or counterproductive; in other cases, it may result in the export of the problem to another country. The classic contemporary case is the Russian counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya. Russian involvement in the second Chechen war appears to have produced a transition in the Chechen resistance, with more terrorist attacks in the rest of Russia, greater reliance on suicide bombers, and the growing influence of militant Islamic fighters. To the extent that the Chechens originally engaged in a classic insurgency rather than in terrorism, they have since 2002 altered their tactics toward increasing attacks on Russian civilians. The strong repressive response by the Russian government has apparently facilitated the spread of the conflict to neighboring areas, including Ingushetia and Dagestan. And there seems to be no end in sight, given the increasing radicalization and identification of some Chechen factions with the al-Qaeda movement.

Democracies or liberal governments face particular difficulties in repressing terrorist groups. Because military or police action requires a target, the use of force against operatives works best in situations where members of the organization can be separated from the general population. This essentially forces “profiling” or some method of distinguishing members from nonmembers—always a sensitive issue, particularly when the only available means of discrimination relate to how members are defined (race, age, religion, nationality, etc.) rather than to what they do (or are planning to do). Excellent intelligence is essential for the latter (especially in advance of an attack), but even in the best of situations, it is typically scarce. Repressive measures also carry high resource and opportunity costs. Long-term repressive measures against suspected operatives may challenge civil liberties and human rights, undermine domestic support, polarize political parties, and strain the fabric of the state itself, further undercutting the state’s ability to respond effectively to future terrorist attacks.

Transition to Another Modus Operandi

In some cases, groups can move from the use of terrorism toward either criminal behavior or more classic conventional warfare. The transition to criminal behavior implies a shift away from a primary emphasis on collecting resources as a means of pursuing political ends toward acquiring material goods and profit that become ends in themselves. Groups that have undertaken such transitions in recent years include Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and arguably all of the major so-called narco-terrorist groups in Colombia. Beginning in 2000, Abu Sayyaf shifted its focus from bombings and targeted executions to the taking of foreign hostages and their exchange for millions of dollars in ransom.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia uses a variety of mechanisms to raise funds—including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and especially drug trafficking—running operations that yield as much as $1 billion annually.

Terrorist groups can also escalate to insurgency or even conventional war, especially if they enjoy state support. Notable examples include the Kashmiri separatist groups, the Khmer Rouge, and the Communist Party of Nepal– Maoists. Transitions in and out of insurgency are especially common among ethnonationalist/separatist groups, whose connection to a particular territory and grounding in an ethnic population provide a natural base; in these situations, the evolution involves changes in size or type of operations (do they operate as a military unit and attack mainly other military targets?) and whether or not the organization holds territory (even temporarily). Terrorism and insurgency are not the same, but they are related. Very weak, territorially based movements may use terrorist attacks and transition to insurgency when they gain strength, especially when their enemy is a state government (as was the case for most groups in the twentieth century). One example is Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, which massacred tens of thousands of civilians in the civil war that followed the Islamic Salvation Front’s victory in the 1991 parliamentary elections. The key in understanding the relationship between the two tactics is to analyze the group’s motivation, its attraction to a particular constituency, its strength, and the degree to which its goals are associated with control of a piece of territory. Transitions to full-blown conventional war, on the other hand, can occur when the group is able to control the behavior of a state according to its own interests, or even when an act of terrorism has completely unintended consequences.

Is al-Qaeda Unique among Terrorist Organizations?

Four characteristics distinguish al-Qaeda from its predecessors in either nature or degree: its ºuid organization, recruitment methods, funding, and means of communication.

Fluid Organization

The al-Qaeda of September 2001 no longer exists. As a result of the war on terrorism, it has evolved into an increasingly diffuse network of affiliated groups, driven by the worldview that al-Qaeda represents. In deciding in 1996 to be, essentially, a “visible” organization, running training camps and occupying territory in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda may have made an important tactical error; this, in part, explains the immediate success of the U.S.-led coalition’s war in Afghanistan. Since then, it has begun to resemble more closely a “global jihad movement,” increasingly consisting of web-directed and cyber-linked groups and ad hoc cells. In its evolution, al-Qaeda has demonstrated an unusual resilience and international reach. It has become, in the words of Porter Goss, “only one facet of the threat from a broader Sunni jihadist movement.” No previous terrorist organization has exhibited the complexity, agility, and global reach of al-Qaeda, with its ºuid operational style based increasingly on a common mission statement and objectives, rather than on standard operating procedures and an organizational structure.

Al-Qaeda has been the focal point of a hybrid terrorist coalition for some time, with ties to inspired freelancers and other terrorist organizations both old and new. Some observers argue that considering al-Qaeda an organization is misleading; rather it is more like a nebula of independent entities (including loosely associated individuals) that share an ideology and cooperate with each other.

The original umbrella group, the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, formed in 1998, included not only al-Qaeda but also groups from Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan. A sampling of groups that are connected in some way includes the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Jemaah Islamiyah (Southeast Asia), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (which merged with al-Qaeda in 2001), al-Ansar Mujahidin (Chechnya), al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (primarily Egypt, but has a worldwide presence), Abu Sayyaf (Philippines), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Pakistan/Kashmir). Some experts see al-Qaeda’s increased reliance on connections to other groups as a sign of weakness; others see it as a worrisome indicator of growing strength, especially with groups that formerly focused on local issues and now display evidence of convergence on al-Qaeda’s Salafist, anti-U.S., anti-West agenda.

The nature, size, structure, and reach of the coalition have long been subject to debate. Despite claims of some Western experts, no one knows how many members al-Qaeda has currently or had in the past. U.S. intelligence sources place the number of individuals who underwent training in camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through the fall of 2001 at between 10,000 and 20,000; the figure is inexact, in part, because of disagreement over the total number of such camps and because not all attendees became members. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2004 estimated that 2,000 al-Qaeda operatives had been captured or killed and that a pool of 18,000 potential al-Qaeda operatives remained. These numbers can be misleading, however: it would be a mistake to think of al-Qaeda as a conventional force, because even a few trained fighters can mobilize many willing foot soldiers as martyrs.

Methods of Recruitment

The staying power of al-Qaeda is at least in part related to the way the group has perpetuated itself; in many senses, al-Qaeda is closer to a social movement than a terrorist group. Involvement in the movement has come not from pressure by senior al-Qaeda members but mainly from local volunteers competing to win a chance to train or participate in some fashion. The process seems to be more a matter of “joining” than being recruited, and thus the tra-ditional organizational approach to analyzing this group is misguided. But the draw of al-Qaeda should also not be overstated: in the evolving pattern of associations, attraction to the mission or ideology seems to have been a necessary but not sufficient condition. Exposure to an ideology is not enough, as reflected in the general failure of al-Qaeda to recruit members in Afghanistan and Sudan, where its headquarters were once located. As psychiatrist Marc Sageman illustrates, social bonds, not ideology, apparently play a more important role in al-Qaeda’s patterns of global organization.

Sageman’s study of established links among identified al-Qaeda operatives indicates that they joined the organization mainly because of ties of kinship and friendship, facilitated by what he calls a “bridging person” or entry point, perpetuated in a series of local clusters in the Maghreb and Southeast Asia, for example. In recent years, operatives have been connected to al-Qaeda and its agenda in an even more informal way, having apparently not gone to camps or had much formal training: examples include those engaged in the London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005, the Istanbul attacks of November 15 and 20, 2003, and the Casablanca attacks of May 16, 2003. This loose connectedness is not an accident: bin Laden describes al-Qaeda as “the vanguard of the Muslim nation” and does not claim to exercise command and control over his followers.

Although many groups boast of a connection to al-Qaeda’s ideology, there are often no logistical trails and thus no links for traditional intelligence methods to examine. This explains, for example, the tremendous difficulty in establishing connections between a radical mosque, bombers, bomb makers, supporters, and al-Qaeda in advance of an attack (not to mention after an attack).

Another concern has been the parallel development of Salatist networks apparently drawing European Muslims into combat against Western forces in Iraq. The European Union’s counterterrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, for example, has cautioned that these battle-hardened veterans of the Iraq conflict will return to attack Western targets in Europe.

The Ansar al-Islam plot to attack the 2004 NATO summit in Turkey was, according to Turkish sources, developed in part by operatives who had fought in Iraq. A proportion of those recently drawn to the al-Qaeda movement joined after receiving a Salafist message disseminated over the internet. Such direct messages normally do not pass through the traditional process of vetting by an imam. European counterterrorism officials thus worry about members of an alienated diaspora— sometimes second-and third-generation immigrants—who may be vulnerable to the message because they are not thoroughly trained in fundamental concepts of Islam, are alienated from their parents, and feel isolated in the communities in which they find themselves. The impulse to join the movement arises from a desire to belong to a group in a context where the operative is excluded from, repulsed by, or incapable of successful integration into a Western community.

Thus, with al-Qaeda, the twentieth-century focus on structure and function is neither timely nor sufficient. Tracing the command and control relationships in such a dramatically changing movement is enormously difficult, which makes comparisons with earlier, more traditional terrorist groups harder but by no means impossible; one detects parallels, for example, between al-Qaeda and the global terrorist movements that developed in the late nineteenth century, including anarchist and social revolutionary groups.

Means of Support

Financial support of al-Qaeda has ranged from money channeled through charitable organizations to grants given to local terrorist groups that present promising plans for attacks that serve al-Qaeda’s general goals. The majority of its operations have relied at most on a small amount of seed money provided by the organization, supplemented by operatives engaged in petty crime and fraud. Indeed, beginning in 2003, many terrorism experts agreed that al-Qaeda could best be described as a franchise organization with a marketable “brand.” Relatively little money is required for most al-Qaedaassociated attacks.

As the International Institute for Strategic Studies points out, the 2002 Bali bombing cost less than $35,000, the 2000 USS Cole operation about $50,000, and the September 11 attacks less than $500,000. Another element of support has been the many autonomous businesses owned or controlled by al-Qaeda; at one point, bin Laden was reputed to own or control approximately eighty companies around the world. Many of these legitimately continue to earn a profit, providing a self-sustaining source for the movement. International counterterrorism efforts to control al-Qaeda financing have reaped at least $147 million in frozen assets. Still, cutting the financial lifeline of an agile and low-cost movement that has reportedly amassed billions of dollars and needs few resources to carry out attacks remains a formidable undertaking.

Choking off funds destined for al-Qaeda through regulatory oversight confronts numerous challenges. Formal banking channels are not necessary for many transfers, which instead can occur through informal channels known as “alternative remittance systems,” “informal value transfer systems,” “parallel banking,” or “underground banking.” Examples include the much-discussed hawala or hundi transfer networks and the Black Market Peso Exchange that operate through family ties or unofficial reciprocal arrangements. Value can be stored in commodities such as diamonds and gold that are moved through areas with partial or problematical state sovereignty. Al-Qaeda has also used charities to raise and move funds, with a relatively small proportion of gifts being siphoned off for illegitimate purposes, often without the knowledge of donors. Yet efforts to cut off charitable ºows to impoverished areas may harm many genuinely needy recipients and could result in heightened resentment, which in turn may generate additional political support for the movement.

Al-Qaeda’s fiscal autonomy makes the network more autonomous than its late-twentieth-century state-sponsored predecessors.

Means of Communication

The al-Qaeda movement has successfully used the tools of globalization to enable it to communicate with multiple audiences, including potential new members, new recruits, active supporters, passive sympathizers, neutral observers, enemy governments, and potential victims. These tools include mobile phones, text messaging, instant messaging, and especially websites, email, blogs, and chat rooms, which can be used for administrative tasks, fund-raising, research, and logistical coordination of attacks. Although al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist group to exploit these means, it is especially adept at doing so.

A crucial facilitator for the perpetuation of the movement is the use of websites both to convey messages, fatwas, claims of attacks, and warnings to the American public, as well as to educate future participants, embed instructions to operatives, and rally sympathizers to the cause. The internet is an important factor in building and perpetuating the image of al-Qaeda and in maintaining the organization’s reputation. It provides easy access to the media, which facilitates al-Qaeda’s psychological warfare against the West. Indoctrinating and teaching new recruits is facilitated by the internet, notably through the dissemination of al-Qaeda’s widely publicized training manual (nicknamed “The Encyclopedia of Jihad”) that explains how to organize and run a cell, as well as carry out attacks. Websites and chat rooms are used to offer practical advice and facilitate the fraternal bonds that are crucial to al-Qaeda. In a sense, members of the movement no longer need to join an organization at all, for the individual can participate with the stroke of a few keys. The debate over the size, structure, and membership of al-Qaeda may be a quaint relic of the twentieth century, displaced by the leveling effects of twenty-first-century technology.

The new means of communication also offer practical advantages. Members of al-Qaeda use the web as a vast source of research and data mining to scope out future attack sites or develop new weapons technology at a low cost and a high level of sophistication. On January 15, 2003, for example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quoted an al-Qaeda training manual retrieved by American troops in Afghanistan that advised trainees that at least 80 percent of the information needed about the enemy could be collected from open, legal sources.

Earlier Terrorist Groups, al-Qaeda, and U.S. Policy Implications

Al-Qaeda’s Fluid organization, methods of recruitment, funding, and means of communication distinguish it as an advancement in twenty-first-century terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda is a product of the times. Yet it also echoes historical predecessors, expanding on such factors as the international links and ideological drive of nineteenth-century anarchists, the open-ended aims of Aum Shinrikyo, the brilliance in public communications of the early PLO, and the taste for mass casualty attacks of twentieth-century Sikh separatists or Hezbollah. Al-Qaeda is an amalgam of old and new, reflecting twenty-first century advances in means or matters of degree rather than true originality; still, most analysts miss the connections with its predecessors and are blinded by its solipsistic rhetoric. That is a mistake. The pressing challenge is to determine which lessons from the decline of earlier terrorist groups are relevant to al-Qaeda and which are not.

First, past experience with terrorism indicates that al-Qaeda will not end if Osama bin Laden is killed. There are many other reasons to pursue him, including bringing him to justice, removing his leadership and expertise, and increasing esprit de corps on the Western side (whose credibility is sapped because of bin Laden’s enduring elusiveness). The argument that his demise will end al-Qaeda is tinged with emotion, not dispassionate analysis. Organi-zations that have been crippled by the killing of their leader have been hierarchically structured, reflecting to some degree a cult of personality, and have lacked a viable successor.

Al-Qaeda meets neither of these criteria: it has a mutable structure with a strong, even increasing, emphasis on individual cells and local initiative. It is not the first organization to operate in this way; and the demise of similar terrorist groups required much more than the death of one person. Unlike the PKK and Shining Path, al-Qaeda is not driven by a cult of personality; despite his astonishing popularity, bin Laden has deliberately avoided allowing the movement to revolve around his own persona, preferring instead to keep his personal habits private, to talk of the insignificance of his own fate, and to project the image of a humble man eager to die for his beliefs. As for a viable replacement, bin Laden has often spoken openly of a succession plan, and that plan has to a large degree already taken effect. Furthermore, his capture or killing would produce its own countervailing negative consequences, including (most likely) the creation of a powerful martyr. On balance, the removal of bin Laden would have important potential benefits, but to believe that it would kill al-Qaeda is to be ahistorical and naive.

Second, although there was a time when the failure to transition to a new generation might have been a viable finale for al-Qaeda, that time is long past. Al-Qaeda has transitioned to a second, third, and arguably fourth generation. The reason relates especially to the second distinctive element of al-Qaeda: its method of recruitment or, more accurately, its attraction of radicalized followers (both individuals and groups), many of whom in turn are connected to existing local networks. Al-Qaeda’s spread has been compared to a virus or a bacterium, dispersing its contagion to disparate sites. Although this is a seductive analogy, it is also misleading: the perpetuation of al-Qaeda is a sentient process involving well-considered marketing strategies and deliberate tactical decisions, not a mindless “disease” process; thinking of it as a “disease” shores up the unfortunate American tendency to avoid analyzing the mentality of the enemy.

Al-Qaeda is operating with a long-term strategy and is certainly not following the left-wing groups of the 1970s in their failure to articulate a coherent ideological vision or the peripatetic right-wing groups of the twentieth century. It has transitioned beyond its original structure and now represents a multigenerational threat with staying power comparable to the enthonationalist groups of the twentieth century. Likewise, arguments about whether al-Qaeda is best described primarily as an ideology or by its opposition to foreign occupation of Muslim lands are specious: al-Qaeda’s adherents use both rationales to spread their links. The movement is opportunistic. The challenge for the United States and its allies is to move beyond rigid mind-sets and paradigms, do more in-depth analysis, and be more nimble and strategic in response to al-Qaeda’s fluid agenda.

The third and fourth models of a terrorist organization’s end—achievement of the group’s cause and transition toward a political role, negotiations, or amnesty—also bear little relevance to al-Qaeda today. It is hard to conceive of al-Qaeda fully achieving its aims, in part because those aims have evolved over time, variably including achievement of a pan-Islamic caliphate, the overthrow of non-Islamic regimes, and the expulsion of all infidels from Muslim countries, not to mention support for the Palestinian cause and the killing of Americans and other so-called infidels. Historically, terrorist groups that have achieved their ends have done so by articulating clear, limited objectives. Al-Qaeda’s goals, at least as articulated over recent years, could not be achieved without overturning an international political and economic system characterized by globalization and predominant U.S. power. As the historical record indicates, negotiations or a transition to a legitimate political process requires feasible terms and a sense of stalemate in the struggle. Also, members of terrorist groups seeking negotiations often have an incentive to find a way out of what they consider a losing cause. None of this describes bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.

This points to another issue. As al-Qaeda has become a hybrid or “virtual organization,” rather than a coherent hierarchical organization, swallowing its propaganda and treating it as a unified whole is a mistake. It is possible that bin Laden and his lieutenants have attempted to cobble together such disparate entities (or those entities have opportunistically attached themselves to al-Qaeda) that they have stretched beyond the point at which their interests can be represented in this movement. Some of the local groups that have recently claimed an association with al-Qaeda have in the past borne more resemblance to ethnonationalist/separatist groups such as the PLO, the IRA, and the LTTE. Examples include local affiliates in Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. This is not to argue that these groups’ aims are rightful or that their tactics are legitimate. Rather, because of its obsession with the notion of a monolithic al-Qaeda, the United States is glossing over both the extensive local variation within terrorist groups and their different goals; these groups have important points of divergence with al-Qaeda’s agenda, and the United States does no one any favors by failing to seriously analyze and exploit those local differences (except perhaps al-Qaeda). The U.S. objective must be to enlarge the movement’s internal inconsistencies and differences. Al-Qaeda’s aims have become so sweeping that one might wonder whether they genuinely carry within them the achievement of specific local grievances. There is more hope of ending such groups through traditional methods if they are dealt with using traditional tools, even including, on a case-by-case basis, concessions or negotiations with specific local elements that may have negotiable or justifiable terms (albeit pursued through an illegitimate tactic). The key is to emphasize the differences with al-Qaeda’s agenda and to drive a wedge between the movement and its recent adherents.

The historical record of other terrorist groups indicates that it is a mistake to treat al-Qaeda as a monolith, to lionize it as if it is an unprecedented phenomenon with all elements equally committed to its aims, for that eliminates a range of proven counterterrorist tools and techniques for ending it. It is also a mistake to nurture al-Qaeda’s rallying point, a hatred of Americans and a resentment of U.S. policies (especially in Iraq and between Israel and the Palestinians), thereby conveniently facilitating the glossing over of differences within. Fifth, reducing popular support, both active and passive, is an effective means of hastening the demise of some terrorist groups. This technique has received much attention among critics of George W. Bush and his administration’s policies, many of whom argue that concentrating on the “roots” of terrorism is a necessary alternative to the current policy of emphasizing military force.

This is a superficial argument, however, as it can be countered that a “roots” approach is precisely at the heart of current U.S. policy: the promotion of democracy may be seen as an idealistic effort to provide an alternative to populations in the Muslim world, frustrated by corrupt governance, discrimination, unemployment, and stagnation. But the participants in this debate are missing the point. The problem is timing: democratization is a decades-long approach to a short-term and immediate problem whose solution must also be measured in months, not just years. The efforts being undertaken are unlikely to have a rapid enough effect to counter the anger, frustration, and sense of humiliation that characterize passive supporters. As for those who actively sustain the movement through terrorist acts, it is obviously a discouraging development that many recent operatives have lived in, or even been natives of, democratic countries—the March 2004 train attacks in Madrid and 2005 bombings in London being notable examples.

The history of terrorism provides little comfort to those who believe that democratization is a good method to reduce active and passive support for terrorist attacks. There is no evidence that democratization correlates with a reduction in terrorism; in fact, available historical data suggest the opposite. Democratization was arguably the cause of much of the terrorism of the twentieth century. Moreover, democracy in the absence of strong political institutions and civil society could very well bring about radical Islamist governments over which the West would have little inºuence. There are much worse things than terrorism, and it might continue to be treated as a regrettable but necessary accompaniment to change were it not for two potentially serious developments in the twenty-first century: (1) the use of increasingly destructive weapons that push terrorist attacks well beyond the “nuisance” level, and (2) the growing likelihood that terrorism will lead to future systemic war. In any case, the long-term, idealistic, and otherwise admirable policy of democratization, viewed as “Americanization” in many parts of the world, does not represent a sufficiently targeted response to undercutting popular support for al-Qaeda.

There are two vulnerabilities, however, where cutting the links between al-Qaeda and its supporters hold promise: its means of funding and its means of communication. Efforts to cut off funding through traditional avenues have had some results. But not nearly enough attention is being paid to twenty-first-century communications, especially al-Qaeda’s presence on the internet. The time has come to recognize that the stateless, anarchical realm of cyberspace requires better tools for monitoring, countermeasures, and, potentially, even control. Previous leaps in cross-border communication such as the telegraph, radio, and telephone engendered counteracting developments in code breaking, monitoring, interception, and wiretapping. This may seem a heretical suggestion for liberal states, especially for a state founded on the right of free speech; however, the international community will inevitably be driven to take countermeasures in response to future attacks. It is time to devote more resources to addressing this problem now. Western analysts have been misguided in focusing on the potential use of the internet for so-called cyberterrorism (i.e., its use in carrying out attacks); the internet is far more dangerous as a tool to shore up and perpetuate the al-Qaeda movement’s constituency.

Preventing or interdicting al-Qaeda’s ability to disseminate its message and draw adherents into its orbit is crucial. Countering its messages in serious ways, not through the outdated and stilted vehicles of government websites and official statements but through sophisticated alternative sites and images attractive to a new generation, is an urgent priority.

As for the opponent’s marketing strategy, al-Qaeda and its associates have made serious mistakes of timing, choice of targets, and technique; yet the United States and its allies have done very little to capitalize on them. In particular, the United States tends to act as if al-Qaeda is essentially a static enemy that will react to its actions, but then fails to react effectively and strategically to the movement’s missteps.

The Bali attacks, the May 2003 attacks in Saudi Arabia, the Madrid attacks, the July 2005 London attacks—all were immediately and deliberately trumpeted by al-Qaeda associates. Where was the coordinated counterterrorist multimedia response? There is nothing so effective at engendering public revulsion as images of murdered and maimed victims, many of whom resemble family members of would-be recruits, lying on the ground as the result of a terrorist act. Outrage is appropriate. Currently, however, those images are dominated by would-be family members in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay.

The West is completely outºanked on the airwaves, and its countermeasures are virtually nonexistent on the internet. But as the RIRA, PFLP-GC, and ETA cases demonstrate, the al-Qaeda movement can undermine itself, if it is given help. A large part of this “war” is arguably being fought not on a battlefield but in cyberspace. The time-honored technique of undermining active and passive support for a terrorist group through in-depth analysis, agile responses to missteps, carefully targeted messages, and cutting-edge technological solutions is a top priority.

This is a crucial moment of opportunity. Polls indicate that many of al-Qaeda’s potential constituents have been deeply repulsed by recent attacks. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, publics in many predominantly Muslim states increasingly see Islamic extremism as a threat to their own countries, express less support for terrorism, have less confidence in bin Laden, and reflect a declining belief in the usefulness of suicide attacks. In these respects, there is a growing range of commonality in the attitudes of Muslim and non-Muslim publics; yet the United States focuses on itself and does little to nurture cooperation. American public diplomacy is the wrong concept. This is not about the United States and its ideals, values, culture, and image abroad: this is about tapping into a growing international norm against killing innocent civilians—whether, for example, on vacation or on their way to work or school—many of whom are deeply religious and many of whom also happen to be Muslims. If the United States and its allies fail to grasp this concept, to work with local cultures and local people to build on common goals and increase their alienation from this movement, then they will have missed a long-established and promising technique for ending a terrorist group such as al-Qaeda.

There is little to say about the sixth factor, the use of military repression, in ending al-Qaeda. Even though the U.S. military has made important progress in tracking down and killing senior operatives, the movement’s ability to evolve has demonstrated the limits of such action, especially when poorly coordinated with other comparatively underfunded approaches and engaged in by a democracy. Although apparently effective, the Turkish government’s repression of the PKK and the Peruvian government’s suppression of Shining Path, for example, yield few desirable parallels for the current counterterrorist campaign.

Transitioning out of terrorism and toward either criminality or full insurgency is the final, worrisome historical precedent for al-Qaeda. In a sense, the network is already doing both. Efforts to cut off funding through the formal banking system have ironically heightened the incentive and necessity to en-gage in illicit activities, especially narcotics trafficking. With the increasing amount of poppy seed production in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has a natural pipeline to riches. This process is well under way. As for al-Qaeda becoming a full insurgency, some analysts believe this has already occurred. Certainly to the extent that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his associates in Iraq truly represent an arm of the movement (i.e., al-Qaeda in Iraq), that transition is likewise well along.

The alliance negotiated between bin Laden and al-Zarqawi is another example of an effective strategic and public relations move for both parties, giving new life to the al-Qaeda movement at a time when its leaders are clearly on the run and providing legitimacy and fresh recruits for the insurgency in Iraq. As many commentators have observed, Iraq is an ideal focal point and training ground for this putative global insurgency. The glimmer of hope in this scenario, however, is that the foreigners associated with al-Qaeda are not tied to the territory of Iraq in the same way the local population is, and the tensions that will arise between those who want a future for the nascent Iraqi state and those who want a proving ground for a largely alien ideology and virtual organization are likely to increase—especially as the victims of the civil war now unfolding there continue increasingly to be Iraqi civilians. The counter to al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq, as it is for other areas of the world with local al-Qaeda affiliates, is to tap into the long-standing and deep association between peoples and their territory and to exploit the inevitable resentment toward foreign terrorist agendas, while scrupulously ensuring that the United States is not perceived to be part of those agendas.

If the United States continues to treat al-Qaeda as if it were utterly unprecedented, as if the decades-long experience with fighting modern terrorism were totally irrelevant, then it will continue to make predictable and avoidable mistakes in responding to this threat. It will also miss important strategic opportunities. That experience points particularly toward dividing new local affiliates from al-Qaeda by understanding and exploiting their differences with the movement, rather than treating the movement as a monolith. It is also crucial to more effectively break the political and logistical connections between the movement and its supporters, reinvigorating time-honored counterterrorism tactics targeted at al-Qaeda’s unique characteristics, including the perpetuation of its message, its funding, and its communications. Al-Qaeda continues to exploit what is essentially a civil war within the Muslim world, attracting alien-ated Muslims around the globe to its rage-filled movement. Al-Qaeda will end when the West removes itself from the heart of this fight, shores up international norms against terrorism, undermines al-Qaeda’s ties with its followers, and begins to exploit the movement’s abundant missteps.

Conclusion

Major powers regularly relearn a seminal lesson of strategic planning, which is that embarking on a long war or campaign without both a grounding in previous experience and a realistic projection of an end state is folly. This is just as true in response to terrorism as it is with more conventional forms of political violence. Terrorism is an illegitimate tactic that by its very nature is purposefully and ruthlessly employed. At the heart of a terrorist’s plan is seizing and maintaining the initiative. Policymakers who have no concept of a feasible outcome are unlikely to formulate clear steps to reach it, especially once they are compelled by the inexorable action/reaction, offense/defense dynamic that all too often drives terrorism and counterterrorism. Although history does not repeat itself, ignoring history is the surest way for a state to be manipulated by the tactic of terrorism.

At the highest levels, U.S. counterterrorism policy has been formulated organically and instinctively, in reaction to external stimuli or on the basis of unexamined assumptions, with a strong bias toward U.S. exceptionalism. Sound counterterrorism policy should be based on the full range of historical lessons learned about which policies have worked, and under which conditions, to hasten terrorism’s decline and demise. Treating al-Qaeda as if it were sui generis is a mistake. As I have argued here, while there are unique aspects to this threat, there are also connections with earlier threats. Speaking of an unprecedented “jihadist” threat, while arguably resonating in a U.S. domestic context, only perpetuates the image and perverse romanticism of the al-Qaeda movement abroad, making its ideology more attractive to potential recruits. Such an approach also further undermines any inclination by the United States to review and understand the relationship between historical instances of terrorism and the contemporary plotting of a strategy for accelerating al-Qaeda’s demise. In short, formulating U.S. counterterrorism strategy as if no other state has ever faced an analogous threat is a serious blunder.

Comparatively speaking, the United States has not had a great deal of experience with terrorism on its territory. In this respect, its response to the shock of al-Qaeda’s attacks is understandable. But the time for a learning curve is past. Intellectually, it is always much easier to over-or underreact to terrorist attacks than it is to take the initiative and think through the scenarios for how a terrorist group, and a counterterrorist effort, will wind down. Short-term reactive thinking is misguided for two reasons: the extraordinary and expensive effort to end terrorism will be self-perpetuating, and the inept identification of U.S. aims will ensure that the application of means is unfocused and ill informed by past experience. Failing to think through al-Qaeda’s termination, and how U.S. policy either advances or precludes it, is an error not only for the Bush administration, criticized by some for allegedly wanting an excuse to hype a permanent threat, but also for any administration of either political party that succeeds or replaces it.

Terrorism, like war, never ends; however, individual terrorist campaigns and the groups that wage them always do. A vague U.S. declaration of a war on terrorism has brought with it a vague concept of the closing stages of al-Qaeda rather than a compelling road map for how it will be reduced to the level of a minor threat. The only outcome that is inevitable in the current U.S. policy is that militarily focused efforts will end, because of wasteful or counterproductive effort and eventual exhaustion. The threat is real and undeniable, but continuing an ahistorical approach to effecting al-Qaeda’s end is a recipe for failure, the further alienation of allies, and the squandering of U.S. power.

WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA

16 April 2012

Al-Qaeda

Introduction

Al-Qaeda in Kashmir

Insurgency of Militants in Kashmir Valley

Al-Qaeda in South Africa

Leaders of Al-Qaeda

Islamic Terrorism

Al-Qaeda and Armed Massacres

Al-Qaeda and Religious Terrorism

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia

Al-Qaeda’s Future

Links between Beginnings and Endings

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